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Abstract 
 Prevalentemente in risposta alla crisi del debito pubblico, il processo di integrazione 
politica europea sembra in procinto di raggiungere nuovi traguardi. Ciò pone a propria 
volta la necessità di riflettere sulla nascita di una cultura giuridica comune a molti 
ordinamenti che si stanno progressivamente avvicinando l'un l'altro sotto molteplici 
aspetti. Un aspetto importante di questa riflessione attiene al "problema linguistico": 
infatti, più quote di sovranità vengono trasferite dagli Stati Membri alle istituzioni di 
Bruxelles, più diviene fondamentale che tali istituzioni parlino nella lingua che i popoli 
europei comprendono meglio, il che significa normalmente la loro lingua nazionale. 
Ciò pone una sfida notevole per l'UE: se vuole realmente assicurare il rispetto della 
"diversità linguistica" (ora riconosciuta dall'art. 22 della Carta dei Diritti 
Fondamentali dell'Unione Europea e, dopo il Trattato di Lisbona, dall'art. 3(3) del 
TEU), deve consentire ad ogni cittadino europeo di parlare in una qualunque delle 
ventitré lingue ufficiali, e allo stesso tempo deve imporgli i propri comandi nella sua 
lingua lui. 
Lo studio del caso canadese è particolarmente utile a comprendere questa sfida: con le sue 
due lingue ufficiali, l'inglese e il francese, il Canada ne ha infatti conosciuta a lungo una 
simile. In questo Paese, riconoscere a ciascuna comunità, quella anglofona e quella 
francofona, il diritto di avere tutti i documenti ufficiali scritti nella propria lingua è stato 
un modo per proteggere le rispettive identità. In particolare, l'opzione bilingue adottata 
dalla federazione canadese ha tradizionalmente consentito alla minoranza francofona di 
salvaguardare un elemento essenzionale del proprio patrimonio culturale. Tuttavia, 
quest'opzione scelta a livello federale fa spazio a un modello di regolamentazione 
improntato a un forte separatismo all'interno della Provincia del Quebec, dove la 
popolazione di lingua francese è largamente predominante. 
La coesistenza delle due comunità solleva diverse questioni per i giuristi. In questo 
lavoro, l'attenzione è rivolta principalmente sul classico problema costituzionale di quali 
diritti sono riconosciuti alla minoranza linguistica: vengono passate in rassegna le 
principali pronunce della Corte Suprema del Canada in tema di diritti linguistici. Dopo 
un'introduzione (§ 1), e un breve resoconto delle disposizioni costituzionali rilevanti (§ 
2), della controversia sui poteri delle province in materia di modifiche costituzionali 
incidenti sulla loro competenza (§ 3), e delle regole principali nell'applicazione 
quotidiana del bilinguismo canadese (§ 4), l'articolo segue un ordine cronologico, 
esaminando le sentenze e analizzando le questioni principali che esse rispettivamente 
hanno sollevati (§ 5); nel paragrafo conclusivo, vengono svolte alcune considerazioni 
(prevalentemente critiche) sul modo in cui i diritti linguistici sono stati declinati 
nell'esperienza costituzionale canadese (§ 6). 
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 Principally in response to the public debt crisis, the process of European political 
integration appears about to make further advances. This, in turn, brings a need to 
reflect on the emergence of a new legal culture shared by many legal systems that are 
gradually moving closer to each other in many ways. The language issue is an important 
aspect of this: the greater the sovereignty transferred by the Member States to the Brussels 
institutions, the more essential it becomes that these institutions speak the languages that 
Europeans know best, generally their national language.   
This poses a considerable challenge to the EU, where language diversity is now recognised 
under Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and, 
after the Lisbon  Treaty, under Article 3 (3) of the TEU. If  the EU truly intends to 
guarantee that language diversity is respected, it must allow every EU citizen to speak 
any of the 23 official languages and, at the same time, issue its rules in every citizen’s 
own language. 
A useful key to understanding the EU situation is provided by Canada, which, with its 
two official languages, French and English, has long faced a similar challenge.  It has 
been possible to protect the identities of both the English-speaking and the French-
speaking communities by recognising that both communities are entitled to have all 
written documents drafted in their own language.  However, this federal-level decision has 
led to a model of regulation that is marked by strong separatism in the Province of 
Quebec, where the French-speaking population constitutes a significant majority. 
The co-existence of the two communities raises several issues for legal scholars. This paper 
looks primarily at the classic constitutional problem of the rights that the linguistic 
minority are entitled to, and a review is provided of the main rulings issued by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. After the introduction (§ 1), and a short survey of relevant 
constitutional provisions (§ 2), an account is provided of the debate over the Provinces’ 
powers when constitutional amendments impinge on their sphere of activity (§ 3), and the 
key regulations relating to the day-to-day administration of Canadian bilingualism are 
described (§ 4). The article then examines cases and key issues arising from them, in 
chronological order (§ 5). The last chapter provides a critical evaluation of the way in 
which language rights have been shaped in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence (§ 6). 
 
Keywords: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - language 
diversity - Supreme Court of Canada 
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1. Introduction: studying Canada, with an eye on the EU 
While new, major steps are being made towards the political integration of 
Europe,1 the "linguistic problem" becomes all the more crucial: the more 
sovereignty is transferred to Brussels institutions, the more important it is, in 
order to comply with the principle of respect for "linguistic diversity,"2 that 
                                                 
                                                
*Assegnista di ricerca at the Università degli Studi di Torino, Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza. I 
would like to thank my former classmate at LSE Grégoire Poulin for his great help, 
particularly in the early stages of  my research. 
1 The latest milestone in this process was the agreement reached by all the EU Members, 
except for the UK, at the European Council in Brussels of  8-9 December 2011: see the 
conclusive Statement by the Euro Area Heads of  State or Government, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata /en/ec/126658.pdf  
(last accessed 31 Jan 2012). 
2 Such principle is now enshrined in art. 22 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the 
European Union and, after the Lisbon Treaty, in art. 3(3) of  the TEU, but was already part of  
the acquis communautaire: see the 2007 study by G Rolla and E Ceccherini, 'Il riconoscimento 
delle diversità culturali e linguistiche nell'ordinamento costituzionale europeo' [2007] 9(2) 
DPCE 660, and in particular § 6, 669-678, by E Ceccherini. See now Xabier Arzoz, 'The 
protection of  linguistic diversity through Article 22 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights' 
in X Arzoz (ed), Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union (John Benjamins 2008), p. 
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such institutions speak in the language that the European peoples better 
understand,3 which normally means their own respective languages.4 
Therefore, the EU legal system faces the great challenge of telling the 
same thing in 23 different ways, as many as the number of the European 
official languages:5 such task is all but simple, as was shown in several cases 
argued before the European courts, where the question arose of some pieces 
of legislation which had different meanings in different linguistic versions;6 
                                                 
                                                
145, but also Bruno de Witte, 'The protection of  linguistic diversity through provisions of  
the EU Charter other than Article 22', ibidem, p. 175. In the European context, the picture is 
completed by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, promoted by the Council 
of  Europe, adopted in 1992, in force since 1998, and currently ratified by twenty-five states 
(as explained in the dedicated page on the Council of  Europe's website, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/aboutcharter/default_en.asp, last accessed 20 
Feb 2012). 
3 Broadly on this issue, see R Sacco and L Castellani (eds), Les multiples langues du droit européen 
uniforme (L'Harmattan Italia 1999). 
4 This relates to any EU official act, not limited to what is provided in articles 20(2)(d) and 24 
TFEU, which respectively state: 'Citizens of  the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject 
to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: [...] (d) the right to 
petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the 
institutions and advisory bodies of  the Union in any of  the Treaty languages and to obtain a 
reply in the same language;' 'Every citizen of  the Union may write to any of  the institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies referred to in this Article or in Article 13 of  the Treaty on 
European Union in one of  the languages mentioned in Article 55(1) of  the Treaty on 
European Union and have an answer in the same language.' Similarly, art. 41(4) of  the Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union stipulates that '[e]very person may write to the 
institutions of  the Union in one of  the languages of  the Treaties and must have an answer in 
the same language.' 
5 As provided for by Council of  the European Economic Community Regulation (EEC) No 
1/58 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community [1958] OJ L17, as 
repeatedly amended. 
6 The most recent example to our knowledge is Case C-567/10 Inter-Environnement Bruxelles 
ASBL and Others (17 November 2011), Opinion of  AG Kokott, available (in French and 
German only) at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010CC0567:FR:HTML (last 
accessed 31 Jan 2012), para 17: see also the cases mentioned therein, in footnotes 4 and 5. 
Another interesting judgment was the one issued by the ECJ in the Case C-385/02, 
Commission v. Italy (14 September 2004): even though the Italian version of  art. 7(3)(e) of  the 
Council Directive 93/37/EEC of  14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of  procedures for the award 
of  public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 54) could have justified the Italian authorities' 
behaviour under scrutiny, the Danish, English, Spanish and Portuguese versions clearly 
outlawed it, thus leading to conclude that the Italian government had not made an "excusable 
error" (in the Italian scholarship, see the case-note by Fabrizio Cassella, 'La comparazione 
delle versioni linguistiche è indispensabile per l'interpretazione delle disposizioni comunitarie' 
[2005] 7(1) DPCE 361. But at least also a ruling by the Court of  First Instance (now General 
Court) deserves to be mentioned: in the Case T-143/89, Ferriere Nord v. Commission (6 April 
1995), the Court explicitly ruled that a linguistic version of  a EC Treaty provision had to give 
way to other versions, even though clearly expressed (see Richard Wainwright, 'Drafting and 
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also, the EU faces two almost opposite needs, i.e. promoting unity while at the 
same time safeguarding diversity,7 and it is very hard to find an adequate 
balance between the two.8 
                                                 
                                                
interpretation of  multilingual texts of  the European Community' in R Sacco (ed), 
L'intérpretation des textes juridiques rédigés dans plus d'une langue (L'Harmattan 
2002), p. 320, 321-2). More deeply, see also the ECJ case-law analysis by Mario Comba, 
'Divergenze nei testi giuridici multilingui dell'Unione Europea' in R Raus (ed), 
Multilinguismo e terminologia nell'Unione Europea. Problematiche e prospettive (Hoepli 
2010), p. 13, 38-46, from which it emerges that the ECJ has consistently held that, in case of  
doubts arising in the interpretation of  a EU law provision, the interpretation must be 
conducted by looking at other linguistic versions). 
The studies in English on the EU linguistic policies and on the principles applied by the EU 
courts in interpreting multilingual legislation, are extremely numerous: inter alia, see A L Kjær 
and S Adamo (eds), Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy (Ashgate 2011); Elina Paunio 
and Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, 'Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of  Linguistic 
Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law ' [2010] 16(4) Eur. L. J. 395; Mattias Derlén, 
Multilingual interpretation of  European Union law (Kluwer Law International 2009); Lawrence M. 
Solan, 'The Interpretation of  Multilingual Statutes by the European Court of  Justice' [2009] 
34(2) Brook. J. Int'l L. 277; Bruno de Witte, 'Language Law of  the European Union: 
Protecting or Eroding Linguistic Diversity?' in R C Smith (ed), Culture and European Union 
Law (Oxford University Press 2004), p. 221; in the already mentioned work by R Sacco (ed), 
L'intérpretation des textes juridiques rédigés dans plus d'une langue, the works by the 
same Rodolfo Sacco, 'L'interprète et la règle de droit européenne,' p. 226, Susan Šarčević, 
'Problems of  interpretation in an enlarged European Union,' p. 239, and Richard 
Wainwright, 'Drafting and interpretation of  multilingual texts of  the European Community,' 
p. 320 (already mentioned); Arzoz (ed) Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union; 
Marie-Pascale Heusse, 'Le multilinguisme ou le défi caché de l'Union européenne' [1999] Rev. Marché 
Comm. Un. Eur No. 426, 202; Geert Van Calster, 'The EU's Tower of  Babel—The 
Interpretation by the European Court of  Justice of  Equally Authentic Texts Drafted in more 
than one Official Language' [1997] 17(1) Yearbook Eur. L. 363; Nial Fennelly, 'Legal 
Interpretation at the European Court of  Justice' [1996] 20(3) Fordham Int'l L. J. 656. Among 
the most recent studies in Italian, see, on top of  Mario Comba's already mentioned article, the 
various articles in issue no. 3 of  2011 of  the law review Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, 
in the section edited by Lucio Pegoraro e Maria Paola Viviani Schlein, 'Sfide traduttive nel 
diritto comparato. Alcune questioni aperte': see in particular the introducting article by 
Viviani Schlein ('Premessa,' p. 647), and the following ones: Barbara Pozzo, 'La traduzione 
dall'inglese come lingua giuridica nel contesto del multilinguismo europeo: problemi e 
prospettive,' p. 651; Valentina Jacometti, 'La redazione di testi giuridici multilingui nelle 
organizzazioni internazionali e nell'Unione europea,' p. 693; Sergio Gerotto, 'Lost (and 
Found) in Translation, ovvero l'esperienza della traduzione dei testi normativi in Svizzera e 
Canada,' p. 714. 
7 The European motto "united in diversity," chosen in 2000, was included among the 
"symbols of  the Union" in art. I-8 of  the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: the failure 
of  such enterprise stands as a very good example of  how hard it actually is to achieve "unity 
in diversity;" for a reflection in the same vein in the Italian literature, in light of  the economic 
and financial crisis that the EU has been experiencing in the recent years, see Riccardo de 
Caria, Post-Crisis Perspectives in Europe on State Intervention in the Economy: So Long to “United in 
Diversity”?, in M Rogoff  (ed), The Financial Crisis of  2008: French and American Responses 
(University of  Maine School of  Law 2011) p. 325; on the history and meaning of  this motto, 
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Studying the Canadian example is quite useful from this perspective.9 
Indeed, with its two official languages, English and French, Canada has long 
experienced a similar challenge.10 
Affording each community, the English-speaking and the French-
speaking, the right to have all the official documents written in their respective 
language has been a way to protect their identities. In particular, the bilingual 
option adopted by the Canadian federation has allowed the French-speaking 
minority to safeguard a key feature of its cultural heritage. However, the 
bilingual option chosen at the federal level makes way to a strongly separatist 
model of regulation within the Province of Quebec, where the French-
speaking population is by far the majority.11 
                                                 
see also Elisabetta Palici di Suni, 'I simboli dell'Unione Europea. Come rappresentare unità e 
diversità' in R Mazzola and I Zuanazzi, Aequitas sive Deus. Studi in onore di Rinaldo Bertolino 
(Giappichelli 2011), volume II, p. 1463, 1465. 
8 The tension between these the two poles is touched on for instance, in the Italian 
scholarship, by Elena Ioriatti Ferrari, 'Lingua e diritto in Europa: multilinguismo, pluralismo 
linguistico e terminologia giuridica uniforme nel diritto europeo dei contratti' [2005] 7(4) 
DPCE 1549; see also Gianmaria Ajani and Piercarlo Rossi, 'Coerenza del diritto privato 
europeo e multilinguismo', in V Jacometti and B Pozzo (eds), Le politiche linguistiche delle 
istituzioni comunitarie dopo l’allargamento: redazione, traduzione e interpretazione degli atti 
giuridici comunitari e il loro impatto sull'armonizzazione del diritto europeo (Giuffré 
2006), p. 119, 126-7 and following, where the authors raise the problem of  how the unitary 
but multilingual EU law can coexist in its day-to-day enforcement with the law of  the various 
Member States, each of  them having their own respective languages. 
9 It is what is done for instance by the already mentioned articles by Gerotto, 'Lost (and 
Found) in Translation, ovvero l'esperienza della traduzione dei testi normativi in Svizzera e 
Canada,' and by Comba, 'Divergenze nei testi giuridici multilingui dell'Unione Europea,' pp. 
19-21. In the scholarship in English, interesting comparisons between Canada and the EU 
are drawn for instance by Aileen Doetsch, Rendre le droit avec justesse. Les méthodes de 
production de textes législatifs plurilingues. Une comparaison Union européenne - Canada 
(P.U. Strasbourg 2008) (focusing on the drafting phase), and more generally in the articles in 
issue no. 1-2 of  2000 of  the Revue de la common law en français, with a foreword by 
Nicholas Kasirer and Gérard Snow, 'Harmonisation et Dissonance : Langues et Droit au 
Canada et en Europe,' p. 1. 
10 For a historical background, see for example Michael MacMillan, 'Federal Language Policy 
in Canada and the Quebec Challenge' in P Larrivée (ed), Linguistic Conflict and Language Laws. 
Understanding the Quebec Question (Palgrave MacMillan 2003), p. 87, 88; Frank M. Lowrey, IV, 
'Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism and National Unity' [1992] 41 Emory L. J. 
223, 224-8; Michel Bastarache, 'Language Rights in the Supreme Court of  Canada: The 
Perspective of  Chief  Justice Dickson' [1991] 20 Man. L.J. 392, 392-5; in Italian, see also, 
among many: Tania Groppi, 'La difficile nascita della nazione in Canada: l'integrazione (o la 
disgregazione?) attraverso i diritti' [2001] 13(3) DPCE 1130, 1130-9; Elisabetta Palici di Suni, 
Intorno alle minoranze (2nd edn, Giappichelli 2002), pp. 148-50; Marie Claude Barbier, 'La 
legislazione sul bilinguismo in Canada' in G Rolla (ed) Lo sviluppo dei diritti fondamentali in 
Canada. Tra universalità e diversità culturale (Giuffrè 2000), p. 267, 267-73. 
11 Palici di Suni, Intorno alle minoranze, pp. 160-1. 
  
7 
Thus, the coexistence of the two communities raises at least two orders 
of questions for lawyers: on the one hand, the classic constitutional issue of 
what rights are afforded to the linguistic minority, and on the other, the 
problems of "traductology,"12 namely the difficulties faced in the drafting and 
enforcement of official legislation in two different languages, and the 
principles elaborated by the courts to cope with them. 
In Canada, such issues have a rather distinctive feature, namely that 
bilingualism is coupled with the co-existence of two different legal systems 
(something often referred to as bijuralism13), and this raises several questions 
                                                 
                                                
12 Generally on this subject, see the work by Rodolfo Sacco and others, The new Ambitions 
of  Legal Science: Legal Anthropology and legal Traductology (Accademia Nazionale 
dei Lincei 2009) and, by the same author, R Sacco (ed), L'interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés 
dans plus d'une langue (L'Harmattan Italia 2002) (specifically on Canada within this work, see 
Pierre-André Côté, 'L’interprétation des textes législatifs bilingues au Canada,' p. 7, but see 
also some hints to the Canadian situation in the contribution by Jean-Claude Gémar, 
'L'interprétation du texte juridique ou le dilemme du traducteur,' p. 103); see also Gerhard 
Dannemann, Silvia Ferreri and Michele Graziadei, 'Language and terminology,' in C Twigg-
Flessner (ed), The Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2010), p. 70; F Olsen, A Lorz and D Stein (eds), Translation Issues in Language and Law 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2009); Deborah Cao, 'Inter-lingual uncertainty in bilingual and 
multilingual law' [2007] 39(1) Journal of  Pragmatics 69; Antonio Gambaro, 'Interpretation of  
Multilingual Legislative Texts', in K Boele-Woelki ans S van Erp (eds), General Reports of  the 
17. Congress of  the International Academy of  Comparative Law (Eleven International 2007); J-C 
Gémar and N Kasirer (eds), Jurilinguistics: Between Law and Language (Thémis-Bruylant 2005). 
Specifically on multilingualism within the EU context, see, among many: Theodor Schilling, 
'Beyond Multilingualism: On Different Approaches to the Handling of  Diverging Language 
Versions of  a Community Law' [2010] 16(1) Eur. Law J. 47; G Ajani, G Peruginelli, G Sartor 
and D Tiscornia (eds), The Multilanguage Complexity of  European Law (European Press 2007); 
Richard Creech, Law and Language in the European Union: The Paradox of  a Babel "United in 
Diversity" (Europa Law Publishing 2005); Kaisa Koskinen, Translating Institutions. An 
Ethnographic Study of  EU Translation (St Jerome Publishing 2008); B Pozzo and V Jacometti 
(eds), Multilingualism and the Harmonisation of  European Law (Kluwer Law International 2006); 
Nikolaus Urban, 'One Legal Language and the Maintenance of  Cultural and Linguistic 
Diversity' [2000] 8(1) Eur. Rev. Priv. Law 51. In Italian, see also J Visconti (ed), Lingua e diritto: 
livelli di analisi (LED 2010), and in particular the works by Gianmaria Ajani, 'Il problema del 
multilinguismo,' p. 21, and Silvia Ferreri, 'La lingua del legislatore europeo,' p. 247; but see also, 
for a general theoretical inquiry on the hurdles faced in the task of  translating any type of  
text from a language into another one, Umberto Eco, Dire quasi la stessa cosa. Esperienze di 
traduzione (Bompiani 2003). In French, see François Ost, Traduire. Défense et illustration du 
multilinguisme (Fayard 2009). 
13 On the Canadian bijuralism, see, inter alia, Marie-Claude Gaudreault, 'Canadian Legislative 
Bijuralism: An Expression of  Legal Duality' [2006] 32(2) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 205; 
Berverly McLachlin, 'Canadian Bijuralism: A Conversation of  Cultures' [2006] 19(2) British J. 
of  Can. Studies 151; Ruth Sullivan, 'The Challenges of  Interpreting Multilingual, Multijural 
Legislation' [2004] 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 985, 1022-54; Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, Bijuralism: A 
Supreme Court of  Canada Justice's Perspective [2002] 62(2) La. L. Rev. 449; see also the booklets on 
the website of  the Department of  Justice of  Canada, in the series The Harmonization of  
Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of  the Province of  Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, available at 
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when it comes to the enforcement of substantive civil law in English, and vice 
versa, substantive common law in French.14 
The present article predominantly addresses the former order of 
problems, reviewing the most important rulings of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the matter of linguistic rights,15 (limiting our investigation to the 
relationship between the anglophone and the francophone communities, and 
thus leaving aside the details of the aboriginal peoples of Canada's question 
and the broader discourse on multiculturalism, that will be anyway touched on 
briefly in the last paragraph):16 after a brief survey of the relevant 
constitutional provisions (§ 2), of the controversy on the powers of provinces 
over constitutional amendments affecting their competence (§ 3), and of the 
most important rules guiding the day-to-day administration of Canadian 
bilingualism (§ 4), the article follows a chronological order, going over the 
cases and analysing for each of them the key issues that they respectively 
raised (§ 5); in the last paragraph, some conclusive (mostly critical) remarks are 
offered (§ 6).17 
                                                 
                                                
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/hfl-hlf/index.html (last accessed 26 Feb 2012); 
finally, let us recall Doetsch, Rendre le droit avec justesse. Les méthodes de production de textes législatifs 
plurilingues. Une comparaison Union européenne - Canada, pp. 41-50, according to whom Canadian 
law provides in fact four possible linguistic combinations: civil-law in French or in English, 
common-law in French or in English. 
14 Such questions are hinted at very clearly by Rodolfo Sacco, 'Lingua e diritto' [2000] 5 Ars 
interpretandi 117, 127-32. See also, inter alia, Claude Pardons, 'Élaboration d’une terminologie 
française de common law. Réflexions sur les travaux du PAJLO au cours des dix dernières 
années' in G Snow and J Vanderlinden (eds), Français juridique et science du droit (Bruylant 1995), 
p. 279. The case of  substantive civil-law to be applied in English can typically arise in 
Quebec, while the opposite situation is typical for instance of  New Brunswick (on which see 
infra, §§ 2.1 and 2.3). 
15 Indeed, as explained by Marie-Ève Hudon, 'The Role of  the Courts in the Recognition of  
Language Rights' (Library of  Parliament, Ottawa 2011), Publication No. 2011-68-E, available 
at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content /LOP/Research Publications /2011-68-e.pdf  (last 
accessed 31 Jan 2012), p. 13, '[t]he courts have contributed much to the recognition of  
language rights in Canada.' See also the reflection by Roger Bilodeau, 'La judiciarisation des 
conflits linguistiques au Canada' [1986] 27 C. de D. 215, 222-5 (the author explains here how 
he brought litigation using a unilingual traffic summons he received in Manitoba to further 
the French-speaking community's linguistic rights: the case is considered infra, at § 5.4). 
16 Multiculturalism and protection of  minority languages are not easily made coherent with 
the two-official langugages policy: on the relationship between the two sometimes opposite 
poles, see for instance Jean-Claude Corbeil, 'L'embarras des langues: origine, conception et 
évolution de la politique linguistique québecoise' (Québec Amérique 2007), in particular pp. 
217-21; in the Italian scholarship, see e.g. Carlo Amirante, 'Sistema federale e tutela dei diritti 
delle minoranze linguistiche ed etniche. Il caso canadese tra bilinguismo e multiculturalismo' 
in S Gambino and G Fabbrini (eds), Regione e governo locale fra decentramento istituzionale e riforme. 
Esperienze e culture a confronto (Rimini 1997), p. 199. 
17 We will quote extensively from the Supreme Court opinions, deeming it useful in most 
cases to provide the reader with the original words chosen by the Supreme Court justices, 
 
5/2012 Working Paper CDCT‐ELC 
www.eulegalculture.di.unito.it 
  
9 
 
2. Constitutional and legislative background 
2.1 Relevant provisions in the Canadian constitutional documents 
The Constitution Act, 1867, formerly known as the British North America 
Act, 1867,18 already contained a provision on linguistic rights, namely section 
133. It reads: 
 
Either the English or the French Language may be used by any 
Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada 
and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those 
Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of 
those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any 
Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court 
of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of 
the Courts of Quebec. 
The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of 
Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.19 
 
More recently, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, namely Part I of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, drew upon the example of s. 133 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 and included several provisions on linguistic rights (under the 
heading Official languages of Canada), which have been in force ever since.20 
                                                 
                                                
rather than trying to paraphrase them; as for the legal scholarship, we will rely on works 
written in English, French or Italian. Two very detailed works, that are not mentioned 
hereinafter but that should always be considered when studying our topic, are: A Braën, P 
Foucher and Y Le Bouthillier (eds), Languages, Constitutionalism and Minorities (LexisNexis 
Canada 2006), a reprinting of  volumes 31 and 32 of  the Supreme Court Law Review, 2nd series, 
containing a great number of  articles on all sorts of  aspects of  linguistic policies, with 
predominant focus on the situation in Canada; and the classic, monumental study by M 
Bastarache (ed), Language Rights in Canada (2nd edn, Éditions Yvon Blais 2004). 
18 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. (U.K.). 
19 As pointed out by the Consolidated version of  Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, '[a] similar 
provision was enacted for Manitoba by section 23 of  the Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3 
(Canada), (confirmed by the Constitution Act, 1871).' 
20 According to a convincing interpretation, such provisions would be "doubly entrenched:" 
as explained by Justice Wilson in his dissent in MacDonald [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 192 (a case 
analysed infra, at § 5.5), '[i]t was clearly established in Blaikie No. 1 that the linguistic rights 
contained in s. 133 are entrenched rights in the sense that they cannot be diminished by the 
unilateral action of  any of  the legislative bodies to which they apply. This entrenched status 
is now reinforced through the amending procedures in the Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that linguistic rights because of  the amending procedures are now at the 
peak of  the constitutional pyramid coming ahead of  the "fundamental" freedoms set out in 
s. 2 of  the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms. They are in this sense "doubly 
entrenched"' (Justice Wilson references for this expression to André Tremblay, 'The Language 
Rights (Ss. 16 to 23),' in W S Tarnopolsky and G A Beaudoin (eds), The Canadian Charter of  
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In particular, s. 16(1) (Official languages of Canada) establishes English and 
French as the official languages of Canada, granting them 'equality of status 
and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the 
Parliament and government of Canada'; s. 17(1) (Proceedings of Parliament) 
stipulates that '[e]veryone has the right to use English or French in any debates 
and other proceedings of Parliament,' while according to s. 18(1) (Parliamentary 
statutes and records), '[t]he statutes, records and journals of Parliament shall be 
printed and published in English and French and both language versions are 
equally authoritative.' 
S. 19(1) (Proceedings in courts established by Parliament) adds that '[e]ither 
English or French may be used by any person in, or in any pleading in or 
process issuing from, any court established by Parliament,' while s. 20(1) deals 
with Communications by public with federal institutions: 'Any member of the public 
in Canada has the right to communicate with, and to receive available services 
from, any head or central office of an institution of the Parliament or 
government of Canada in English or French, and has the same right with 
respect to any other office of any such institution where (a) there is a 
significant demand for communications with and services from that office in 
such language; or (b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that 
communications with and services from that office be available in both 
English and French.' 
All the sections, from 16 to 20, also contain specific provisions for New Brunswick, that 
perfectly match the ones dictated for the federal level: New Brunswick is thus the only 
province that has agreed on a constitutional obligation to become officially bilingual.21 
Two final provisions clarify then that '[n]othing in sections 16 to 20 
abrogates or derogates from any right, privilege or obligation with respect to 
the English and French languages, or either of them, that exists or is 
continued by virtue of any other provision of the Constitution of Canada' (s. 
21), and that '[n]othing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from any 
legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after 
the coming into force of this Charter with respect to any language that is not 
English or French' (s. 22). 
Finally, s. 23 is devoted to the issue of Minority Language Educational 
Rights. It is a quite long provision, which stipulates that: 
                                                 
Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (The Carswell Company Limited 1982), at pp. 445-6 (Blaikie 
No. 1 is dealt with infra, at § 5.1). 
21 Section 16(1), added by the Constitution Amendment, 1993 (New Brunswick), is also specifically 
devoted to this province (for a case involving a rule dictated for New Brunswick, see Société des 
Acadiens, infra, § 5.6). Section 16 also contains a third paragraph, that reads: «Nothing in this 
Charter limits the authority of  Parliament or a legislature to advance the equality of  status or 
use of  English and French». For a study of  linguistic rights in New Brunswick, see for 
instance Gaétan Migneault, 'La progression des droits linguistiques au Nouveau-Brunswick 
dans une perspective globale' [2007] 52 McGill L. J. 83. 
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(1) Citizens of Canada 
(a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the 
English or French linguistic minority population of the province in 
which they reside, or (b) who have received their primary school 
instruction in Canada in English or French and reside in a province 
where the language in which they received that instruction is the 
language of the English or French linguistic minority population of 
the province, have the right to have their children receive primary 
and secondary school instruction in that language in that province. 
(2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is 
receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English or 
French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive 
primary and secondary school instruction in the same language. 
(3) The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to 
have their children receive primary and secondary school 
instruction in the language of the English or French linguistic 
minority population of a province 
(a) applies wherever in the province the number of children of 
citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the provision 
to them out of public funds of minority language instruction; and 
(b) includes, where the number of those children so warrants, the 
right to have them receive that instruction in minority language 
educational facilities provided out of public funds. 
 
However, it has to be added that, according to s. 59 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, '(1) Paragraph 23(1)(a) shall come into force in respect of Quebec 
on a day to be fixed by proclamation issued by the Queen or the Governor 
General under the Great Seal of Canada. (2) A proclamation under subsection 
(1) shall be issued only where authorized by the legislative assembly or 
government of Quebec. (3) This section may be repealed on the day 
paragraph 23(1)(a) comes into force in respect of Quebec and this Act 
amended and renumbered, consequentially upon the repeal of this section, by 
proclamation issued by the Queen or the Governor General under the Great 
Seal of Canada.' As the official annotations explain, no proclamation has ever 
been issued under this section, and therefore paragraph 23(1)(a) is not in force 
in respect of Quebec. 
Also, s. 23 must be read in connection with s. 24(1), providing the 
remedies to violations of the Charter: 'Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as 
guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court 
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances.' 
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Finally, two landmark provisions in the Canadian Charter are sections 1, 
establishing the proportionality test, and 33, the so called "notwithstanding 
provision." 
Section 1 states that '[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.' 
As explained in one of the cases analysed below, Ford, '[t]he test under s. 
1 of the Canadian Charter was laid down by this Court in R. v. Oakes, and restated 
by the Chief Justice in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., as follows: 
 
Two requirements must be satisfied to establish that a limit is 
reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. First, the legislative objective which the limitation is designed 
to promote must be of  sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutional right. It must bear on a "pressing and substantial 
concern". Second, the means chosen to attain those objectives must 
be proportional or appropriate to the ends. The proportionality 
requirement, in turn, normally has three aspects: the limiting 
measures must be carefully designed, or rationally connected, to the 
objective; they must impair the right as little as possible; and their 
effects must not so severely trench on individual or group rights that 
the legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed 
by the abridgment of  rights. The Court stated that the nature of  the 
proportionality test would vary depending on the circumstances. 
Both in articulating the standard of  proof  and in describing the 
criteria comprising the proportionality requirement the Court has 
been careful to avoid rigid and inflexible standards.22 
 
Moving to section 33, it provides: 
 
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare 
in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, 
that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a 
provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a 
declaration made under this section is in effect shall have such 
operation as it would have but for the provision of this Charter 
referred to in the declaration. (3) A declaration made under 
subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it comes 
                                                 
22 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, § 62. The cases mentioned are R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, and R. 
v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (the passage quoted is at pp. 768-9). 
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into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the 
declaration. (4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-
enact a declaration made under subsection (1). (5) Subsection (3) 
applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4). 
 
As Hogg and Bushell (now Thornton) explained in their leading 1997 
article, '[s]ection 33 of the Charter is commonly referred to as the power of 
legislative override. Under section 33, Parliament or a legislature need only 
insert an express notwithstanding clause into a statute and this will liberate the 
statute from the provisions of section 2 and sections 7-15 of the Charter. The 
legislative override is the most obvious and direct way of overcoming a judicial 
decision striking down a law for an infringement of Charter rights. Section 33 
allows the competent legislative body to re-enact the original law without 
interference from the courts.'23 
It is important to point out that subsection (1) explicitly exempts 
sections 16 to 23 from the realm of this clause, therefore the above-mentioned 
provisions on the Official Languages of Canada and on Minority Language 
Educational Rights, which are the most relevant to our purposes, cannot be 
derogated by an ordinary law by means of a "notwithstanding provision." 
Also, '[a] restriction on the use of section 33 is that, by virtue of 
subsection (3), the effect of a notwithstanding clause expires at the end of five 
years, and has to be re-enacted in order to be continued in force. This 
                                                 
23 Peter W. Hogg and Allison Bushell, 'The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislators 
(Or Perhaps The Charter Of  Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)' [1997] 35 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 75, 83. See also, more broadly, David Johansen and Philip Rosen, 'The 
Notwithstanding Clause of  the Charter' [2008] Parliamentary Information and Research Service 
BP-194E, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications /bp194-
e.pdf  (last accessed 23 Dec 2011); Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of  Canada (5th edn, 
Thomson Carswell 2007), vol. 2, chapter 39 (Override of  Rights), 163-74; Sonja 
Grover, 'Democracy and the Canadian charter notwithstanding clause: Are they compatible?' 
[2005] 9(4) Int'l J. Hum. R. 479. In the Italian scholarship, see for example Maria Rosaria 
Radiciotti, 'Protezione dei diritti fondamentali, judicial review e notwithstanding clause in Canada', 
in G Rolla (ed), L'apporto della Corte suprema alla determinazione dei caratteri dell'ordinamento 
costituzionale canadese (Giuffrè 2008), p. 195; Cesare Pinelli, Forme di Stato e forme di governo: corso 
di diritto costituzionale comparato (1st edn, Jovene 2006), p. 241; Lisa Lanzoni, 'Problemi e 
tecniche della sospensione dei diritti fondamentali: recenti tendenze in prospettiva 
comparata' [2005] 7(3) DPCE 1083, and in particular 1095-1099; Francesca Rosa, 'Limiti ai 
diritti e clausole orizzontali: Canada, Nuova Zelanda, Israele e Sudafrica a confronto, [2002] 
4(2) DPCE 633, 635-642; Antonella Benazzo, 'Il federalismo canadese. Notwithstanding clause e 
federalismo' [2002] 32(1-2) Amministrare 23; Giampaolo Gerbasi, 'Problematiche 
costituzionali sulla clausola nonobstant di cui all'art. 33 della Canadian Charter of  rights and 
freedoms' in S Gambino and C Amirante (eds), Il Canada: un laboratorio costituzionale. Federalismo, 
Diritti, Corti (CEDAM 2000), p. 241; Id., 'La clausola nonobstant quale strumento per la tutela 
dei valori delle comunità provinciali' in Rolla (ed), Lo sviluppo dei diritti fondamentali in Canada. 
Tra universalità e diversità culturale, p. 135. 
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restriction forces a periodic review of the use of section 33. The five-year 
period will always include an election, and will often yield a change of 
government.'24 
One final remark is that we should always keep in mind that the federal 
legislator has always 'had to take into account that many of subjects that are 
more directly connected to linguistic rights, such as typically education, fall 
into the jurisdiction of the provinces: the federal government therefore could 
only indirectly pursue linguistic minorities protection, for instance by funding 
bilingual education schemes.'25 
 
2.2 Quebec legislation 
Given our special focus on Quebec, we shall also review the main pieces 
of legislation of this province concerning our topic: the Charter of the French 
Language, and the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. 
The Charter of the French Language, also known as Bill 101,26 is a Quebec 
statute of 1977, containing that province's policy on linguistic rights and on 
the protection of the French language, referred to in the first paragraph of the 
preamble as 'the distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-
speaking, [...] the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity.' 
Bill 101 is a very articulated piece of legislation, overall designed to grant 
French a special level of protection27 (though a necessary caveat is that, as was 
shown in the previous paragraph, s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 mandates 
a certain degree of bilingualism in Quebec too). After proclaiming, in s. 1, that 
(only) 'French is the official language of Québec,' it deals in Title I with all the 
aspects connected to the Status of the French language, from the Fundamental 
language rights to the use of French in the legislature, in the courts, in the civil 
administration, in semipublic agencies, in labour relations, in commerce and 
business, and in the education field; then, the law also covers Linguistic 
officialization, Toponymy and Francization, and it establishes the Office Québécois de la 
langue française and the Conseil supérieur de la langue française. 
Moving to the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,28 also of 1977, the 
most important provisions are the following: on the one hand, s. 3, protecting 
- among others - the freedom of expression ('Every person is the possessor of 
the fundamental freedoms, including [...] freedom of expression'), s. 9.1, on 
                                                 
24 Hogg and Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislators (Or Perhaps 
The Charter Of  Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All), p. 84. 
25 Giovanni Poggeschi, I diritti linguistici. Un'analisi comparata (Carocci 2010), pp. 71-2 (our 
translation). 
26 R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11. 
27 As writes Poggeschi, I diritti linguistici. Un'analisi comparata, pp. 72-3, its provisions show a 
clear intention to give the French language a sharp supremacy, and to "francesize" the 
economic life. 
28 R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12. 
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the limits that can be lawfully imposed on fundamental freedoms and rights 
('In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a 
proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being 
of the citizens of Québec. In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and 
rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law'), and s. 10, prohibiting 
discriminations on several grounds, including language ('Every person has a 
right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and 
freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on [...] language. 
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the 
effect of nullifying or impairing such right'); on the other hand, the 
notwithstanding clause in s. 52: 'No provision of any Act, even subsequent to 
the Charter, may derogate from sections 1 to 38, except so far as provided by 
those sections, unless such Act expressly states that it applies despite the 
Charter.' 
Many of the cases we will discuss elaborate on some provisions in the 
pieces of legislation just mentioned. 
 
2.3 Other provinces 
We will consider the relevant laws of provinces other than Quebec when 
discussing the single cases in which they are involved; let us just recall that, as 
explained in § 2.1, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, New 
Brunswick is the only officially bilingual province upon constitutional 
obligation. 
 
3. The "Quebec veto" controversy 
Before going into the details of the cases, and in order to better 
understand them - especially the ones involving Quebec - it is necessary to go 
over the early stages of the existing tension between this province and the rest 
of Canada, which date back to the so called "Quebec veto" controversy. 
The historical context was that of "patriation," namely the process of 
coming back of the constitution from the UK to Canada.29 The Canadian 
Parliament proposed a Resolution to the UK Queen, providing for such 
                                                 
29 On which see for example the work by Edward McWhinney, Canada and the constitution 1979-
1982: Patriation and the Charter of  Rights (University of  Toronto Press 1982); in the Italian 
scholarship, see for example Nino Olivetti Rason, 'Manutenzione costituzionale: l'esperienza 
canadese,' in S Gambino and G D'Ignazio (eds), La revisione costituzionale e i suoi limiti. Fra teoria 
costituzionale, diritto interno, esperienze straniere (Giuffrè 2007) p. 339 (now in F Palermo (ed), La 
'manutenzione' costituzionale (CEDAM 2007) p. 87); Francesca Rosa, 'La Corte suprema di 
fronte alla patriation della Costituzione' in Rolla (ed), L'apporto della Corte suprema alla 
determinazione dei caratteri dell'ordinamento costituzionale canadese, p. 51; Fulco Lanchester, 'La 
"Patriation" della Costituzione canadese: verso un nuovo federalismo?' [1983] 32(1) Riv. Trim. 
Dir. Pub. 337. 
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"patriation" and including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Eight provinces, 
including Quebec, opposed such proposed Resolution, based 'on their 
assertion that both conventionally and legally the consent of all the provinces 
was required for the address to be forwarded to Her Majesty,'30 while only two 
had approved it. 
In a first ruling on the case, called Patriation Reference or First Reference (Re: 
Resolution to amend the Constitution),31 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
Houses of Parliament had not violated any 'legal principles of federalism 
proceeding without the concurrence of the provinces: the requirement of 
provincial consent had not crystallized into law;'32 however, a different 
majority also ruled that 'a substantial degree of provincial consent—to be 
determined by the politicians and not the courts—was conventionally required 
for the amendment of the Canadian Constitution.'33 
Following-up to this First Reference, 'the Government of Canada and the 
governments of the ten provinces held a Constitutional Conference, on 
November 2 to 5, 1981, to seek agreement on the patriation of the 
Constitution together with a charter of rights and an amending formula. On 
November 5, 1981 Canada and nine of the ten provinces signed an agreement 
to this effect. Quebec was the dissenting province.'34 
The province of Quebec therefore vetoed the resolution of the Canadian 
Parliament, adopted to conform to such agreement, and submitted 'the 
following question [...] to the Court of Appeal for hearing and consideration: 
Is the consent of the Province of Quebec constitutionally required, by 
convention, for the adoption by the Senate and the House of Commons of 
Canada of a resolution the purpose of which is to cause the Canadian 
Constitution to be amended in such a manner as to affect: i) the legislative 
competence of the Legislature of the Province of Quebec in virtue of the 
Canadian Constitution; ii) the status or role of the Legislature or Government 
of the Province of Quebec within the Canadian federation; and, does the 
objection of the Province of Quebec render the adoption of such resolution 
unconstitutional in the conventional sense?'35 
The question was answered in the negative by the Court of Appeal36 on 
the 7th of April, 1982, and then the case, Quebec Veto Reference (Re: Objection by 
Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution),37 reached the Supreme Court, 
                                                 
30 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 755. 
31 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753. 
32 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 758, emphasis added. 
33 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 759. 
34 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 795. 
35 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 798. 
36 [1982] C.A. 33, 134 D.L.R. (3d) 719. 
37 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793. For a comment on this case, see for example Gail C. Brandt, 'The 
Quebec Veto Reference: A Constitutional Postscript' [1983] 21 U. W. Ontario L. Rev. 163. 
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which delivered its judgment in December of 1982. The Court held that 
'Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments 
affecting the legislative competence of the Province. Appellant failed to 
demonstrate compliance with the most important requirement for establishing 
a convention, that is, acceptance or recognition of such a convention by the 
actors in the precedents. This recognition is not only an essential element of 
conventions: it is the normative one, the formal one which enables us 
unmistakably to distinguish a constitutional rule from a rule of convenience or 
from political expediency. As for the conventional rule of unanimity, it has 
already been unanimously rejected by this Court in Re: Resolution to amend the 
Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753. Appellant advanced no compelling reason 
why this opinion should be modified.'38 
Meanwhile, in accordance with the agreement of November 1981, only 
ten days after the ruling by the Court of Appeal, the Constitution Act, 1982, 
including as its Part I the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, had been 
signed into law in April of 1982. Quebec also immediately reacted to this, by 
passing An Act respecting the constitution Act, 198239 in June 1982, with the goal 
of 'immunizing' the whole legislation of Quebec from the Canadian Charter: 
indeed such 'omnibus statute [...] added a standard-form notwithstanding 
clause to all of that province’s statutes.'40 The Quebec government also 
included 'a notwithstanding clause in every piece of legislation put before the 
National Assembly between 1982 and 1985. [...]. [Anyway] this practice largely 
ceased after 1985,'41 and 'when the blanket override came to the end of its five-
year life, no attempt was made to re-enact it for another five-year term.'42 
Such controversy - which was reignited, as we shall see in §§ 5.9 and 
5.11, by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ford - was the result of the 
existing animosity of Quebec towards the Canadian federation,43 and at the 
                                                 
                                                
38 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 794. 
39 R.S.Q. 1982, c. L-4.2. 
40 Hogg and Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislators (Or Perhaps 
The Charter Of  Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All), p. 83, footnote 26. 
41 Johansen and Rosen, The Notwithstanding Clause of  the Charter, p. 10. 
42 Hogg and Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislators (Or Perhaps 
The Charter Of  Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All), p. 83, footnote 26. 
43 Among the most recent accounts of  "Canada's perennial constitutional crisis" with regard 
to Quebec, see David R. Cameron, Jacqueline D. Krikorian, 'Recognizing Quebec in the 
Constitution of  Canada: Using the Bilateral Constitutional Amendment Process' [2008] 58(4) 
U. Toronto Law J. 389, in particular 389-403; for earlier studies, see L. Kinvin Wroth, 'Quebec, 
Canada and the First Nations: The Problem of  Secession' [1999] 23 Vt. L. Rev. 709; Patrick J. 
Monahan, 'The Law and Politics of  Quebec Secession' [1995] 33 Osgoode Hall L. J. 1; Charles 
Taylor, 'Can Canada Survive the Charter?' [1992] 30 Alta. L. Rev. 427; in the Italian 
scholarship, see also Dario E. Tosi, Secessione e Costituzione tra prassi e teoria (Jovene 2007), pp. 
159-67; Tania Groppi, 'Il Canada tra riforma della Costituzione e secesione' in Rolla (ed), Lo 
sviluppo dei diritti fondamentali in Canada. Tra universalità e diversità culturale, p. 19 (also in Gambino 
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same time it contributed to increase the distance between the two sides: this 
animosity also led up to the two referendums of 1980 and 1995 for the 
secession of Quebec, the latter falling short of reaching the necessary quorum 
only by a very few votes.44 
 
4. The essential rules of Canadian bilingualism 
In considering the main features of Canadian bilingualism,45 we need to 
go as back as 1866:46 indeed that year, what was then the Province of Canada 
enacted the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which included 'a provision to guide 
interpreters in the resolution of problems caused by differences in the French 
and English versions of the Code.'47 Such provision was § 2615 and stated: 
 
If  in any article of  this code founded on the laws existing at the 
time of  its promulgation, there be a difference between the English 
and French texts, that version shall prevail which is the most 
consistent with the provisions of  the existing laws on which the 
article is founded; and if  there be any such difference in an article 
changing the existing laws, that version shall prevail which is the 
                                                 
and Amirante (eds), Il Canada: un laboratorio costituzionale. Federalismo, Diritti, Corti, p. 337); 
Susanna Mancini, Minoranze autoctone e Stato. Tra composizione dei conflitti e secessione (Giuffrè 
1996), pp. 91-113. The famous Quebec-born writer Mordecai Richler almost epitomized the 
existing tensions among the various linguistic and religious communities existing in Canada, 
often publishing some controversial pieces that were very polemically welcomed across the 
board. 
44 A fundamental step in this ongoing controversy was the Supreme Court of  Canada's 1998 
judgment in Reference re Secession of  Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, where the Court denied 
Quebec a right to secede under national or international law; we will not consider this ruling, 
because it is not directly related to our topic, but it always has to be kept in mind: suffice it to 
say here that in this judgment, 'the Court determined that respect for minority rights was one 
of  the five fundamental structural principles of  the Constitution, the others being 
federalism, democracy, the rule of  law and constitutionalism,' explained by Robert B. Asselin, 
'Section 41 of  the Official Languages Act: scope, evolution and implementation framework' 
[Library of  Parliament 2001] PRB 01-9E, avaliable at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP 
/ResearchPublications/prb019-e.pdf  (last accessed 10 February 2012); among the extremely 
vast literature on the subject, let us just mention, on the links between this reference and 
linguistic policies, Marc Cousineau, 'Le renvoi sur la sécession du Québec: La résurrection 
des droits linguistiques au Canada' [1999] 11 Rev. nat. droit const. 147. 
45 For a deep analysis in the Italian scholarship, see Valeria Piergigli, 'Minoranza anglofona in 
Québec versus minoranze francofone del Rest of  Canada' [2002] 32(1-2) Amministrare 229; see 
also Ead., 'Le minoranze linguistiche anglofona e francofona nelle province canadesi: aspetti 
problematici' in G Dotoli (ed),  Il Canada del nuovo secolo. Gli archivi della memoria, Atti del 
Convegno internazionale, Monopoli, 30 maggio-3 giugno 2001 (Schena 2002), p. 863. 
46 Deborah Cao, Translating Law (Multilingual Matters 2007), p. 123. 
47 Pierre-André Côté, 'Bilingual Interpretation of  Enactments in Canada: Principles v. 
Practice' [2004] 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 1067, 1067. See also John E.C. Brierley, 'Quebec's Civil 
Law Codification: Viewed and Reviewed' [1968] 14 McGill L.J. 521, 535-8. 
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most consistent with the intention of  the article, and the ordinary 
rules of  legal interpretation shall apply in determining such 
intention.48 
 
The following year, as we already know, the Constitution Act, 1867 was 
enacted, whose s. 133 mandated, inter alia, the printing and publication of '[t]he 
Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec' (thus not 
of the other Provinces' legislatures) in both English and French. The case-law 
has elaborated two main rules guiding the application of s. 133: the "equal 
authenticity rule" and the "shared meaning rule."49 
The former was established (even though it was not yet called this way) 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Pacific Railway v. Robinson,50 where 
it stated, in a very famous passage: 
 
I take it that whether the article was first written in French or in 
English is immaterial. [...] In the case of ambiguity, where there is 
any possibility to reconcile the two, one must be interpreted by the 
other. The English version cannot be read out of the law. It was 
submitted to the legislature, enacted and sanctioned simultaneously 
with the French one, and is law just as much as the French one is.51 
 
In other words, 'both language versions of a bilingual statute are the 
official, original and authoritative expressions of the law; [...] it means that 
neither the English nor the French version has the status of a copy or 
translation, and neither enjoys priority or paramountcy over the other.'52 
Anyway, since CPR v. Robinson concerned the Civil Code of Quebec, this rule 
formally only applied to Quebec legislation. But since s. 133 also imposes 
bilingualism for the Canadian statutes, the "equal authenticity rule" had to be 
extended to the Acts of the Canadian Parliament: the Supreme Court did that 
in the case The King v. Dubois.53 
                                                 
48 Civil Code of  Lower Canada (1866), § 2615. 
49 Cao, Translating Law, p. 123. See also Ruth Sullivan, 'The Challenges of  Interpreting 
Multilingual, Multijural Legislation' [2003] 29 Brook. J. Int'l L. 985, and in particular 1005-22; 
Ead., 'Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of  Canada' [1999] 30 Ottawa L. Rev. 
175, and in particular 187-215; Michel Bastarache, Naiomi Metallic, Regan Morris & Chris 
Essert, The Law of  Bilingual Interpretation (LexisNexis Canada 2008), chapter 2, 'The 
Fundamental Rules of  Interpretation Applicable to Bilingual Statutes in Canada'; 
Susan Šarčević, New approach to legal translation (Kluwer Law International 2000 (1997)), pp. 
75-7. 
50 [1891] 19 S.C.R. 292. 
51 [1891] 19 S.C.R. 292, 325. 
52 Cao, Translating Law, p. 123. 
53 [1935] S.C.R. 378. 
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The rule was later codified too, in the Official Languages Act, 1969 and in 
the Constitution Act, 1982:54 'S18(1) of the Constitution Act provides that the 
statutes of Parliament of Canada shall be printed and published in both 
English and French, and both language versions are equally authoritative. 
S8(1) of the Official Languages Act stipulates that in constructing an 
enactment, both its versions in the official languages are equally authentic. 
Furthermore, for the construction of an enactment where there is difference 
between the two versions, regard must be had to both versions (S8(2) of the 
Official Languages Act). This means that where there are discrepancies 
between the versions, the court must read both versions with care and both 
must be considered in resolving interpretative issues, to determine the 
intention of the legislature and both versions should be attributed the same 
importance or weight.'55 
                                                 
                                                
54 Between the two, the Supreme Court issued its milestone judgment in Jones v. A.G. of  New 
Brunswick [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182, upholding the validity of  the provisions of  the Official 
Languages Act (R.S.C. 1970, c. O-2) establishing both French and English as official languages. 
The appellant had challenged them on the grounds that they allegedly did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of  the federal government, but the Court, in a unanimous decision, rejected this 
claim, deeming the challenged provision to be 'within the legislative competence of  the 
Parliament of  Canada under s. 91 of  the British North America Act, 1867, which provides that 
Parliament can "make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of  Canada, in 
relation to all matters not coming within the Classes of  Subjects by this Act assigned 
exclusively to the Legislatures of  the Provinces"' (the quote is from the syllabus, at pp. 182-
3). The co-official character of  the two languages (a feature that Canada shares with many 
countries in the world, such as - in Europe - Belgium, Finland, and Ireland) was then 
confirmed by the Constitution Act, 1982, and then a few years later the Official Languages Act 
underwent substantial changes, become necessary in order to conform to the changes 
brought by the Constitution Act, 1982 itself  (the amending act was the Official Languages 
Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.))). 
55 Cao, Translating Law, p. 124. We should anyway always be aware of  Rodolfo Sacco's 
insightful warning that the declamations of  one legal system's jurists about the equal 
authenticity of  two official languages may not correspond to the actual interpretative practice 
they follow, even though they would never admit it: 'D'abord, il faut faire une distinction 
entre les systèmes où un texte est privilégié par rapport aux autres, et les systèmes où tous les 
textes ont une égale autorité. Nous devons, en effet, nous poser la question. Que font les 
Suisses qui adoptent des lois multilingues? Que font les Belges. qui font des lois multilingues? 
Que faisaient les Soviétiques lorsqu'ils rédigeaient des lois multilingues? Que font les 
Québecois? Que fait la Vallée d'Aoste? Le Suisse nous répondra que les quatre langues de la 
fédération, au moment de l'interprétation d'une loi, n'ont pas toutes la même importance, car 
la loi même établit une différence entre le français et l'allemand d'un coté, et les autres 
langues de l'autre coté. Mais le problème se présente au moment de choisir de lire la loi en 
français, ou de la lire en allemand. Et quelqu'un de nous pourrait avoit l'impression que le 
texte ui compte est le texte allemand, parce qu'il est rédigé avec plus de soin, et que la langue 
allemande permet de formuler l'idée avec plus de précision. Pour avoir une réponse, il ne 
suffira pas toujours d'interroger le juriste du pays doné. Celui-ci sera tenté de nous répéter la 
vérité officielle, et nous dira que l'importance des deux ou dix textes est identiques. Mais s'il 
n'a pas fait une enquête bien analytique il court le danger de croire a priori que le réel 
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As for the "shared or common meaning rule," it has been quite clearly 
explained in the following way: 'where the two versions of bilingual legislation 
do not say the same thing, the meaning that is shared by both ought to be 
adopted unless that meaning is for some reasons unacceptable.'56 
In other words, '[t]he attempt to discover or construct a shared meaning 
is the first step in the interpretation of bilingual legislation. The shared 
meaning is not always decisive, however, and other indicators of meaning 
must also be taken into account. Indeed, where these other indicators suggest 
the shared meaning is inappropriate, the court is entitled to reject it in favour 
of a more appropriate version, which is plausible in one language version but 
not in the other.'57 
The rule was recently summarized by Justice Bastarache in R. v. Daoust, 
along with a description of the steps to be followed in the interpretation of 
bilingual legislation: 
 
26. The Court has on several occasions discussed how a bilingual 
statute should be interpreted in cases where there is a discrepancy 
between the two versions of  the same text.  For example, 
in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, 
2002 SCC 62, at para. 56, LeBel J. wrote: 
 
A principle of  bilingual statutory interpretation holds 
that where one version is ambiguous and the other is 
clear and unequivocal, the common meaning of  the two 
versions would a priori be preferred [...].  Furthermore, 
where one of  the two versions is broader than the 
other, the common meaning would favour the more 
restricted or limited meaning [...]. 
                                                 
corresponde aussi bien dans l'ensemble que dans les détails à la règle légale axée sur l'égalité 
des langues. L'on peut même croire que le juriste étranger partirait avantagé dans une telle 
enquête, car il serait moins influencé par la présomption que peut créer la sacralité du 
principe d'égalité' (R. Sacco, 'L'interprète et la règle de droit européenne', in the already 
mentioned work, edited by the same Sacco, L'interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés dans 
plus d'une langue, p. 226, 227-8). 
56 Ibidem. This approach resembles the one followed by the ECJ: as explained by Wainwright, 
'Drafting and interpretation of  multilingual texts of  the European Community,' at p. 321, 
'First, the Court will try and avoid coming to the conclusion that one or more versions are 
significantly different. This is for obvious reasons of  legal certainty and equality before the 
law. An effort will therefore be made to give a common interpretation which best reflects the 
sense in all the languages (Case 80/76, Kerry Milk).' 
57 Dáithí Mac Cárthaigh, 'Interpretation and Construction of  Bilingual Laws: A Canadian 
Lamp to Light the Way?' [2007] 7(2) Judicial Studies Institute Journal 211, 217 (the Author 
recalls, for this conclusion, the example of  the case Food Machinery Corp. v. Canada (Registrar of  
Trade Marks), [1946] 2 D.L.R. 258 (Ex.Ct)). 
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As well, in R. v. Mac, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 856, 2002 SCC 24, at para. 5, I 
stated the following: 
 
The Criminal Code is a bilingual statute of  which both 
the English and French versions are equally 
authoritative. In his Interpretation of  Legislation in 
Canada (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 327, Pierre-André Côté 
reminds us that statutory interpretation of  bilingual 
enactments begins with a search for the shared meaning 
between the two versions. 
 
I would also draw attention to the two-step analysis proposed by 
Professor Côté in The Interpretation of  Legislation in Canada (3rd ed. 
2000), at p. 324, for resolving discordances resulting from 
divergences between the two versions of  a statute: 
 
Unless otherwise provided, differences between two 
official versions of  the same enactment are reconciled 
by educing the meaning common to both. Should this 
prove to be impossible, or if  the common meaning 
seems incompatible with the intention of  the legislature 
as indicated by the ordinary rules of  interpretation, the 
meaning arrived at by the ordinary rules should be 
retained. 
 
27. There is, therefore, a specific procedure to be followed when 
interpreting bilingual statutes.  The first step is to determine 
whether there is discordance.  If  the two versions are 
irreconcilable, we must rely on other principles [...]. A purposive 
and contextual approach is favoured [...]. 
 
28. We must determine whether there is an ambiguity, that is, 
whether one or both versions of  the statute are “reasonably 
capable of  more than one meaning” [...].  If  there is an ambiguity 
in one version but not the other, the two versions must be 
reconciled, that is, we must look for the meaning that is common 
to both versions [...].  The common meaning is the version that is 
plain and not ambiguous [...]. 
 
29. If  neither version is ambiguous, or if  they both are, the 
common meaning is normally the narrower version [...].  Professor 
Côté illustrates this point as follows [...]:  
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There is a third possibility: one version may have a 
broader meaning than another, in which case the shared 
meaning is the more narrow of  the two. 
 
30. The second step is to determine whether the common or 
dominant meaning is, according to the ordinary rules of  statutory 
interpretation, consistent with Parliament’s intent [...].  At this 
stage, the words of  Lamer J. in Slaight Communications Inc. v. 
Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at p. 1071, are instructive: 
 
First of  all, therefore, these two versions have to be 
reconciled if  possible.  To do this, an attempt must be 
made to get from the two versions of  the provision the 
meaning common to them both and ascertain whether 
this appears to be consistent with the purpose and 
general scheme of  the Code. 
  
31. Finally, we must also bear in mind that some principles of  
interpretation may only be applied in cases where there is an 
ambiguity in an enactment.  As Iacobucci J. wrote in Bell 
ExpressVu, supra, at para. 28:  “Other principles of  interpretation 
— such as the strict construction of  penal statutes and the 
‘Charter values’ presumption — only receive application where 
there is ambiguity as to the meaning of  a provision.”58 
                                                 
58 R. v. Daoust, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217, §§ 26-31. As for the shared meaning rule, it has also been 
criticized by some scholars, particularly as it emerges from Daoust: see Ruth Sullivan, 'Some 
problems with the shared meaning rule as formulated in R. v. Daoust and 'The Law of  Bilingual 
Interpretation'' [2010] 42(1) Ottawa L. Rev. 71 (the book referred to is the one mentioned supra, 
at footnote 49); but see also Paul Salembier, 'Rethinking the Interpretation of  Bilingual 
Legislation: the Demise of  the Shared Meaning Rule,' [2003] 35 Ottawa L. Rev. 75. 
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5. The case-law on minority linguistic rights 
5.1 Blaikie No. 1 and No. 2 (1979 and 1981): the Constitution prevents 
Quebec from making French the only language of its legislature, 
courts, and administrative bodies 
Moving on to consider the most important cases related to the linguistic 
policy in Canada, the first ones in line are Att. Gen. of Quebec v. Blaikie et al.59 of 
1979 and the two-years later's follow-up Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie et 
al.60 
Blaikie No. 1 concerned two appeals from the Court of Appeal for 
Quebec, which had struck down the whole Chapter III (ss. 7 to 13) of Title I 
of the Charter of the French language. 
In their original version, in force at the time, ss. 7 to 13 read as follows: 
 
7. French is the language of  the legislature and the courts in 
Quebec. 
8. Legislative bills shall be drafted in the official language. They 
shall also be tabled in the Assemblée nationale, passed and assented 
to in that language. 
9. Only the French text of  the statutes and regulations is official. 
10. An English version of  every legislative bill, statute and 
regulation shall be printed and published by the civil 
administration. 
11. Artificial persons addressing themselves to the courts and to 
bodies discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions shall do so in 
the official language, and shall use the official language in pleading 
before them unless all the parties to the action agree to their 
pleading in English. 
12. Procedural documents issued by bodies discharging judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions or drawn up and sent by the advocates 
practising before them shall be drawn up in the official language. 
Such documents may, however, be drawn up in another language if  
the natural person for whose intention they are issued expressly 
consents thereto. 
                                                 
59 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016. For a comment in French, see for example 'L'Arrêt Blaikie et la 
Langue des Municipalités et des Commissions Scolaires' [1980] 11 Rev. Gen. Droit 325; two 
articles in English commented on Blaikie together with Forest, a case mentioned infra in § 5.3 
as the one that led to Manitoba Language Rights: Edward A. Sellers, 'Constitutionally 
Entrenched Linguistic Minority Rights: The Forest and Blaikie Decisions' [1986] 15 Man. L. J. 
257; Robert W. Kerr, 'Blaikie and Forest: The Declaratory Action as a Remedy against 
Unconstitutional Legislation' [1981] 26 McGill L. J. 97. 
60 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 312. 
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13. The judgments rendered in Quebec by the courts and by bodies 
discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions must be drawn up in 
French or be accompanied with a duly authenticated French 
version. Only the French version of  the judgment is official. 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed the holding of the Court of Appeal, 
finding such provisions in breach of s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which 
had to be considered 'an entrenched provision, [...] forbidding modification by 
unilateral action of Parliament or of the Quebec Legislature.'61 S. 133 was 
'correctly described as giving a constitutionally based right to any person to 
use English or French in legislative debates in the federal and Quebec Houses 
and in any pleading or process in or issuing from any federally established 
Court or any Court of Quebec, and as imposing an obligation of the use of 
English and French in the records and journals of the federal and Quebec 
legislative Houses and in the printing and publication of federal and Quebec 
legislation.'62 
In other words, in this case the Court established that 'the National 
Assembly could not declare French the only language of legislation and the 
courts. The Constitution that underlay the creation of Canada in 1867 bound 
Québec to comply with bilingualism in enacting laws and for judicial 
proceedings.'63 Two years later, Blaikie No. 2 further specified that 'this 
obligation extended beyond legislation as such to all normative texts 
emanating from the government.'64 
The holding in Blaikie No. 1 has remained on the books (and was even 
broadened by Blaikie No. 2), and the Charter of the French language had to be 
amended in accordance, even though Chapter III was eventually replaced only 
in 1993, by Bill 86.65 Anyway, long before that, the very 'day after the decision 
of this Court in Blaikie No. 1, the Legislature of Quebec re-enacted in both 
languages all those Quebec statutes that had been enacted in French only.'66 
 
                                                 
61 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016, 1017. 
62 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016, 1026. 
63 M. Chevrier, 'Laws and Language in Québec: The Principles and Means of  Québec's 
Language Policy' [1997], available at 
http://english.republiquelibre.org/The_principles_and_means_of_Qu%C3%A9bec's_ 
language_ policy (last accessed 31 Jan 2012). 
64 Ibidem. 
65 S.Q. 1993, c. 40, s. 1. See Leigh Oakes, 'Language planning and policy in Québec,' in D 
Ayoun (ed), Studies in French applied linguistics (John Benjamins 2008), 345-86, 358. 
66 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 19. The statute referred to is An Act respecting a judgment rendered 
in the Supreme Court of  Canada on 13 December 1979 on the language of  the legislature 
and the courts in Québec, 1979 (Que.), c. 61. 
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5.2 Protestant School Boards (1984): Quebec could not restrict the 
rights that the Constitution granted to English-speaking parents with 
regard to the language of education of their children 
 A few years after the two Blaikie cases, the Court decided Attorney 
General of Quebec v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards et al.,67 a case 
involving the provisions of Title I, Chapter VIII (The language of instruction) of 
the Charter of the French language - and in particular its key provisions, ss. 72 and 
73 -, which were challenged by the respondent association only a few weeks 
after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms entered into force.68 
Inter alia, ss. 72 and 73 respectively stated that, as a general rule, 
'instruction in the kindergarten classes and in the elementary and secondary 
schools' should be given in French, and that an exception could be made, and 
thus education could be given in English, upon request of the parents, for the 
following children: '(a) a child whose father or mother received his or her 
elementary instruction in English, in Québec; (b) a child whose father or 
mother domiciled in Québec on 26 August 1977, received his or her 
elementary instruction in English outside Québec; (c) a child who, in his last 
year of school in Québec before 26 August 1977, was lawfully receiving his 
instruction in English, in a public kindergarten class or in an elementary or 
secondary school; (d) the younger brothers and sisters of a child described in 
paragraph c.' 
The Court found indeed a contrast between ss. 72 and 73 of Bill 101 and 
the above-mentioned section 23 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: this latter 
provision was arguably passed with the precise aim of overriding more 
restrictive regulations such as typically the ones in the Quebec statute. But 
even if this was not the intent of the constitutional framers, anyway 'the 
provisions of s. 73 of Bill 101 collide directly with those of s. 23 of the Charter, 
and are not limits which can be legitimized by s. 1 of the Charter. Such limits 
cannot be exceptions to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter nor 
amount to amendments to the Charter.'69 
On these grounds, sections 72 and 73 were therefore declared of no 
force or effect, pursuant to paragraphs 52(1) and (2)(a) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. 
A few aspects of the ruling deserve more careful consideration. First of 
all, from the point of view of the use by courts of comparative materials (an 
issue that has gained more attention since, also raising significant 
                                                 
67 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66. For a comment on this case, see Daniel Proulx, 'La Loi 101, la clause-
Québec et la Charte canadienne devant la Court suprême : un cas d'espèce?' [1995] 16(1) Rev. 
Gen. Droit 167. 
68 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 71. 
69 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 88. 
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controversies70), the appellants in this case (i.e. the government of Quebec) 
remarkably tried to encourage the Court to rely on the experience of 'other 
free and democratic societies such as Switzerland and Belgium, which have 
socio-linguistic situations comparable to that in Quebec, have adopted stricter 
linguistic measures than Bill 101, and these measures have been held to be 
reasonable and justified by the Swiss and European courts.'71 The Court does 
not involve in such arguments, deeming other ones alone 'fatal to appellant's 
position,'72 but the custom of looking beyond national borders to some 
foreign experiences will become common in the Canadian Supreme Court, 
which thus demonstrates much more openness towards the use of 
comparative experiences for deciding its cases, than its American 
counterpart.73 
Another important passage of the opinion, for the purposes of the 
interpretation of s. 23 of the Charter, is the one stating that this provision 'is 
not, like other provisions in that constitutional document, of the kind 
generally found in such charters and declarations of fundamental rights. It is 
not a codification of essential, pre-existing and more or less universal rights 
that are being confirmed and perhaps clarified, extended or amended, and 
which, most importantly, are being given a new primacy and inviolability by 
their entrenchment in the supreme law of the land. The special provisions of s. 23 
of the Charter make it a unique set of constitutional provisions, quite peculiar to 
Canada.'74 
S. 23 is therefore looked at from the beginning as a rule in some way 
unique, from comparative perspective, which was drafted in order to take into 
account the specific situation of coexistence of the two communities, the 
Anglophone being the majority in Canada but the minority in Quebec, and the 
Francophone vice versa. 
Looking at such situation in historical perspective is essential: it allows to 
understand the origins of s. 23 and thus to interpret it in the most appropriate 
way, but also - and it is the third passage we want to underline - it dispels some 
possible misconceptions. In particular, it has not always been the case that 
Quebec legislators felt so passionately the urge to protect the use of French 
language, even to the detriment of the rights of the Anglophone minority: to 
the contrary, in the past 'the fate reserved to the English language as a 
language of instruction had generally been more advantageous in Quebec than 
the fate reserved to the French language in the other provinces.'75 
                                                 
70 See some references below, at the end of  § 5.9 on the Ford judgment. 
71 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 78. 
72 Ibidem. 
73 Let us direct again below, to § 5.9. 
74 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 79, emphasis added. 
75 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 81. 
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However, at some point in the last half-century things changed in 
Quebec: this province began to pass legislation meant 'to give preferred 
treatment to French as the language of instruction, and correspondingly to 
lessen the benefits hitherto given to English, in fact if not in law:' Bill 101 was 
'the culmination of this legislation.'76 This trend was typical of Quebec: it has 
indeed 'been the only province where there was then this tendency to limit the 
benefits conferred on the language of the minority.'77 
We are here confronted with an important feature of what could be 
described as the "Quebec exception": while in the other provinces of Canada, 
or in European countries, the typical trend has been towards an increased 
protection of linguistic minorities, Quebec has experienced a different 
movement, towards protecting the language of the majority, even if this 
sometimes meant sacrificing the needs of the Anglophone minority. 
On some occasions, such as in Protestant School Boards, the Supreme Court 
has reacted, but this has led to tensions, culminated in the already mentioned 
referendums for the secession of Quebec from the rest of Canada, the second 
of which did not pass only for a few votes.78 
 
5.3 Manitoba Language Rights (1985), aka the mirror image of Blaikie: 
it is unconstitutional for the provinces to make English the only 
language of their legislature and courts (even though the de facto 
doctrine can temporarily save unilingual legislation until it is re-
enacted in both official languages) 
The next case to consider is Re Manitoba Language Rights,79 a case in the 
progeny of the two Blaikie rulings. It concerned Manitoba's language 
legislation, and in particular the Official language Act, 1890,80 which provided: 
                                                 
                                                
76 Ibidem. 
77 Ibidem. 
78 See supra, § 3. 
79 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721. For some reflections on this case, see Warren Newman, 'Understanding 
the Rule of  Law in Canada', in Stephen Tierney (ed), Accommodating Cultural Diversity (Ashgate 
2007), pp. 199-238, and in particular the paragraph titled 'The Practice of  the Rule of  Law in 
Canada: The Manitoba Language Rights Reference', 212-5; see also Sydney B. Horton, 'The 
Manitoba Language Rights Reference and the Doctrine of  Mandatory and Directory 
Provisions' [1987] 10 Dalhousie L.J. 195; S.J. Whitley, 'The Manitoba Language Reference: 
Judicial Consideration of  "Language Charged with Meaning" [1985] 15 Man. L.J. 295; and, in 
French, Michel Bastarache, 'Commentaire sur la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada 
dans le renvoi au sujet des droits linguistiques au Manitoba, jugement rendu le 13 juin 1985' 
[1985] McGill L. J. 93.  
80 An Act to Provide that the English Language shall be the Official Language of  the 
Province of  Manitoba, 1890 (Man.), c. 14. There had already been a previous, minor case 
concerning the same statute: Attorney General of  Manitoba v. Forest [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032: 
here, the Court had struck down some restrictions on the use of  French that the Official 
language Act, 1890 had introduced, thereby violating s. 23 of  the Manitoba Act, 1870 (in 
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'1 Any statute or law to the contrary notwithstanding, the English language only 
shall be used in the records and journals of the House of Assembly for the 
Province of Manitoba, and in any pleadings or process in or issuing from any 
court in the Province of Manitoba. The Acts of the Legislature of the Province 
of Manitoba need only be printed and published in the English language. 2 This 
Act shall only apply so far as this Legislature has jurisdiction so to enact, and 
shall come into force on the day it is assented to.' 
As the Court points out, 'upon enactment of the Official Language Act, 
1890 the Province of Manitoba ceased publication of the French version of 
Legislative Records, Journals and Acts,'81 with the result that 'the Manitoba 
Legislature has, since 1890, enacted nearly all of its laws in English only'82 (and 
had gone on like that until at least 198183). 
 However, this seemed in striking contrast with s. 133 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 and s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870,84 which - very similarly to s. 133 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 - provided that 'both English and French "shall be 
used in the ... Records and Journals" of the Manitoba Legislature. It further 
provide[d] that "[t]he Acts of the Legislature shall be printed and published in 
both those languages."'85 And it was beyond doubt, from Blaikie No. 1 and 
Blaikie No. 2, that 'all references to "Acts of the Legislature" [...] [had to be] 
intended to encompass all statutes, regulations and delegated legislation of the 
Manitoba Legislature, enacted since 1890;'86 to put it differently, 'Blaikie No. 
1 stands for the proposition that s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 requires (i) 
simultaneous enactment of legislation in both English and French, and (ii) 
equal authority and status for both the English and the French versions.'87 
To be sure, the Official language Act, 1890 had been already challenged three 
times before lower courts, and each time declared unconstitutional, but each time 
the judgments were not followed; a fourth challenge had reached the Supreme 
Court in 1979: 'on December 13, 1979, in Attorney General of Manitoba v. Forest, 
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032, this Court, in unanimous reasons, held that the provisions 
of Manitoba's Official Language Act, 1890 were in conflict with s. 23 of 
the Manitoba Act, 1870 and unconstitutional.'88 
                                                 
                                                
particular, the 1890 Act had abrogated some rights, including the right to use the French 
language before the courts of  Manitoba, that were instead protected by the Manitoba Act, 
1870, on its turn confirmed by the Constitution Act, 1867). 
81 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 9. 
82 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 55. 
83 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, §§ 15-6. 
84 R.S.C. 1970, App. II. 
85 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 26. 
86 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 44. 
87 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 130. 
88 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, §§ 10-3. The Court adds that 'on July 9, 1980, after the decision of  this 
Court in Forest, the Legislature of  Manitoba enacted An Act Respecting the Operation of  Section 
23 of the Manitoba Act in Regard to Statutes, 1980 (Man.), c. 3': also this Act was challenged, and 
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But after the Legislature of Manitoba enacted a law in response to Forest, 
the question was raised again before the Supreme Court in the case at bar, 
with regard to this latter law. First of all, this reference by the Governor 
General in Council asked the Court to determine whether 'the requirements of 
s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and of s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 
1870 respecting the use of both the English and French languages in (a)the 
Records and Journals of the  Houses of the Parliament of Canada and  of the 
Legislatures of Quebec and  Manitoba, and (b)the Acts of the Parliament of 
Canada  and of the Legislatures of Quebec and  Manitoba'89 were mandatory, or 
just directory. 
The Court answered very clearly that 'there is no authority in Canada for 
applying the mandatory/directory doctrine to constitutional provisions,'90 and 
that even 'more important than the lack of authority to support the application 
of the mandatory/directory distinction to constitutional provisions, [...] is the 
harm that would be done to the supremacy of Canada's Constitution if such a 
vague and expedient principle were used to interpret it. It would do great 
violence to our Constitution to hold that a provision on its face mandatory, 
should be labelled directory on the ground that to hold otherwise would lead 
to inconvenience or even chaos. Where there is no textual indication that a 
constitutional provision is directory and where the words clearly indicate that 
the provision is mandatory, there is no room for interpreting the provision as 
directory.'91 Therefore s. 133 and s. 23 were to be considered mandatory. 
As the Court explains in a later passage, worth quoting: 
 
Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 is a specific manifestation of 
the general right of Franco-Manitobans to use their own language. 
The importance of language rights is grounded in the essential role 
that language plays in human existence, development and dignity. It 
is through language that we are able to form concepts; to structure 
and order the world around us. Language bridges the gap between 
isolation and community, allowing humans to delineate the rights 
and duties they hold in respect of one another, and thus to live in 
society.  
 
Of course, if the Court had just stopped there, it would have meant that 
all the legislation enacted in Manitoba since 1890 was invalid and thus of no 
force and effect, with the huge chaos the Court hinted at: indeed 'the positive 
                                                 
its validity was the subject of  question 4 in the case we are reviewing, which we will not 
consider as it is less relevant for our purposes. 
89 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 1. 
90 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 37. 
91 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 39. 
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legal order which has purportedly regulated the affairs of the citizens of 
Manitoba since 1890 [...] [would be] destroyed and the rights, obligations and 
any other effects arising under these laws [...] [would be] invalid and 
unenforceable.'92 
The Court took that into account in answering Questions 2 ('Are those 
statutes and regulations of the Province of Manitoba that were not printed and 
published in both the English and French languages invalid by reason of s. 23 
of the Manitoba Act, 1870?') and 3 ('If the answer to question 2 is affirmative, 
do those enactments that were not printed and published in English and 
French have any legal force and effect, and if so, to what extent and under 
what conditions?'). 
It drew the inevitable consequence of its answer to question 1, and 
declared that all 'the unilingual enactments of the Manitoba Legislature [we]re 
inconsistent with s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 since the constitutionally 
required manner and form for their enactment ha[d] not been followed,'93 and 
therefore they were invalid and of no force or effect. 
However, it resorted to the "de facto doctrine," according to which the 
official acts carried on by someone who irregularly or illegally occupied a 
public position, "under color of right or authority," are allowed to maintain 
their validity, until the mischief is remedied or indefinitely. By applying such 
doctrine to the case at bar, the Court concluded that all the unilingual statutes 
and regulations of the Province of Manitoba were invalid, but 'the invalid 
current Acts of the Legislature will be deemed temporarily valid for the 
minimum period of time necessary for their translation, re-enactment, printing 
and publication'94 (answer to question 2); as a consequence, '[t]he Acts of the 
Legislature that were not enacted, printed and published in English and 
French have no legal force and effect because they are invalid, but [...] the 
current Acts of the Legislature will be deemed to have temporary force and 
effect for the minimum period of time necessary for their translation, 
re-enactment, printing and publication'95 (answer to question 3). It was the 
first instance of a delayed declaration of invalidity by the Canadian Supreme 
Court, a remedy then become common practice.96 
 
                                                 
92 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 61. 
93 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 54. 
94 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 157. 
95 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, § 159. 
96 On delayed declarations of  invalidity, see for example Kent Roach, 'Constitutional, 
Remedial, and International Dialogues about Rights: The Canadian Experience' [2005] 40 
Tex Int'l L.J. 537, and in particular 546-8; Id., 'Remedial Consensus and Dialogue under the 
Charter: General Declarations and Delayed Declarations of  Invalidity' [2002] 35(2) U. Brit. 
Colum. L. Rev. 211. Among the cases considered here, see for instance Nguyen, below at § 5.19. 
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5.4 Bilodeau (1986): Manitoba Language Rights reloaded: all 
Manitoba's legislation published in only one official language is 
unconstitutional (even though the effects of the declaration of invalidity 
shall again be delayed under the de facto doctrine) 
In 1986, on the same day, the Supreme Court of Canada released its 
judgment in three cases involving the linguistic rights of minorities in a 
proceeding before a court: Bilodeau, MacDonald, and Société des Acadiens.97 
Bilodeau v. A.G. (Man.)98 concerned a trivial speed violation, because of 
which Mr Bilodeau had been summoned to appear in court. He applied for the 
dismissal of the charge, on the grounds that both the statute providing the 
violation, and the one regulating the summons, had been printed and 
published in English only, thus violating s. 23 of The Manitoba Act, 1870, a 
provision we already met in Manitoba Language Rights. 
Indeed, the Court referred to this precedent and quickly dismissed Mr 
Bilodeau's appeal: it explained that, under Manitoba Language Rights, the statutes 
under review were actually to be considered invalid, but that the de facto doctrine 
allowed to maintain their effects until they were re-enacted also in French. 
Specifically on the summons statute, the Court followed MacDonald (on which 
see the next paragraph) and simply explained that in that case 'the majority 
holds that a unilingual summons and charge does not contravene s. 133. The 
same conclusion applies in respect of s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870:'99 so 
the summons was not invalid only because it was issued under an invalid 
statut
summons in the other official language notifying the recipient of the nature 
                                                
e. 
It is though worth mentioning also the very short dissent by Justice 
Wilson, who agreed on this latter point, but nonetheless deemed the summons 
contrary to s. 23: 'just as a person living in the Province of Quebec whose 
language is English is entitled under s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to an 
accommodation of his or her linguistic rights in the issuance of a French 
summons, so also is a person who is living in the Province of Manitoba whose 
language is French entitled under s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 to a similar 
accommodation in the issuance of an English summons. As I stated in 
MacDonald the state's obligation can be discharged by an addendum to the 
 
97 For a comment on the case-law uo to that point, in light of  these three judgments, see 
McPierre Foucher, 'L'interprétation des droits linguistiques constitutionnels par la Cour 
Suprême du Canada' [1987] 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 381; see also the already mentioned first-person 
account by Professor Bilodeau himself, in his article 'La judiciarisation des conflits 
linguistiques au Canada.' 
98 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449. For an account of  the "intense political controversy generated" by this 
case and Manitoba Language Rights, see Gordon H.A. Mackintosh, 'Heading Off  Bilodeau: 
Attempting Constitutional Amendment' [1986] 15 Man. L.J. 271. 
99 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449, § 11. 
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and importance of the document and directing him or her to obtain a 
translation from court officials.'100 
Justice Wilson's line of thought seems quite reasonable and avoids the 
majority's formalistic and "utilitarian" construction, already adopted in 
Manitoba Language Rights. The symmetry he invokes between the treatment of 
anglophones in Quebec and francophones outside Quebec is also an 
interesting perspective, although the Court has adopted, on the whole, a 
different approach.101 
 
5.5 MacDonald (1986): summons issued only in one language are not in 
breach of s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 
As we have already anticipated, the relevant question for our purposes in 
MacDonald v. City of Montreal102 was whether the linguistic rights of an English 
speaker under s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 had been violated by a 
summons (to answer a charge of violating a municipal by-law) issued only in 
French. It was again a case of a speed violation, and it was the opposite 
situation than Bilodeau: in Bilodeau, it was a francophone in a predominantly 
English province being summoned in English, here it was an anglophone in 
Quebec being summoned in French.  
The Court found no violation also in this case: in the Court's words, the 
appellant's main submission was 'that s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives 
to any person, anglophone or francophone, the right to be summoned before 
any court of Canada and any court of Quebec by a process issued in his own 
language, at least where the "State" is a party to the proceedings, such as penal 
or criminal proceedings.'103 
The Court found such submission 'contrary to the plain meaning of s. 
133 as construed'104 in the two Blaikie cases, and therefore ruled tat s. 133 does 
not confer to the appellant a positive right to be summoned in his own 
language. As Justice Beetz put it, 'The only positive duty that I can read in s. 
                                                 
100 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449, § 22. On the notion of  'reasonable accommodation' in the Canadian 
Supreme Court's case-law, although with reference to religious minorities, see Emmanuelle 
Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim and Isabella Rorive, 'Reasonable Accommodation for Religious 
Minorities: A Promising Concept for European Antidiscrimination Law?' [2010] 17(2) 
Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 137, 144-50; for the application of  the notion of  
accommodation to language rights, see instead Xabier Arzoz, 'Accommodating Linguistic 
Difference: Five Normative Models of  Language Rights' [2010] 6 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 102; in 
the Italian scholarship, see for example Donatella Loprieno and Silvio Gambino, 'L'obbligo di 
"accomodamento ragionevole" nel sistema multiculturale canadese' in Rolla (ed) L'apporto 
della Corte suprema alla determinazione dei caratteri dell'ordinamento costituzionale canadese, p. 217. 
101 See our conclusive remarks in § 6. 
102 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460. 
103 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 58. 
104 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 59. 
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133 is the one imposed on the Houses of Parliament of Canada and the 
Legislature of Quebec to use both the English and the French languages in the 
respective Records and Journals of those Houses, as well as the duty to 
legislate in both languages. [...] A negative duty is also imposed by s. 133 on 
everyone not to infringe language rights conferred by the section with respect 
to the language of Parliamentary debates and court proceedings. These are 
constitutionally protected rights and it would be unlawful for instance to expel 
a member of the House of Commons or of the Quebec National Assembly on 
the ground that he uses either French or English in debates, or for a judge of a 
Quebec or a federal court to prevent the use of either language in his court. 
But this duty is not the positive one which the appellant invokes. [...] One sure 
and practical way, and probably the only way for the issuer to discharge his 
alleged duty to accommodate the recipient of a summons would be to issue 
the summons in both the English and French languages, as was suggested in 
Walsh. This would certainly be permissible and might well be desirable but to 
impose it as a duty flowing from s. 133 is to make a mockery of the text of this 
section.'105 
The opinion also considers what - de lege ferenda - would seem a very 
reasonable compromise, namely the interpretation suggested by the Société 
franco-manitobaine: their idea was to distinguish 'between civil proceedings on 
the one hand, and criminal or penal ones on the other. According to this 
suggestion, the initiator of civil processes or proceedings would retain the 
option to choose the language, as was the practice prior to Confederation, but 
in criminal or penal proceedings, the accused would have the right to be 
summoned before courts of criminal or penal jurisdiction in the language of 
his choice. [...] [However,] [i]n my view, this distinction is in no way warranted 
by the language of s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [...] [and would 
therefore amount] to a constitutional amendment beyond the reach of 
ordinary legislators and far outside the province of any court.'106 
However, in this way the opinion arguably considers only the right - of 
the public authorities! - to "speak" and "write" in either official language, but 
downplays the even more important "due process" right of the individual to 
be charged and tried in a language he understands. Justice Beetz is aware of 
the tension between these two poles, but disposes of it, in some way avoiding 
to answer: 'It is axiomatic that everyone has a common law right to a fair 
hearing, including the right to be informed of the case one has to meet and the 
right to make full answer and defence. Where the defendant cannot 
understand the proceedings because he is unable to understand the language in 
which they are being conducted, or because he is deaf, the effective exercise of 
these rights may well impose a consequential duty upon the court to provide 
                                                 
105 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 67-69. 
106 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 82-85. 
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adequate translation. But the right of the defendant to understand what is 
going on in court and to be understood is not a separate right, nor a language 
right, but an aspect of the right to a fair hearing.'107 
It sounds wise: however, the consequence to draw would seem that it is 
necessary to balance fair trial rights (of the individual) with language rights (of 
the authorities); but the opinion does not do that, and simply concludes that 
'[a]t no point did the appellant allege he did not understand the charge or the 
case he had to meet; by his own account, he secured a translation of the 
summons. There is nothing to show that he asked the court for a translation 
and we need not decide whether he would have been entitled to one.'108 
As was anticipated, Justice Wilson dissented, like he did in Bilodeau: 
relying on the legislative history of s. 133, and also on a different reading of 
the two judgments in Blaikie, he argues that s. 133 actually does 'confer a right 
on a litigant to use his or her language in court [...] [and therefore] there is a 
correlative duty on the state to respect and accommodate that right.'109 
Therefore the correct interpretation of s. 133 is that in such provision '[t]wo 
parts are addressed to the state and two parts to the citizen. The parts 
addressed to the state are mandatory; they impose an obligation on the state; 
you must keep bilingual records and journals of both Houses and you must 
print and publish your statutes in both languages. Clearly this is mandatory on 
the state so that the citizens speaking either language can understand them. 
The parts addressed to the citizen, on the other hand, confer rights on the 
citizen; you may use your own language, English or French, in parliamentary 
debates and in court proceedings.'110 
It still remains to understand whether the right to use one's language in 
court proceedings also implies the right to be summoned in that language, and 
here Justice Wilson has a very pragmatic conclusion, that we deem quite 
sound: 
 
In my view the initiating documents emanating from the court 
must as a minimum recognize and accommodate the litigant's right 
to understand and be understood. The ideal form of compliance 
with the state's constitutional obligation would obviously be the 
issuance of bilingual documents. However, it is clear from the 
legislative history of s. 133 that something less than this has 
historically been considered adequate and the legislature did not see 
fit, when it enacted s. 133 and gave constitutional status to the 
litigant's linguistic right, to require the issuance of bilingual 
                                                 
107 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 114. 
108 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 122. 
109 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 159. 
110 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 161. 
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documents. I believe, therefore, that the state's obligation would be 
discharged by an addendum to the initiating document in the 
official language not used in the body of the document to put the 
recipient on notice that this is a directive from the Court 
commanding his or her appearance before it to respond to a charge 
and that translation into the other official language should be 
obtained by application to the appropriate court officials. I think 
this is consistent both with a purposive, as opposed to a literal, 
interpretation of s. 133 and with the legislative background from 
which the section sprang. Nor does it seem too onerous a duty to 
place upon the state.111 
 
5.6 Société des Acadiens (1986): the right to use either official language 
before a court does not imply the right to be judged by a court whose 
members understands that language 
Société des Acadiens v. Association of Parents112 was on a different matter than 
the previous two cases. It was a relatively minor case from New Brunswick 
brought by the Société des Acadiens and an association, involving s. 19(2) of the 
Canadian Charter, which stipulates that '[e]ither English or French may be used 
by any person in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court of 
New Brunswick.' 
The appellants alleged that their "constitutional language rights" were 
infringed because an application for leave to appeal they had previously 
brought had been heard by a panel of three judges, among which sat one 
whose comprehension of French they contested. 
The constitutional issue raised in the case (the only one that concerns us 
here) was therefore whether 's. 19(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms entitle[s] a party pleading in a court of New Brunswick to be heard by 
a court, the member or members of which are capable of understanding the 
proceedings, the evidence and the arguments, written and oral, regardless of 
the official language used by the parties.'113 
There were three opinions: all agreed on dismissing the appeal on factual 
grounds (deeming there was no proof of an insufficient qualification of the 
judge involved). However, the dissents by the Chief Justice Dickson and by 
Justice Wilson would have answered the constitutional question in the 
affirmative, while the majority opinion - written by Justice Beetz - found the 
                                                 
111 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, § 190. 
112 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549. For a (critical) comment in French on this case, see Roger Bilodeau, 
'Une analyse critique de l'affaire Société Des Acadiens Du Nouveau-Brunswick et l'avenir précaire 
du bilinguisme judiciaire Au Canada' [1987] 32 McGill L. J. 232. 
113 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, § 2. 
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right claimed by the appellants only in s. 13(1) of the Official Languages of New 
Brunswick Act, and not in s. 19(2) of the Canadian Charter. 
Indeed s. 13(1) of the New Brunswick statute clearly read: '13 (1) Subject 
to section 15, in any proceeding before a court, any person appearing or giving 
evidence may be heard in the official language of his choice and such choice is 
not to place that person at any disadvantage.' S. 19(2) of the Canadian Charter 
had a different wording, and thus it could not be equated to it. 
The most important aspect of the judgment lies precisely on the 
difference, drawn by Justice Beetz, between language rights like those 
provided by s. 19(2) of the Charter and s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, on 
the one side, and due process rights, like the ones in s. 13(1) of the New 
Brunswick Act, on the other: 
 
It is my view that the rights guaranteed by s. 19(2) of the Charter 
are of the same nature and scope as those guaranteed by s. 133 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 with respect to the courts of Canada and 
the courts of Quebec. As was held by the majority at pp. 498 to 
501 in MacDonald, these are essentially language rights unrelated to 
and not to be confused with the requirements of natural justice. 
These language rights are the same as those which are guaranteed 
by s. 17 of the Charter with respect to parliamentary debates. They 
vest in the speaker or in the writer or issuer of court processes and 
give the speaker or the writer the constitutionally protected power 
to speak or to write in the official language of his choice. And there 
is no language guarantee, either under s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 
1867, or s. 19 of the Charter, any more than under s. 17 of the 
Charter, that the speaker will be heard or understood, or that he has 
the right to be heard or understood in the language of his choice.114 
 
The common law right of the parties to be heard and understood 
by a court and the right to understand what is going on in court is 
not a language right but an aspect of the right to a fair hearing. It is 
a broader and more universal right than language rights. It extends 
to everyone including those who speak or understand neither 
official language. It belongs to the category of rights which in the 
Charter are designated as legal rights and indeed it is protected at 
least in part by provisions such as those of ss. 7 and 14 of the 
Charter.115 
 
                                                 
114 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, § 53. 
115 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, § 60. 
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And finally, in a passage very often quoted in later judgments (in spite of 
the fact that, as we shall see, the main holding of this case will be reversed): 
 
Unlike language rights which are based on political compromise, 
legal rights tend to be seminal in nature because they are rooted in 
principle. Some of them, such as the one expressed in s. 7 of the 
Charter, are so broad as to call for frequent judicial determination. 
Language rights, on the other hand, although some of them have 
been enlarged and incorporated into the Charter, remain 
nonetheless founded on political compromise. 
This essential difference between the two types of rights dictates a 
distinct judicial approach with respect to each. More particularly, 
the courts should pause before they decide to act as instruments of 
change with respect to language rights. This is not to say that 
language rights provisions are cast in stone and should remain 
immune altogether from judicial interpretation. But, in my opinion, 
the courts should approach them with more restraint than they 
would in construing legal rights.116 
 
This premiss leads the majority to conclude that s. 19(2) should not be 
interpreted in the way advocated for by the appellants, a conclusion not shared 
by Chief Justice Dickson or by Justice Wilson. In particular, the former 
objected that 'the Charter was designed primarily to recognize the rights and 
freedoms of individuals vis-à-vis the State. When acting in their official 
capacities on behalf of the State, therefore, judges and court officials do not 
enjoy unconstrained language liberties. Rather, they are invested with certain 
duties and responsibilities in their service to the community. This extends to 
the duty to give a meaningful language choice to litigants appearing before 
them.'117 
To conclude on this case with a comparative note, for the record the 
recently enacted Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings,118 set to be transposed by Member States by October 2013, also did 
not go as far as providing for a right to be heard by a judge who understands 
the language of the accused (to be sure, such requirement was in fact imposed 
in Canada in the later case that - as anticipated - essentially reversed the 
holding of Société des Acadiens, and that will be considered at length in § 5.14). 
 
                                                 
116 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, § 63-5. 
117 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, § 23. 
118 OJ L 280 of  26.10.2010. 
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5.7 R. v. Mercure (1988): an accused person has a right to enter a plea in 
the official language of his choice 
Two years after MacDonald, Société des Acadiens and Bilodeau, the Court 
applied the principles established in those three cases in R. v. Mercure.119 Mr 
Mercure also exploited a speed ticket to bring an application with much 
broader consequences, this time in the competent court in Saskatchewan. His 
application was 'to enter a plea in the French language, to have the trial 
proceeded with in that language, and to have the hearing delayed until the 
relevant statutes were produced in the French language.'120 
The majority opinion by Justice La Forest dismissed the second and 
third claim, on the grounds of its recent precedents: 'It seems to me that many 
of the issues surrounding the second issue have already been dealt with in 
the Société des Acadiens case. The appellant was entitled only to use French, not 
to require others to do so. As to the request that a French version of the 
statutes be produced, this appears to be covered by the similar case of Bilodeau 
[...] in relation to s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. The majority of the Court 
there held that the principle of the rule of law would preserve the 
enforceability of the conviction of the appellant there, and if that were all I 
would be prepared to follow a similar course here.'121 
However, the majority found that the appellant did have a right to enter 
a plea in French: the fact that he was not granted such right vitiated the whole 
trial, therefore the appeal was allowed. What is more relevant are anyway some 
of the statements made by the Court in relation to this first claim. They are 
worth quoting extensively: 
 
[I]t is settled by Société des Acadiens that while a person is 
constitutionally entitled to speak French in court in New 
Brunswick under s. 19(2) of  the Charter, he has no right to be 
understood in that language. The judge and all court officials may 
use English or French as they wish both in oral and in written 
communication; see also MacDonald v. City of  Montreal, supra, at pp. 
483 and 497. As I read Beetz J.'s judgment in Société des Acadiens, the 
appellant has no right to a translator, except as required for a fair 
trial either at common law or under ss. 7 and 14 of  the Charter (p. 
577). The right to be understood is not a language right but one 
arising out of  the requirements of  due process. Beetz J. in Société des 
Acadiens carefully employs the word "power" to describe the 
                                                 
119 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234. Two years later, there was a further follow-up in R. v. Paquette [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 1103, a judgment delivered orally by the Court, that simply stated that Mercure 
thoroughly disposed of  the question at bar. 
120 1988] 1 S.C.R. 234, 281. 
121 Ibidem. 
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language rights accorded an individual. He says, at p. 574: "They 
vest in the speaker or in the writer or issuer of  court processes and 
give the speaker or the writer the constitutionally 
protected power to speak or to write in the official language of  his 
choice" (emphasis added). At page 575, he contrasts this power to 
language provisions that provide for the right to communicate (s. 
20 of  the Charter) or to be heard (s. 13(1) of  the Official Languages of  
New Brunswick Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. O-1). 
Applying these principles to the present case, it seems to me that 
the trial judge could, subject to what I shall have to say later about 
records, proceed with the trial in English. There is no evidence to 
indicate that the appellant needed the services of  a translator to 
understand the proceedings, so a fair trial could be conducted 
without making a translation available from English to French. At 
all events, what the appellant sought throughout these proceedings 
was to vindicate his language rights, not the right to a fair 
hearing.122 
 
So the issue is raised again of the relationship between language and fair 
trial rights, and this case is particularly helpful in order to clarify the difference 
between the two categories. 
Mercure also explored an issue not raised in Société des Acadiens: in that 
case, 'the issue was whether the judge understood the appellant (which it was 
held he did). Beetz J., however, left to another day the issues regarding the 
reasonable means necessary to ensure that the members of the courts 
understand the proceedings. He also did not deal with the issue, which has 
some relation to the matters just mentioned, whether when proceedings are 
required by law to be recorded, a person using one or the other official 
language has the right to have his remarks recorded in that language. Nor did 
that issue arise in MacDonald or Bilodeau [...]. These cases were essentially 
addressed to whether processes validly made in one only of the official 
languages were required to be translated in the other. As already mentioned, 
however, it does arise in the present case, both as regards the making of a plea 
and the giving of evidence by the appellant. In my view, the appellant's right 
or power to use French would be seriously truncated if recorded in another 
language. For his use of the language goes beyond the immediate forum. The 
proceedings, for example, may continue in the Court of Appeal where the 
judges may quite properly wish to refer to the exact words used by a person at 
trial, words that person has a right to use. Absent valid legislation requiring the 
recording of the appellant's statements in one language only, and none was 
brought to our attention, the appellant would seem to me to have a right to 
                                                 
122 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234, 273-4. 
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have his statements recorded in the French language. His situation, of course, 
differs from that of a person who uses a language other than English or 
French whose rights to translation derive solely from the requirements of due 
process.'123 
Justice La Forest here is touching on a by no means minor aspect, in fact 
a critical one to a full protection of language rights in the courtroom set. Quite 
surprisingly, though, the already mentioned Directive 2010/64/EU did not 
provide for a right to record-keeping in the language chosen by the accused. 
 
5.8 Forget (1988): the exemption of French-educated persons from the 
French knowledge test required for admission to Quebec professional 
corporations did not discriminate against non-francophones 
But in 1988 the Court also decided another round of three important 
cases, all from Quebec: Forget, Ford and Devine.124 
Forget v. Quebec (Attorney General)125 was brought by a nursing assistant to 
challenge, inter alia, section 2(a) of the Regulation respecting the knowledge of the 
official language necessary to obtain a permit from a professional corporation. The 
Regulation had been enacted in accordance with s. 35 of the Charter of the 
French language, which requires professional orders to issue permits only 'to 
persons whose knowledge of the official language is appropriate to the 
practice of their profession.' 
Ms Forget needed a permit from the Corporation professionnelle des infirmiers 
et infirmières auxiliaires du Québec, in order to be allowed to practice her job: 
under s. 2(a) of the Regulation, those who have 'taken at least three years of full 
time instruction given in French, at the secondary level or later' are presumed 
to have enough knowledge of French to meet the appropriateness level 
required, whereas those who have not, need to prove their knowledge of 
French by passing a specific examination. 
Ms Forget did not satisfy the former condition, so she had to take the 
test, but she failed, and then challenged its very legitimacy, alleging that it 
amounted to a discrimination against her on the basis of language, contrary to 
s. 10 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. 
Drawing on what the Court of Appeal for Quebec had stated in Johnson v. 
Commission des affaires sociales,126 the majority in Forget outlined the three 
necessary conditions for a finding of discrimination under s. 10, which have 
always been applied since: '(1) a "distinction, exclusion or preference", (2) 
                                                 
123 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234, 275-6. 
124 For a comment covering all three, see Daniel Proulx, La norme québécoise d'égalité 
dérape en Cour suprême: commentaire des arrêts Forget, Devine et Ford [1990] 24 R.J.T. n.s. 
375. 
125 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90. 
126 [1984] C.A. 61. 
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based on one of the grounds listed in the first paragraph, and (3) which "has 
the effect of nullifying or impairing" the right to full and equal recognition and 
exercise of a human right or freedom.'127 
In the case at bar, the Court found that the first two conditions were 
met, but the third one was not: 'the distinction created by the subject 
Regulations is based on language within the meaning of s. 10 of the Charter. 
The two groups of candidates that result from this distinction are divided 
along language lines--the fact that in general their mother tongue or language 
of use is, or is not, French. In other words, most candidates who benefit from 
the presumption will be francophones, while those who take the test will be 
for the most part non-francophones.'128 
However - and with the caveat that s. 35 itself had not being challenged 
by Ms Forget - 'the right to equality set forth in s. 10 of the Charter does not 
mean that all candidates for a professional corporation have to be treated in 
the same way. [...] In view of the undisputed requirement that candidates have 
a knowledge of French, Regulations that make distinctions to take account of 
the language skills of individuals do not prima facie compromise the right to 
equality.'129 
In short, 'in the instant case non-francophones are not prohibited from 
joining a professional corporation on grounds that are arbitrary and have 
nothing to do with the required aptitudes. On the contrary, the Regulations 
enacted by the Office allow them to show that they possess the necessary 
skills, namely an appropriate knowledge of French, to be admitted to a 
professional corporation. It should be borne in mind that this requirement is 
imposed by s. 35 of the Charter of the French language, and this provision is 
not being challenged. The impugned Regulations do not reject non-
francophones outright, they offer them a means of establishing that they meet 
this requirement. [...]. Far from being an arbitrary obstacle for a professional 
candidate, the Regulations facilitate admission to the corporation while 
remaining consistent with the requirements of the Act.'130 
As a result, the presumption laid out in the Regulation was 'reasonable [...] 
and justified in the context of the objective sought by s. 35 of the Act,'131 
therefore the challenged provision could not be considered discriminatory on 
any ground. 
                                                 
127 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90, § 10. 
128 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90, § 17. 
129 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90, § 21. 
130 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90, § 24. 
131 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 90, § 33. 
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5.9 Ford (1988): Quebec's rules requiring the use of French only in 
public signs and company names were not proportionate to the goal of 
protecting the French language, and unlawfully discriminatory against 
the English-speaking minority 
A few months after Forget, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its 
judgment in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),132 a landmark case among the 
ones we are considering. 
Ford focussed on two provisions (and the relevant penalties for 
infringing them) in Quebec's Charter of the French Language, ss. 58 and 69, 
respectively requiring 'public signs and posters and commercial advertising' to 
'be solely in the official language' (i.e. in French), and allowing to use 'only the 
French version of a firm name' in Quebec. The question raised, for that 
matter, was whether such provision violated 'the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s. 3 of 
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,'133 on the one hand, and the 
prohibition to discriminate on the basis of language, on the other. 
As far as the former is concerned, Ford first clarified that, 'in so far as 
this issue is concerned, the words "freedom of expression" in s. 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter should be given the same 
meaning.'134 
Then, the Court made a very important statement, affirming what had 
already been said by the lower courts: the 'freedom of expression includes the 
freedom to express oneself in the language of one's choice.'135 Indeed: 
 
Language is so intimately related to the form and content of 
expression that there cannot be true freedom of expression by 
means of language if one is prohibited from using the language of 
one's choice. Language is not merely a means or medium of 
expression; it colours the content and meaning of expression. It is, 
as the preamble of the Charter of the French Language itself indicates, a 
means by which a people may express its cultural identity. It is also 
the means by which the individual expresses his or her personal 
identity and sense of individuality.136 
 
                                                 
132 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. For a comment, see John D. McAlphine and Allan C. Donovan, 'Case 
comments: Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General). Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General)' 
[1988] 23 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 615. 
133 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, § 1. 
134 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, § 39. 
135 Ibidem. 
136 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, § 40. On the link between language and cultural identity (an issue 
often raised in the following cases), see broadly, in the Italian scholarship, Valeria Piergigli, 
Lingue minoritarie e identità culturali (Giuffrè 2001). 
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The Court was making a very important point: it was including linguistic 
rights within the realm of freedom of expression, therefore it was ascribing 
them to the typically individualistic dimension of civil rights, rather than to the 
collective dimension of social rights. This dual nature of language rights runs 
underneath any discourse on them,137 and emerges in the Canadian Supreme 
Court's case-law as well: here, the issue involved was that of some shop 
owners resisting the duty to use only French in the signs and advertising for 
their businesses, therefore it was a typical example of commercial speech, by 
all means an individualistic right; but in later cases, just like in the preamble to 
the Quebec Charter, also the collective dimension of linguistic rights was at 
stake, providing clear evidence of such "dual nature" feature of linguistic 
rights.138 
The Court then moved on to the proportionality analysis, so typical of 
Canadian constitutional adjudication,139 considering 'whether the limit 
imposed on freedom of expression by ss. 58 and 69 of the Charter of the French 
Language [wa]s justified under s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms and s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'140 
The Court first explained that, in spite of its different wording, s. 9.1 of 
the Quebec Charter was 'a justificatory provision corresponding to s. 1 of the 
Canadian Charter [...] subject, in its application, to a similar test of rational 
connection and proportionality,'141 therefore the analysis to be conducted is 
the same for the two provisions. As for the merits, the justices held that the 
materials brought about by the respondents to uphold the legitimacy of the 
challenged provisions 'establish that the aim of the language policy underlying 
                                                 
137 See for example the analysis and the literature referred to in Leigh Oakes, 'Promoting 
language rights as fundamental individual rights: France as a model?' [2011] 9 French Politics 
50, 52-55. 
138 On which see, inter alia, Lauri Mälksoo, 'Language Rights in International Law: Why the 
Phoenix is Still in the Ashes' [2000] 12 Fla. J. Int'l Law 431, and in particular 432-48; for a 
specific focus on the Canadian situation, see Gordon S. Campbell, 'Language, Equality and 
the Charter: collective versus individual rights in Canada and beyond' [1993] 4 NJCL 29; 
Maxwell Yalden, 'Collective claims on the human rights landscape: a Canadian view' [1993] 1 
Int'l J. Group Rts. 17; for a look at this issue in European law, see Robert F. Weber, 'Individual 
Rights and Group Rights in the European Union’s Approach to Minority Languages' [2007] 
17(2) Duke J. of  Comp. & Int'l L. 361; in the Italian scholarship, see for instance Donatella 
Loprieno, 'La politica linguistica del Québec tra diritti individuali e diritti collettivi' in 
Gambino and (eds), Il Canada: un laboratorio costituzionale. Federalismo, Diritti, Corti, p. 305; Palici 
di Suni, Intorno alle minoranze, 201-5. 
139 The most important contributions, in the recent scholarship on Canadian proportionality, 
are the ones by Dieter Grimm, 'Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence' [2007] 57 U. Toronto L.J. 383, and by Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, 
'Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism' [2008] 47 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 72, 
113-124. 
140 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, §§ 61-73. 
141 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, § 63. 
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the Charter of the French Language was a serious and legitimate one. They indicate 
the concern about the survival of the French language and the perceived need 
for an adequate legislative response to the problem. Moreover, they indicate a 
rational connection between protecting the French language and assuring that 
the reality of Quebec society is communicated through the "visage linguistique." 
The section 1 and s. 9.1 materials do not, however, demonstrate that the 
requirement of the use of French only is either necessary for the achievement 
of the legislative objective or proportionate to it.'142 
In other words, the Court deemed it excessive to impose the use of 
French only in order to pursue the legitimate goal of safeguarding this 
language. Interestingly, the Court did not just anyway limit itself to the pars 
destruens, but rather it suggested some possible, less restrictive alternatives. 
Typically, instead of prohibiting the use of languages different than French, on 
public signs and posters, in commercial advertising and in names, Quebec 
could have legitimately 'requir[ed] the predominant display of the French 
language, even its marked predominance [...]. French could be required in 
addition to any other language or it could be required to have greater visibility 
than that accorded to other languages. [...] But exclusivity for the French 
language has not survived the scrutiny of proportionality test and does not 
reflect the reality of Quebec society,'143 that also includes an English-speaking 
minority which cannot be overlooked. 
The other challenge moved to ss. 58 and 69 in Ford was about s. 10 of 
the Quebec Charter, prohibiting discriminations based on several grounds, 
including language: even though it would not have been necessary to decide 
this issue, in view of the conclusions already reached on freedom of 
expression grounds, the Court decided to consider it as well, also because the 
same issue had also been raised in Devine, a case that had proceeded in parallel 
to Ford (see the following paragraph). 
Applying the three-prong test of Forget, the Court concluded that ss. 58 
and 69 infringed s. 10 of the Quebec Charter: such provisions had the effect 'of 
impinging differentially on different classes of persons according to their 
language of use. Francophones are permitted to use their language of use while 
anglophones and other non-francophones are prohibited from doing so,' and 
this amounted to 'nullifying the right to full and equal recognition and exercise' 
of the 'freedom to express oneself in the language of one's choice, which has 
been held to be recognized by s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.'144 
To conclude, one last remark on Ford concerns its discussion of a series 
of cases from the European Commission of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights. The Attorney General of Quebec had indeed relied 
                                                 
142 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, § 73. 
143 Ibidem. 
144 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, § 82. 
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on such cases in advocating for the legitimacy of the challenged provisions. In 
§ 44, the Court distinguishes the cases - that are even included in the list of 
cases cited at the beginning of the judgment - and reaches a different 
conclusion, but nonetheless, by extensively discussing them, it shows a 
remarkable openness towards the use of foreign and comparative materials, 
which is shared by all the justices: quite to the opposite, their American 
colleagues are sharply divided on this issue, with Scalia famously advocating 
against reliance on foreign law to decide cases before an American court.145 
 
5.10 Devine (1988): Quebec's requirement that leaflets, order forms, 
invoices and the like were written in French was legitimate because the 
contextual use of English was not disallowed 
As we already anticipated in the previous paragraph, Devine v. Quebec 
(Attorney General)146 proceeded in parallel to Ford, and was decided on the same 
day, immediately after it. The case was brought by some local businesses and 
business owners in Montreal, to challenge - in the Court's syllabus words - 'the 
validity of ss. 52, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61 of the Charter of the French Language, 
R.S.Q., c. C-11, and the Regulation respecting the language of commerce and business. 
Sections 52 and 57 require that certain items be drawn up in French. These 
sections, read with s. 89 of the Charter of the French Language, permit the use of 
another language together with the French. Section 58 requires that "Public 
signs and posters and commercial advertising shall be solely in" French. 
Sections 59, 60 and 61 create exceptions to s. 58.' 
First, for that matter, the Court denied that the challenged provisions 
requiring the "joint use" of French amounted to 'an unconstitutional barrier to 
the mobility which is a protected feature of the Canadian Constitution, 
reflected in s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867, inhering in Canadian citizenship 
and now guaranteed by s. 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. [...] 
[T]he challenged provisions do not impose conditions which present an 
unacceptable obstacle to mobility. They are conditions with which anyone may 
comply [...]. The challenged provisions are not designed to prevent people 
from entering the province. They are simply conditions of doing business in 
the province with which anyone may comply.'147 
However, moving on with the analysis, the Court pointed out that 
'sections 59, 60 and 61 as well as ss. 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 19 of 
the Regulation respecting the language of commerce and business create[d] exceptions to 
                                                 
145 See Norman Dorsen, 'The relevance of  foreign legal materials in U.S. constitutional cases: 
A conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer' [2005] 3(4) Int. J. 
Comparative Law 519; see also Jeremy Waldron, 'Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium' 
[2005] 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129. 
146 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790. 
147 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, § 19. 
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s. 58', but since s. 58 had been struck down in Ford, they could not survive 'in 
isolation,'148 and consequently had to be declared of no force or effect as well. 
As for '[t]he remaining sections, 52 and 57, if they are preserved, neither 
cause unintended results in the overall legislative scheme, nor conflict with s. 
2(b) of the Canadian Charter or s. 3 of the Quebec Charter as interpreted 
in Ford. Their subsistence does not cause unintended results because they are 
not dependent on s. 58 for their meaning, as were ss. 59, 60 and 61. Similarly, 
their continued existence does not infringe either Charter because, while ss. 52 
and 57 provide for the publication of such items as catalogues, brochures, 
order forms and invoices in French, they do not require the exclusive use of 
French. Section 89 makes it clear that where exclusive use of French is not 
explicitly required by the Act, the official language and another language may 
be used together. Following the reasons in Ford, permitting joint use passes the 
scrutiny required by s. 1 of the Canadian Charter and s. 9.1 of the 
Quebec Charter. The rational connection between protecting the French 
language and assuring that the reality of Quebec is communicated through the 
"visage linguistique" by requiring signs to be in French was there established. The 
same logic applies to communication through such items as brochures, 
catalogues, order forms and invoices, and the rational connection is again 
demonstrated. Sections 52 and 57 are therefore sustainable under s. 9.1 of the 
Quebec Charter, and s. 57--the only one of the two subject to the 
Canadian Charter--is sustainable thereunder by virtue of s. 1.'149 
Finally, the Court also considered a few other issues: in particular, the 
most relevant for our analysis is 'whether ss. 52 and 57 [we]re [nonetheless] 
contrary to s. 10 of the Quebec Charter,'150 to which it was answered that 
'sections 52 and 57 do create a distinction based on language of use but do not 
have the effect of impairing or nullifying rights guaranteed under s. 3. They 
thus conform to the Quebec Charter.'151 
 
5.11 Quebec government's reaction to Ford and Devine and the current 
legislation 
The government of Quebec immediately reacted to the holdings in 
Devine and most of all Ford, by 'introduc[ing] an amendment to the language 
law that would maintain unilingual French signs outside premises while 
permitting the use of bilingual signs inside. To ensure that the amendment 
would not become the object of another legal challenge, the amending 
legislation invoked the legislative override authority of section 33 and the 
similar provision in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. This 
                                                 
148 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, § 25. 
149 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, § 27. 
150 Ibidem. 
151 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, § 30. 
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marked the first time that the override had been used in direct response to a 
Supreme Court of Canada decision, rather than in anticipation of litigation. [...] 
In 1993, when the notwithstanding clause reached the end of its five-year life, 
the Quebec National Assembly lifted the ban on English language signs and 
amended the law to require only that French be “markedly predominant.” The 
amended legislation was not protected by a notwithstanding clause.'152 
The laws referred to in the previous quote were both titled An Act to 
amend the Charter of the French Language: the former153 was also called Bill 178, the 
latter154 Bill 86. 
After the amendment by s. 1 of Bill 178, s. 58 read: 
 
58. Public signs and posters and commercial advertising, outside or 
intended for the public outside, shall be solely in French. Similarly, 
public signs and posters and commercial advertising shall be solely 
in French, 1. Inside commercial centres and their access ways, 
except inside the establishments located there; 2. Inside any public 
means of transport and its access ways; 3. Inside the establishments 
of business firms contemplated in Section 136; 4. Inside the 
establishments of business firms employing fewer than fifty but 
more than five persons, where such firms share, with two or more 
other business firms, the use of a trademark, a firm name or an 
appellation by which they are known to the public. The 
Government may, however, by regulation, prescribe the terms and 
conditions according to which public signs and posters and public 
advertising may be both in French and in another language, under 
the conditions set forth in the second paragraph of Section 58.1, 
inside the establishments of business firms contemplated in 
subparagraphs 3 and 4 of the second paragraph. The Government 
may, in such regulation, establish categories of business firms, 
prescribe terms and conditions which vary according to the 
category and reinforce the conditions set forth in the second 
paragraph of Section 58.1.155 
 
S. 18 of Bill 86 again amended the formula of s. 58, and it has not 
changed any more. In its current version, it reads: 
                                                 
152 Johansen and Rosen, The Notwithstanding Clause of  the Charter, pp. 10-1: as explained 
by Hogg and Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislators (Or Perhaps 
The Charter Of  Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All), p. 84, 'the passions that supported 
Quebec’s draconian French-language policies had [indeed] died down enough that the 
government felt able to abandon the notwithstanding clause.' 
153 R.S.Q. 1988, c. 54. 
154 R.S.Q. 1993, c. 40. 
155 The notwithstanding clause was in s. 10. 
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58. Public signs and posters and commercial advertising must be in 
French. They may also be both in French and in another language 
provided that French is markedly predominant. However, the 
Government may determine, by regulation, the places, cases, 
conditions or circumstances where public signs and posters and 
commercial advertising must be in French only, where French need 
not be predominant or where such signs, posters and advertising 
may be in another language only. 
 
Let us just clarify that the use of the notwithstanding clause by the 
Province of Quebec in reaction to Ford was possible because, even though the 
controversy concerned linguistic rights, in fact the challenge had been brought 
on freedom of expression (and prohibition of discrimination) grounds, and 
not on the specific linguistic rights protected by sections 16-23 of the Canadian 
Charter, the only ones that cannot be derogated by a notwithstanding clause 
under s. 33. 
 
5.12 Mahe (1990): linguistic education rights in the Canadian Charter 
must be granted according to a "sliding scale" of requirement, the 
more demanding the more the number of eligible students warrants 
Mahe v. Alberta,156 together with Arsenault-Cameron, is the key case for 
determining the principles applicable to linguistic minority rights in the field of 
education, one of the most important areas of any pro-minority policy; both 
cases dealt essentially with the interpretation of s. 23 of the Canadian Charter 
(Minority Language Educational Rights). 
Mahe was the first case where the Court was faced with the task of 
determining the scope of such provision.157 It was brought by some "s. 23 
parents", i.e. people who were educated in French, lived in a province 
(specifically, it was Edmonton area in Alberta) where French was a minority 
language, and had school age children ("s. 23 students"): due to these 
qualifications, these parents had the right, under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter, 
'to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction' in 
French in their province. 
However, they deemed their s. 23 rights had not been 'satisfied by the 
existing educational system in Edmonton nor by the legislation under which it 
operate[d, allegedly] resulting in an erosion of their cultural heritage, contrary 
to the spirit and intent of the Charter. In particular, the appellants argue[d] that 
s. 23 guarantees the right, in Edmonton, to the "management and control" of 
                                                 
156 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342. For a comment on this case, see Robert G. Richards, 'Mahe v. Alberta: 
Management and Control of  Minority Language Education' [1990] 36 McGill L. J. 216. 
157 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 22 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
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a minority-language school -- that is, to a Francophone school run by a 
Francophone school board.'158 In order to answer, the Court had to 
'determine the meaning of s. 23 of the Charter.'159 
struct
ol, they did not demand freedom from 
gover
n the area concerned is 
large 
                                                
The Court thus explained that: 
 
The general purpose of s. 23 is clear: it is to preserve and promote 
the two official languages of Canada, and their respective cultures, 
by ensuring that each language flourishes, as far as possible, in 
provinces where it is not spoken by the majority of the 
population. The section aims at achieving this goal by granting 
minority language educational rights to minority language parents 
throughout Canada. My reference to cultures is significant: it is 
based on the fact that any broad guarantee of language rights, 
especially in the context of education, cannot be separated from a 
concern for the culture associated with the language. Language is 
more than a mere means of communication, it is part and parcel of 
the identity and culture of the people speaking it.  It is the means 
by which individuals understand themselves and the world around 
them.160 
 
Therefore the appellants were 'fully justified in submitting that "history 
reveals that s. 23 was designed to correct, on a national scale, the progressive 
erosion of minority official language groups and to give effect to the concept 
of the 'equal partnership' of the two official language groups in the context of 
education." [...] Section 23 confers upon a group a right which places positive 
obligations on government to alter or develop major institutional 
ures.'161 
The linguistic rights at issue in this case were therefore group rights, not 
rights of the individual like in Ford: here the appellants claimed - in their 
position of members of a group - that the government afforded them enough 
money to run a French-only scho
nment interference as in Ford. 
The right to have one's children educated in French implies indeed a 
cost, paid out of public funds: this is why subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) limit 
such right to the cases where the number of children i
enough. But when is such number large enough? 
 
158 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 11 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
159 Ibidem. 
160 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 23 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. The Court 
refers here to Ford, that had recognized 'the cultural importance of  language' at [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 712, 748-9. 
161 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, pp. 25-6 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
 5/2012 Working Paper CDCT‐ELC 
 
51www.eulegalculture.di.unito.it 
Mahe answers this question, establishing the interpretation of s. 23(3) that 
is still followed by the Court: 's. 23 should be viewed as encompassing a "sliding 
scale" of requirement, with subs. (3)(b) indicating the upper level of this range 
and the term "instruction" in subs. (3)(a) indicating the lower level.  The idea of a 
sliding scale is simply that s. 23 guarantees whatever type and level of rights and 
servic
re of s. 23 suggests that pedagogical 
consi
schools in Edmonton [we]re [not] sufficient to mandate under s. 23 the 
es is appropriate in order to provide minority language instruction for the 
particular number of students involved.'162 
This means that, as the appellants claimed, 's. 23 mandates, where the 
numbers warrant, a measure of management and control:'163 but what is such 
measure? Here comes the "sliding scale": 'In some circumstances an 
independent Francophone school board is necessary to meet the purpose of 
s. 23.  However, where the number of students enrolled in minority schools is 
relatively small, the ability of an independent board to fulfill this purpose may 
be reduced and other approaches may be appropriate:'164 indeed 'completely 
separate school boards are not necessarily the best means of fulfilling the 
purpose of s. 23.  What is essential, however, to satisfy that purpose is that the 
minority language group have control over those aspects of education which 
pertain to or have an effect upon their language and culture.  This degree of 
control can be achieved to a substantial extent by guaranteeing representation 
of the minority on a shared school board and by giving these representatives 
exclusive control over all of the aspects of minority education which pertain to 
linguistic and cultural concerns.'165 To conclude, 'the relevant figure for s. 23 
purposes is the number of persons who will eventually take advantage of the 
contemplated programme or facility. [...] The numbers warrant provision 
requires, in general, that two factors be taken into account in determining what 
s. 23 demands: (1) the services appropriate, in pedagogical terms, for the 
numbers of students involved; and (2) the cost of the contemplated 
services,'166 even though 'the remedial natu
derations will have more weight than financial requirements in 
determining whether numbers warrant.'167 
Applying all these principles to the specific situation in Edmonton under 
review, the Court concludes that 'requiring a Francophone school, together 
with a degree of management and control to the parents, is [...] a reasonable 
requirement,' while the 'numbers of students likely to attend Francophone 
                                                 
162 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 27 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
163 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 31 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. For a 
reflection on the "numbers warrant" requirement, see Leslie Green, 'Are Language Rights 
Fundamental?' [1987] 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 639, 666-9. 
164 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 35 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
165 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 37 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
166 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 46 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
167 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 47 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
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establishment of an independent Francophone school board.'168 'Since such 
rights were not provided at the time, the Court mandated the Province to 
'enact legislation (and regulations, if necessary), that [we]re in all respects 
consi
 of subs. (3)(b), replies to it by relying on 
the French version of this provision: 
stent with the provisions of s. 23 of the Charter.'169 
Finally, one last aspect of the decision deserves mentioning, connected 
to the issues of traductology and of interpretation of bilingual legal 
documents, that we hinted at in § 1: it is the fact that the Court, facing a 
possible objection to its interpretation
 
I recognize that the English text of subs. (3)(b) is perhaps 
ambiguous:  the phrase "minority language educational facilities" 
could either mean the facilities of the minority, or the facilities for the 
minority.  The French text, however, is clearer.  It has been stated on 
several occasions by this Court, that where there is an ambiguity in 
one version of the Charter, and the other version is less ambiguous, 
then the meaning of the less ambiguous version should be 
dopted.170 a
 
The Court thus reaffirms what it indicates as a consolidated rule of 
interpretation, namely that, in case of some ambiguity in one version of the 
Charter, resort must be made to the version in the other language. As easily 
predictable, the European Court of Justice has reached similar conclusions when 
faced with the same problem of some piece of EU legislation that has not the 
same meaning in all the linguistic versions: the straightforward difference is that 
the EU has not just two but 23 official languages, which can sometimes make it 
                                                 
168 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 50 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
169 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, p. 51 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
170 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, pp. 31-2 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
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very easy to spot the "outcast" version,171 but some other times can make things 
fairly 
case proceeded then by way of 
reference, and in front of the Supreme Court it concerned two of the originally 
three
of  the Charter mean? In particular, does it include the right 
         
complicated.172 
5.13 Reference re Public Schools Act (1993), or the application of Mahe 
Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), s. 79(3), (4) and (7)173 came a few 
years after Mahe and thoroughly applied the principles laid down in that case. 
It originated as a statement of claim filed by the Fédération provinciale des comités 
de Parents Inc. and by some individual co-plaintiffs, in order to request relief 
under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter. The 
 constitutional questions, that is to say: 
 
1. What does the right to have one's children receive instruction "in 
minority language educational facilities" guaranteed by section 
23(3)(b) 
to have one's children receive instruction in a distinct physical 
setting? 
                                        
otorious example of  "outcast" version is the case of  art. 3 of  the Council Dire
/EEC of  5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts: while the ot
ges are unequivocal in declaring a contractual clause unfair if  it was included "con
 requirement of  good faith" (the French version re
171 A n ctive 
93/13 her 
langua trary 
to the ads "en dépit de l'exigence de bonne foi", 
the German one "entgegen dem Gebot von Treu und Glauben ", the Spanish one "pese a las 
exigen
Legge 6 febbraio 1996, n. 52 (IPSOA 1996), p. 16; Enzo Roppo, Clausole vessatorie (nuova 
normativa), in Enc. Giur. Treccani (Ed. Enc. It. 1996), vol. VI, p. 5). 
172 Some very good examples are provided by the already mentioned law review article by 
f  Health (6 
e Renvoi Relatif  a 
cias de la buena fe"), the Italian equivalent says something very different. Indeed the 
Italian version considers a contractual term unfair if  it was adopted "malgrado il requisito della 
buona fede" (emphasis added), which literally means "in spite of  the requirement of  good 
faith" (the thesis of  a mistake in the Italian translation is shared for example by Giorgio Cian, 
'Il nuovo capo XIV-bis (titolo II, libro IV) del codice civile, sulla disciplina dei contratti con i 
consumatori' [1996] 2 Studim Iuris 411, 415; Giorgio De Nova, Le clausole vessatorie: art. 25, 
Solan, 'The Interpretation of  Multilingual Statutes by the European Court of  Justice': see in 
particular Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of  Ulm (12 November 1969); Case 90/83, Michael 
Paterson and others v W. Weddel & Company Limited and others (22 March 1984); 
Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom (28 March 1985); Case 228-87, Pretura unificata di 
Torino v. X (22 September 1988); Case C-484/04, Commission v. United Kingdom (7 September 
2006) (as can be easily understood, the issue is particularly sensitive when the interpretation 
has some influence on a criminal proceeding, such as in Pretura unificata di Torino and Paterson v 
Weddel). Other important cases include Case C-361/01, P Christina Kik v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (9 September 2003), and 
Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry o
October 1982). See also the cases and the literature mentioned supra, at footnote 6. 
173 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839. For a comment on this case, see Benoît Pelletier, 'L
la Loi Sur Les Ecoles Publiques du Manitoba' [1993] 25 Ottawa L. Rev. 81. 
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2. (i)Do section 23 and section 15 of  the Charter grant any right of  
management or control in connection with section 23's guarantees of  
French language instruction and facilities? 
(ii)If  so, do the provisions in Part I, II, and III of  The Public Schools 
Act concerning the formation of  school divisions and districts, the 
election of  school boards, and the powers and duties of  school 
boards meet Manitoba's constitutional obligations with reference to 
ly refer to distinct physical settings in its discussion on schools as 
cultu
such a right of  management and control? If  not, in what essential 
elements do the provisions fail to do so?174 
 
As mentioned, to decide the case the Court extensively relied on Mahe, 
which had not yet been released when the case was filed before the Supreme 
Court: as for the former question, it stated that '[w]hile this Court in Mahe did 
not explicit
ral centres, it seems reasonable to infer that some distinctiveness in the 
physical setting is required to successfully fulfil this role,'175 therefore the 
answer given had to be in the affirmative, with the caveat that 'the concept of a 
right to "distinct physical setting" does not automatically translate into a right 
to facilities that are entirely separate,'176 depending on the circumstances of 
any specific case, and as a consequence 'the assessment of what will constitute 
appropriate facilities should only be undertaken on the basis of a distinct 
geographic unit within the province.'177 
Cour rant, 
at lea hool 
board 'not 
provi ents of French-language students to have management and 
control over French-language education as required under s. 23 of the 
Chart
nd the setting 
                                                
As for the second question, it was also mostly disposed by Mahe: the 
t clarified that the numbers relative to the province of Manitoba war
st in some areas, 'the establishment of a separate Francophone sc
,'178 and that the legislation then in force in that province179 did 
de for the par
er.'180 
Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), s. 79(3), (4) and (7) deserves one last 
remark: when explaining that Manitoba's legislation falls short of affording 
French parents the "management and control over French-language education 
for their children,"181 and that '[t]he participation of minority language parents 
or their representatives in the assessment of educational needs a
 
://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
174 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 12 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
175 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 20 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
176 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 21 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
177 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 22 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
178 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 25 of  the pdf  version on http
179 Manitoba's Public Schools Act , R.S.M. 1987, c. P250. 
180 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 26 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
181 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 27 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
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up of
e have described the dichotomy between linguistic rights as individual 
 but it goes without saying that such 
nume
                                                
 structures and services which best respond to them is most important,' 
the Court also adds that: 
 
The rights provided by s. 23, it must be remembered, are granted 
to minority language parents individually.  Their entitlement is not 
subject to the will of the minority group to which they belong, be it 
that of a majority of that group, but only to the "numbers warrant" 
condition.182 
 
W
rights of group rights; we have seen that some rights are typically 
individualistic, as in the case of commercial speech (Ford), while others are 
typically collective rights, like educational rights: they only have meaning if 
certain numeric thresholds are triggered,
ric threshold imply by definition the existence of a group. 
Here, though, Chief Justice Lamer reminded us that, to be sure, also 
group rights like educational rights are, at the end of the day, rights conferred 
upon and exercised by individuals. The difference is that, while in order to 
exercise individual rights like commercial speech rights, the individual does not 
need co-operation from his fellows in the minority group, group rights cannot 
really be exercised by the individual alone. Admittedly, their "entitlement" does 
not depend on the will of the majority of his group, like Chief Justice Lamer 
rightly points out; but it does depend on the very existence of a group, and on 
its numbers: the larger the group, the greater the rights. 
 
5.14 Beaulac (1999): Société des Acadiens should not be followed: 
courts handling criminal cases must be "institutionally bilingual" and 
able to understand either official language that the accused chooses to 
use 
Except for the already mentioned Reference re Secession of Quebec, we do not 
meet other important cases until 1999, when R. v. Beaulac183 was decided. 
Beaulac is the major case for determining the interpretation principles 
applicable to the linguistic rights in Canada. 
 
le by Michel Doucet, 'Les droits linguistiques: une nouvelle trilogie' 
182 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, p. 29 of  the pdf  version on http://scc.lexum.org/en/. 
183 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768. For a comment on this case, André Braën, 'L'interprétation judiciaire 
des droits linguistiques au Canada et l'affaire Beaulac' [1998] 29 Rev. Gen. Droit 379; more 
broadly on Beaulac as well as on Arsenault-Cameron (infra, § 5.15), Reference re Secession of  Quebec 
and another minor ruling of  the Ontario Superior Court, see Marc Cousineau, 'Survol Des 
Droits Linguistiques: Enfin de Vrais Droits Linguistiques Au Canada' [2000] 32 Ottawa L. 
Rev. 117; similarly, Beaulac, Arsenault-Cameron and Reference re Secession of  Quebec are collectively 
the subject of  the artic
[2000] 49 U.N.B.L.J. 3. 
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The case was quite straightforward: Mr Beaulac had been charged in the 
Province of British Columbia with first degree murder; a first trial had to be 
repeated, he was convicted in a second trial but his conviction was overturned, 
and before his third trial he reapplied for having a judge and jury who spoke 
both English and French. He relied on s. 530(4) of the Criminal Code,184 
according to which, where the court 'is satisfied that it is in the best interests 
of ju
 or judge and jury who speak the official language of Canada 
that is the language of the accused or, if the language of the accused is not one 
of th ich 
the accused, in the opinion of the court, can best give testimony, the court 
may,  be 
tried jury, 
as the nt, 
who 
 in 
Engli peal 
uphe  Mr 
Beau ed 
his ap dge 
and ju
ely 
impo
stice that the accused be tried before a justice of the peace, provincial 
court judge, judge
e official languages of Canada, the official language of Canada in wh
if it does not speak that language, by order remand the accused to
by a justice of the peace, provincial court judge, judge or judge and 
 case may be, who speak that language or, if the circumstances warra
speak both official languages of Canada.' 
Mr Beaulac's s. 530(4) application was dismissed, he was then tried
sh only and convicted (by a different judge), and the Court of Ap
ld the conviction on the grounds that he was able to speak English.
lac brought his s. 530(4) application to the Supreme Court, which allow
peal, and eventually ordered that he be tried in a new trial before a ju
ry who spoke both English and French. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Bastarache first made an extrem
rtant point: 
 
Language rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a 
manner consistent with the preservation and development of 
official language communities in Canada; see Reference re Public 
Schools Act (Man.), at p. 850.  To the extent that Société des Acadiens 
protection of official language communities where they do apply. It 
is also useful to re-affirm here that language rights are a particular 
istinct from the principles of fundamental 
du Nouveau-Brunswick, at pp. 579-80, stands for a restrictive 
interpretation of language rights, it is to be rejected. The fear that a 
liberal interpretation of language rights will make provinces less 
willing to become involved in the geographical extension of those 
rights is inconsistent with the requirement that language rights be 
interpreted as a fundamental tool for the preservation and 
kind of right, d
justice. They have a different purpose and a different origin.185 
 
                                                 
184 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
185 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, § 25. 
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The Court thus partly revisits Société des Acadiens,186 and clarifies that 
language rights must be interpreted "purposively", i.e. in a way to let them 
fulfill
s of s. 530(1) and (4), is [thus] either official language 
to wh
 their goal to promote the linguistic and cultural identity of a person, as 
part of a community. 
S. 530(4) is then considered together with s. 530(1) (the general provision 
on the right to be tried by a bilingual judge, while s. 530(4) concerns the cases 
when the application under s. 530(1) has not been timely): the Court rules that 
such provisions create 'an absolute right of the accused to equal access to 
designated courts in the official language that he or she considers to be his or 
her own,' and therefore 'the courts called upon to deal with criminal matters 
are [...] required to be institutionally bilingual in order to provide for the equal 
use of the two official languages of Canada.'187 
Justice Bastarache then moved on to explain that '[t]he language of the 
accused is very personal in nature; it is an important part of his or her cultural 
identity.  The accused must therefore be afforded the right to make a choice 
between the two official languages based on his or her subjective ties with the 
language itself.  The principles upon which the language right is founded, the 
fact that the basic right is absolute, the requirement of equality with regard to 
the provision of services in both official languages of Canada and the 
substantive nature of the right all point to the freedom of Canadians to freely 
assert which official language is their own language. [...] An accused's own 
language, for the purpose
ich that person has a sufficient connection. It does not have to be the 
dominant language. If the accused has sufficient knowledge of an official 
language to instruct counsel, he or she will be able to assert that that language 
is his or her language, regardless of his or her ability to speak the other official 
language. The Crown may challenge the assertion made, but it will have the 
onus of showing that the assertion is unfounded. The court, in such a case, 
will not inquire into specific criteria to determine a dominant cultural identity, 
nor into the personal language preferences of the accused. It will only satisfy 
itself that the accused is able to instruct counsel and follow the proceedings in 
the chosen language.'188 
Finally, the Court further clarified something not immediately evident, 
namely that language rights, when related to court proceedings such as in this 
                                                 
186 In their concurring opinion, C.J. Lamer and J. Binnie disagree on this point, stating that 
this was not a constitutional case, but merely one of  statutory interpretation, therefore there 
was no need to reverse Société des Acadiens, which in fact had to be deemed a sound precedent, 
when it said that language rights reflect a political compromise, a point of  view allegedly 
shared by Reference re Secession of  Quebec, Mahe and Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.). Anyway, 
the two concurring justices agreed with the other seven's analysis on the statutory 
interpretation issue. 
187 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, § 28. 
188 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, § 34. 
  
58
case, should not be confused with fair trial rights: 'Another important 
consideration with regard to the interpretation of the “best interests of justice” 
is the complete distinctiveness of language rights and trial fairness. [...] The 
right 
30.'189 To sum up, 'the best interests of justice will be served by 
accepting the application of the accused to be tried in his official 
ge
n was 
cente
The year after Beaulac, the Court released its judgment in a new case, 
coming this time from the Prince Edward Island, Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince 
Edward Island 192 Mahe as one of the major 
      
to full answer and defence is linked with linguistic abilities only in the 
sense that the accused must be able to understand and must be understood at 
his trial.  But this is already guaranteed by s. 14 of the Charter, a section 
providing for the right to an interpreter.  The right to a fair trial is universal 
and cannot be greater for members of official language communities than for 
persons speaking other languages.  Language rights have a totally distinct 
origin and role.  They are meant to protect official language minorities in this 
country and to insure the equality of status of French and English. [...] 
Fairness of the trial is not to be considered at this stage and is certainly not a 
threshold that, if satisfied, can be used to deny the accused his language rights 
under s. 5
langua . Therefore, it is the denial of the application that is exceptional and 
that needs to be justified. The burden of this demonstration should fall on the 
Crown.'190 
The conclusion is that '[i]n the present instance, much discussio
red on the ability of the accused to express himself in English. This 
ability is irrelevant because the choice of language is not meant to support the 
legal right to a fair trial, but to assist the accused in gaining equal access to a 
public service that is responsive to his linguistic and cultural identity. It would 
indeed be surprising if Parliament intended that the right of bilingual 
Canadians should be restricted when in fact official language minorities, who 
have the highest incidence of bilingualism (84 percent for francophones living 
outside Quebec compared to 7 percent for anglophones according to Statistics 
Canada 1996 Census), are the first persons that the section was designed to 
assist.'191 
 
5.15 Arsenault-Cameron (2000): when numbers warrant, the 
government cannot just offer minority students transportation to an 
already existing school, but has to provide for the establishment of an 
educational facility in the area where the minority students reside 
:  as anticipated, it stands with 
                                           
.C.R. 3. For a comment on this case, see Gaétan Migneault, 'Arsenault-Cameron : 
2000] 45 McGill L. J. 1023; in the Italian scholarship, see the case-
                                                
189 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, § 41. 
190 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, § 42. 
191 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, § 42. 
192 [2000] 1 S
une occasion manquée' [
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precedents in the area of educational rights and for establishing the principles 
applicable in the interpretation of s. 23 of the Canadian Charter. 
ch Language Board to establish a French school for grades 
one t
hools Act (Man.), the Court began 
by st
ge groups and to give effect to the equal partnership of the two 
offici
 to high quality education in its 
own language, in circumstances where community development will be 
          
The appellants in this case, relying on s. 23 of the Canadian Charter, had 
requested the Fren
o six in their area; the Board made a conditional offer of French first 
language instruction in such area, but the Minister of Education refused to 
approve it, offering instead to keep paying for the transportation of the 
appellants' children to an already existing, but more distant (almost an hour by 
bus) French language school, a solution however not accepted by the parents. 
The parents therefore sought 'a declaration to the effect that they have 
the right to have their children receive French language instruction at the 
primary level in a facility situated'193 in their area. Their request was granted by 
the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, but then an appeal against its 
decision was allowed. 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justices Major and Bastarache restored 
the first decision. 
Relying on Mahe and Reference re Public Sc
ating that s. 23 'mandates that provincial governments do whatever is 
practically possible to preserve and promote minority language education.'194 
Indeed, as pointed out especially in Mahe, 'language rights cannot be separated 
from a concern for the culture associated with the language and that s. 23 was 
designed to correct, on a national scale, the historically progressive erosion of 
official langua
al language groups in the context of education,'195 and it is therefore 
'necessary to take into account the importance of language and culture in the 
context of instruction as well as the importance of official language minority 
schools to the development of the official language community when 
examining the actions of the government in dealing with the request for 
services'196 by the linguistic minority parents. 
This is connected to the "purposive interpretation" mandated in Beaulac 
with reference to language rights: 'a purposive interpretation of s. 23 rights is 
based on the true purpose of redressing past injustices and providing the 
official language minority with equal access
enhanced.'197 
                                       
 Suni, 'Il diritto all'insegnamento del francese in Canada' [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 3, § 3. 
note by Elisabetta Palici di
DPCE 553. 
193 [2000] 1 
194 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 26. 
195 Ibidem. 
196 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 27. 
197 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 28. 
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Such a reference to an "equal access", as a right of the "language 
minority", is a key aspect of Arsenault-Cameron, and connects it to some of 
recurring themes we have already highlighted when considering previous 
judgments. Indeed the opinion here explains that the Minister had erred in 
'insisting on the individual right to instruction,'198 thus 'ignor[ing] the linguistic 
and cultural assimilation of the Francophone community in [the relevant area], 
thereby restricting the collective rights of the parents of the school 
children:'199 in other words, educational rights are here viewed as collective 
rights of the parents, and as a paramount means to protect the cultural identity 
of the minority community, as outlined in Mahe.200 
The Court then goes into more details on the issue of equality:201 the 
point
ther words, when it comes to linguistic minorities, s. 23 
impo
 made is that s. 23 cannot be reconciled with a 'formal vision of equality that 
would focus on treating the majority and minority official language groups 
alike,'202 because 'section 23 is premised on the fact that substantive equality 
requires that official language minorities be treated differently, if necessary, 
according to their particular circumstances and needs, in order to provide 
them with a standard of education equivalent to that of the official language 
majority.'203 In o
ses to adopt a substantive equality approach, positively taking steps to 
ensure equal treatment, and not just affording majority and minority groups 
the same treatment. 
Moving to apply these principles, and the "sliding scale" approach 
outlined in Mahe, to the case at bar, the Court emphasizes that every case has 
                                                 
198 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 29, emphasis added. 
199 Ibidem. 
200 Education rights are therefore rights given to the parents to benefit (themselves but also) 
their children. Quite the opposite happened, in a very different setting, with the Chen case, 
me Department): on that occasion, 
. J. 50; finally, let us recall, for a careful study of  the relationship between equality 
echt der Minoritäten (Hölder 1898), pp. 27 and 
emphasis added. 
 
decided by the European Court of  Justice in 2004 (C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and 
Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of  State for the Ho
the right to reside for an indefinite period in a foreign EU Member State was given to a baby 
in order to benefit (the child but also) his/her parents. 
201 On which see for instance Yves LeBouthillier, 'Le concept d'égalité dans les dispositions 
linguistiques et à l’article 15 de la Charte: y a-t-il des liens?', in Sheila McIntyre and Sanda 
Rodgers (eds), Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms 
(LexisNexis Canada 2006), p. 152; Michel Bastarache, 'L'égalite réelle des communautés de 
langue officielle du Canada' [2005] 7 Rev. C.L. Français 7; David Leitch, 'Méconnaissance de la 
langue d'instruction: l'article 15 peut-il combler le vide laissé par l'article 23?' [2002] 21 
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 185; Victor C. Goldbloom, 'Language Equality in Canada: A Delicate 
Balance' [1998] 47 U.N.B.L.J. 177; several years earlier, José Woehrling, 'Minority Cultural 
and Linguistic Rights and Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms' [1986] 
31 McGill L
and minority rights, Georg Jellinek, Das R
following. 
202 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 31, 
203 Ibidem, emphasis added.
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to be considered according to its peculiarities, in order to determine what 
specifically the "numbers warrant" on each occasion. It is then impossible to 
devise strict rules applicable in every context, though '[i]t is however important 
to note that the s. 23 standard is not neutral but favours community 
development.'204 
In any case, '[t]he pedagogical requirements established to address the 
needs of the majority language students cannot be used to trump cultural and 
linguistic concerns appropriate for the minority language students:'205 it 
follows that '[t]he travel considerations should have been applied differently 
[by the Appeal Division] for minority language children for at least two 
reaso
 
withi
ies and parental control 
on th
                                                
ns.  First, unlike majority language children, s. 23 children were faced 
with a choice between a locally accessible school in the majority language and 
a less accessible school in the minority language.  The decision of the Minister 
fostered an environment in which many of the s. 23 children were discouraged 
from attending the minority language school because of the long travel times.  
A similar disincentive would not arise in the circumstances of the majority.  
Second, the choice of travel would have an impact on the assimilation of the 
minority language children while travel arrangements had no cultural impact 
on majority language children.  For the minority, travel arrangements were in 
large measure a cultural and linguistic issue; they involved not only travel times 
but also a consideration of distances because of the impact of having children 
sent outside their community and of not having an educational institution
n the community itself.'206 
As a consequence, it derives that 'the Appeal Division erred in deciding 
that the sliding scale approach was governed by the "reasonable accessibility" 
of services without considering which services would best encourage the 
flourishing and preservation of the French language minority:'207 in other 
words, the priority is to ensure that the minority language is protected, and 
accessibility, or economic considerations cannot stand in the way of a 
thorough fulfillment of such goal. As again clarified by Mahe, the government 
enjoys discretion in choosing how to fulfill its obligations under s. 23, but 
'[t]his discretion is however subject to the positive obligation on government 
to alter or develop “major institutional structures” to effectively ensure the 
provision of minority language instruction and facilit
e scale warranted by the relevant number of children of the minority.'208 
In conclusion, '[t]he duty to promote French language and culture in 
Prince Edward Island cannot mean that the government can impose the 
 
204 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 57 
205 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 38. 
206 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 50. 
207 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 51. 
208 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 52. 
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concentration of all minority language students in one predominantly French 
region.  Both a textual and purposive analysis of s. 23(3) of the Charter indicate 
that when the numbers of s. 23 children in a specific area warrant the 
provision of minority language instruction, that instruction should take place 
in facilities located in the community where those children reside.  Section 
23(3)(a) states that the right to minority language instruction applies 
“wherever in the province”  (emphasis added)  the number of children is 
sufficient to warrant such instruction.  The words “wherever in the province” 
link the right to instruction to the geographic place where the conditions for 
the exercise of that right are present.'209 
In summary, transportation in this case was not sufficient, buses cannot 
be considered an educational facility, and government was thereby obliged to 
allow an educational scheme more consistent with the goal of promoting the 
"linguistic and cultural development" of the French language community. 
5.16 Doucet-Boudreau (2003): a restatement of the case-law thus far in 
the area of educational linguistic rights 
Three years after Arsenault-Cameron, another case in the field of education 
came up, Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education).210 To be sure, the 
issue involved was that of remedies to s. 23 violations, and in particular the 
interp
d a delay in the fulfillment by the government of its 
oblig
hat the trial judge had rightly retained jurisdiction 
                                                
retation of s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter. 
The appellants, some Francophone parents from Nova Scotia, had 
requested an order directing their Province to set up, out of public funds, 
French-language facilities and programs for their children in secondary school. 
The trial judge had foun
ations under s. 23, and thereby ordered the institution of school facilities 
and programs before a certain deadline, retaining jurisdiction to assess the 
progress in the enforcement. 
This latter part of the order was appealed by the Province of Nova 
Scotia, and the appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal: the case before the 
Supreme Court was on this specific jurisdictional issue, on which the 5-4 
judgment by the Court held t
 
2003' [2004] 49 (5) Giur. cost. 3591, 3595-9 (§ 2, Le lingue 
tela). 
209 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, § 56. 
210 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3. See the comments by Brendan Brammal, 'A Comment on Doucet-
Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of  Education) and R. v. Demers' [2006] 64 U. Toronto Fac. 
L. Rev. 113; Michel Doucet, 'Glenda Doucet-Boudreau et al. c. Attorney General of  Nova Scotia' 
[2004] 6 Rev. C.L. Français 313; Debra M. McAllister, 'Doucet-Boudreau and the 
Development of  Effective Section 24(1) Remedies: Confrontation or Cooperation?' [2004] 
16(1) Nat. J. Const. L. 153; and, eight years down the road, Paul S. Rouleau and Linsey 
Sherman, 'Doucet-Boudreau, dialogue and judicial activism: tempest in a teapot?' [2010] 41(2) 
Ottawa L. Rev. 171; in the Italian scholarship, see Nino Olivetti Rason, 'La giurisprudenza della 
Corte Suprema del Canada nel 
ufficiali del Canada e la loro tu
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to hear reports, and thereby restored his order in the part struck down by the 
Cour
ourt 
made ave 
broad 3 (in 
partic and 
prese
ools 
Act, and 
prom ture 
of s.  the 
progr but 
also chools 
Refere
he minority language education rights protected under s. 23 of 
laces positive obligations on governments to mobilize resources 
 exercise of 
inority language education rights a unique collective aspect even 
tion 
rights ave 
none the 
cases
bers 
warra larly 
vulne out 
                                                
t of Appeal. 
But what is important in this case are some of the statements the C
, as obiter dicta, in the first part of the majority opinion, which h
er implications. The Court here summarized its past case-law on s. 2
ular Mahe, Reference re Public Schools Act, Beaulac, Arsenault-Cameron), 
nted it coherently. 
First, it recalled the link, very clear in Mahe and Reference re Public Sch
between language education rights and the goal of preserving 
oting the culture of the minority. Then, it reaffirmed the remedial na
 3, namely its aim to 'correct past injustices not only by halting
essive erosion of minority official language cultures across Canada, 
by actively promoting their flourishing (Mahe, supra, at p. 363; S
nce, supra, at p. 850).'211 
More importantly, it added: 
 
T
the Charter are unique. They are distinctively Canadian, representing 
“a linchpin in this nation’s commitment to the values of 
bilingualism and biculturalism” (Mahe, supra, at p. 350).  Section 23 
p
and enact legislation for the development of major institutional 
structures (Mahe, at p. 389). While the rights are granted to 
individuals (Schools Reference, at p. 865), they apply only if the 
“numbers warrant”, and the specific programs or facilities that the 
government is required to provide varies depending on the number 
of students who can potentially be expected to participate 
(Mahe, supra, at p. 366; Schools Reference, supra, at p. 850; Arsenault-
Cameron, supra, at para. 38). This requirement gives the
m
though the rights are granted to individuals.212 
 
So we are again confronted with the double nature of language educa
: formally, it is individuals who are entitled to them, but they h
theless a strong collective dimension, that recurrently pops out in 
. 
Finally, the Court made another important point: 'the “num
nt” requirement leaves minority language education rights particu
rable to government delay or inaction:'213 the more time goes by with
 
S.C.R. 3, § 29. 
211 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, § 27. 
212 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, § 28. 
213 [2003] 3 
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s. 23 on" 
incre se to "warrant."'214 In other 
words, minority rights are special from this point of view: timely enforcement 
is par
h not legal, terms, such suspensions may well be 
ermanent.  If delay is tolerated, governments could potentially 
ter and the critical need for timely 
 
ski (2005): the "major part" requirement in s. 23(2) of the 
 rights being truly respected, the more the "likelihood of assimilati
ases, carrying 'the risk that numbers migt cea
ticularly relevant, because if such enforcement is too much delayed, the 
minority group could happen to disappear in the meanwhile. 
 
Thus, particular entitlements afforded under s. 23 can be 
suspended, for so long as the numbers cease to warrant, by the 
very cultural erosion against which s. 23 was designed to guard.  In 
practical, thoug
p
avoid the duties imposed upon them by s. 23 through their own 
failure to implement the rights vigilantly.  The affirmative promise 
contained in s. 23 of the Char
compliance will sometimes require courts to order affirmative 
remedies to guarantee that language rights are meaningfully, and 
therefore necessarily promptly, protected.215 
 
Therefore, budget considerations cannot be an obstacle to a prompt 
enforcement of linguistic rights: these are typically "judgments that bear a 
cost," to translate from their Italian definition,216 i.e. judgments that impose an 
expense on the government, out of the public budget. But not only cannot a 
lack of resources justify a lack of enforcement (as already clarified in Arsenault-
Cameron): from Doucet-Boudreau, we derive that it cannot justify even just a delay 
in the enforcement. 
5.17 Sol
Canadian Charter must be interpreted in a qualitative way, and not with 
a too rigid quantitative approach 
After another two years, on the same day the Court released two other 
important judgments, both unanimous, both from Quebec, and both revolving 
                                                 
214 Ibidem. 
215 Ibidem. 
216 In the Italian scholarship, see inter alia Andrea Giorgis, 'La Corte Costituzionale riserva al 
legislatore la tutela dei diritti che costano?' [1995] 147 Giur. it. 529; AA.VV., Le sentenze della 
Corte Costituzionale e l’art. 81, u.c., della Costituzione (Giuffrè 1993); E. Grosso, Sentenze 
costituzionali di spesa “che non costino” (Giappichelli 1991); Costantino Mortati, 'Appunti per uno 
studio sui rimedi giurisdizionali contro comportamenti omissivi del Legislatore' [1970] 93(5) 
Foro it. 153. In English, see for example Mark Tushnet, 'Social Welfare Rights and the Forms 
of  Judicial Review' [2004] 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1895; Martha Jackman, 'From National Standards 
to Justiciable Rights: Enforcing International Social and Economic Guarantees through 
Charter of  Rights Review' [1999] 14 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 69; Albie Sachs, 'Enforcement of  Social 
and Economic Rights' [2007] 22 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 673. 
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around the construction of s. 73 of the Charter of the French language, therefore 
again involving educational rights.217 Indeed this provision makes an exception 
to the rule in s. 72, according to which 'instruction in the kindergarten classes 
and in the elementary and secondary schools shall be in French, except where 
this chapter allows otherwise,' and inter alia stipulates: 'The following children, 
at the request of one of their parents, may receive instruction in English:  (1) a 
child 
hools under s. 73(2) of the Charter of the French 
langu
s constitutional, or whether it violated s. 23(2) of the 
Canadian Charter, affording the right to continuity of language of instruction. 
ted, 
i.e. th tive 
mean
and 
gave the 
interp e it 
imme
                                                
whose father or mother is a Canadian citizen and received elementary 
instruction in English in Canada, provided that that instruction constitutes the 
major part of the elementary instruction he or she received in Canada; (2) a 
child whose father or mother is a Canadian citizen and who has received or is 
receiving elementary or secondary instruction in English in Canada, and the 
brothers and sisters of that child, provided that that instruction constitutes the 
major part of the elementary or secondary instruction received by the child in 
Canada.' 
The first of the two cases we are referring to is Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec 
(Attorney General).218 Three families had requested admission for their children 
to public English-language sc
age, but their requests had been denied because their children did not 
meet the "major part" requirement in that provision, not having received the 
"major part" of their education in English. The question was then whether the 
s. 73(2) requirement wa
The Court held that s. 73(2), provided that it was properly interpre
at the word "major" in it was given a qualitative rather than quantita
ing, was constitutional. 
In order to reach this conclusion, it went over its previous case-law, 
a comprehensive account of the principles to be applied in 
retation of s. 23 and of language rights in general. The Court mad
diately clear that: 
 
The protection of minority language rights by s. 23 of the Canadian 
Charter is an integral part of the broader protection of minority 
rights, a principle recognized as foundational to Canada’s 
 
 comment, see Andr B217 For é raën, 'La Cour suprême et l'accès a l'école anglaise au Québec' 
[2005] 35  
Board; .R. 
257, th  law 
issues) t of  
Solski, yants 
Droit par l'ar , see 
Nino Olivetti Rason, 'La giurisprudenza della Corte Suprema del Canada nel biennio 2004-
 3643, 3656-8 (§ 6, Eguaglianza e diritti linguistici). 
 a
Rev. Gen. Droit 363 (the article also comments on Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School
Casimir v. Quebec (Attorney General); Zorrilla v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C
at we have not included in our analysis because it only deals with administrative
; for a comment on the right to minority language education in Canada in ligh
see Michael Aquilino, 'Qui suis-je?: Identité Linguistique et Exclusion des non-a
ticle 23 de la Charte' [2006] 38(1) Ottawa L. Rev. 67. In the Italian scholarship
2005' [2006] 51(5) Giur. Cost.
218 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201. 
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Constitution in Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217, at para. 79.  Minority language rights are fundamental because 
“[l]anguage is more than a mere means of communication, it is part 
and parcel of the identity and culture of the people speaking 
it”: Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, at p. 362; Ford v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at pp. 748-49. The 
constitutional protection of minority language rights is necessary 
for the promotion of robust and vital minority language 
communities which are essential for Canada to flourish as a 
ilingual country.219 
lt-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 
.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 1, at para. 26; Mahe, at pp. 363-64. Minority 
 that 
such  or 
simila not 
only the 
mann
dicho ore 
deepl
         
b
 
Education rights play a fundamental role in promoting and 
preserving minority language communities. Indeed, “[m]inority 
language education rights are the means by which the goals of 
linguistic and cultural preservation are achieved”: Doucet-Boudreau v. 
Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2003 SCC 62, at 
para. 26; see also Arsenau
S
language education is a requisite tool to encourage linguistic and 
cultural vitality. Not only do minority schools provide basic 
language education, they also act as community centres where the 
members of the minority can meet to express their culture. Thus, 
the education rights provided by s. 23 form the cornerstone of 
minority language rights protection.220 
 
Going over the legislative history of ss. 16 to 23, the Court observed
provisions, just like the previous s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867
r provisions in provincial legislation, addressed 'situations in which 
individual rights, but also the existence of language communities and 
er in which those communities perceive their future, are in issue.'221 The 
tomy individual v. collective rights is then explored again, even m
y than in previous cases: 
 
First, the members of the minority communities and their families, 
in every province and territory, must be given the opportunity to 
achieve their personal aspirations.  Second, on the collective level, 
these language issues are related to the development and existence 
of the English-speaking minority in Quebec and the French-
speaking minorities elsewhere in Canada.  They also inevitably have 
                                        
219 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 2. 
220 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 3. 
221 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 4. 
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an impact on how Quebec’s French-speaking community perceives 
his picture must be added the 
erious difficulties resulting from the rate of assimilation of 
ysis, 
'the da’s 
devel
 was recognized by this Court in Reference re 
ecession of Quebec as one of the fundamental principles of the 
xpressed by the protected languages (Mahe, at p. 362). Thus, the 
                                                
its future in Canada, since that community, which is in the majority 
in Quebec, is in the minority in Canada, and even more so in 
North America as a whole.  To t
s
French-speaking minority groups outside Quebec, whose current 
language rights were acquired only recently, at considerable 
expense and with great difficulty.  Thus, in interpreting these rights, 
the courts have a responsibility to reconcile sometimes divergent 
interests and priorities, and to be sensitive to the future of each 
language community.  Our country’s social context, demographics 
and history will therefore necessarily comprise the backdrop for the 
analysis of language rights.  Language rights cannot be analysed in 
the abstract, without regard for the historical context of the 
recognition thereof or for the concerns that the manner in which 
they are currently applied is meant to address. 
 
As stated in Lavigne, a minor case we have not included in our anal
promotion of both official languages is essential to Cana
opment':222 it follows that arguably 
 
[s]ection 23, which is linked to the broader principle of protection 
of minority rights that
S
Canadian Constitution, reflects a common desire to protect 
Canada’s English- and French-speaking minorities, and to promote 
their development.  Any broad guarantee of language rights attests 
to a fundamental respect for and interest in the cultures that are 
e
recognition of rights to minority language instruction contributes 
to the preservation of the minority language and culture, as well as 
of the minority group itself (Doucet-Boudreau, at para. 26).  With this 
in mind, this Court has been sensitive to the concerns, and the 
language dynamics, of Quebec, where a majority of the members 
of Canada’s French-speaking minority is concentrated (see, for 
example: Attorney General of Quebec v. Quebec Association of Protestant 
School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, at p. 82; Ford, at pp. 777-
78; Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), s. 79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 
S.C.R. 839, at p. 851). 
 
 
222 Lavigne v. Canada (Office of  the Commissioner of  Official Languages), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 
773, § 22. 
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All this considered, the Court moved to tackle another recurring issu
se-law on minority rights, namely that of the tension between protec
nority rights and the principle of equality, and of how to reconcile th
, the Court provides the thus far most detailed answer to such questio
 
Section 23 provides a comprehensive code of minority language 
education rights which afford special status to minority English- or 
French-language comm
e in 
its ca tion 
of mi em. 
Here n: 
unities.  The Court in Mahe, at p. 369, 
cognized that this special status would create inequalities between 
 Public Schools Act (Man.), at 
p. 85 theless, these rights are not 
prima at a 
language community is present to benefit from their exercise. A close attention 
       
re
linguistic groups. [...] Specifically, English speakers living in Quebec 
and French speakers living in the territories and other provinces 
would enjoy rights denied to other linguistic groups. Section 23 has 
been described as an exception to ss. 15 and 27 of the Canadian 
Charter;  it is rather an example of the means to achieve substantive 
equality in the specific context of minority language communities. 
While this entrenched inequality may be the product of political 
compromise and negotiation, this does not mean that s. 23 rights 
are to be construed narrowly. The Court has confirmed on several 
occasions that language rights must be interpreted in a broad and 
purposive manner consistent with the preservation and promotion 
of both official language communities in Canada: R. v. Beaulac, 
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, at para. 25; Reference re Public Schools Act 
(Man.), at p. 850; Reference re Secession of Quebec, at para. 80; Arsenault-
Cameron, at para. 27.223 
 
Which brings the Court back to the dual nature (individual v. collective) 
of linguistic rights: 'For the Attorney General of Quebec, s. 23 is a provision 
for the implementation of community rights; for the appellant, it is about 
individual rights that can be exercised by qualified persons throughout 
Canada. As is often the case, these two approaches are not entirely devoid of 
merit [...]. Section 23 is clearly meant to protect and preserve both official 
languages and the cultures they embrace throughout Canada; its application 
will of necessity affect the future of minority language communities. Section 
23 rights are in that sense collective rights. The conditions for their application 
reflect this (Doucet-Boudreau, at para. 28): implementation depends on numbers 
of qualified pupils (Mahe, at pp. 366-67; Reference re
0; Arsenault-Cameron, at para. 32). Never
rily described as collective rights, even though they presuppose th
                                          
223 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 20. 
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to the formulation of s. 23 reveals individual rights in favour of per
belonging to specific categories of rights holders.'
sons 
ree-
 to 
that 
 is 
 not quantitative: 'The strict mathematical approach lacks 
flexib  his 
ors 
t in 
age 
"Do 
riteria is to guarantee continuity of  
minority language education rights and mobility to children being 
educa
eality 
at children properly enrolled in minority-language schools are entitled 
guage community or of  the child.  Nevertheless, a 
qualit
       
224 
All this leads the Court to clarify that the purpose of s. 23(2) is th
fold: 'to provide continuity of minority language education rights,
accommodate mobility and to ensure family unity,'225 and then to derive 
the right approach in constructing s. 23(2) and its "major part" requirement
qualitative, and
ility and may even exclude a child from education vital to maintaining
or her connection with the minority community and culture.'226 Several fact
should be taken into account in the analysis: "How Much Time Was Spen
Each Program?," "At What Stage of Education Was the Choice of Langu
of Instruction Made?," "What Programs Are or Were Available?," 
Learning Disabilities or Other Difficulties Exist?." 
The conclusion is therefore the following: 
A “major part” requirement, defined qualitatively, i.e., as meaning a 
“significant part”, as described in para. 28 is a valid qualifier for “parcours 
scolaire” or “educational experience”. The “major part” requirement must 
make room for the nuances and subjectivity required to determine 
whether the admission of  a particular child, considering his or her 
personal circumstances, is consistent with the objectives of  s. 23 and the 
specific need to protect and reinforce the minority language 
community.227 
The purpose of  the s. 23(2) c
ted in one of  the official languages. If  children are in a recognized 
education program regularly and legally, they  will in most instances be 
able to continue their education in the same language. This is consistent 
with the wording of  s. 23(2) and the purposes of  protecting and 
preserving the minority-language community, as well as with the r
th
to a continuous learning experience and should not be uprooted and sent 
to majority-language schools. Uprooting would not be in the interest of  
the minority lan
ative assessment of  the situation to determine whether there is 
evidence of  a genuine commitment to a minority language educational 
experience is warranted, with each province exercising its discretion in 
light of  its particular circumstances, obligation to respect the objectives 
                                          
23. 224 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, §§ 22-
225 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 30. 
226 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 37. 
227 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 46. 
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of  s. 23, and educational policies.228 
 
The approach will be both subjective and objective.  This does not 
imply an artificial “snapshot” approach. Provincial governments are 
entitled to verify that registration and overall attendance in the program, 
the past and present educational experience of  the child, are consistent 
with participation in the class of  beneficiaries defined in s. 23(2).229 
 
5.18 Gosselin (2005): the exclusion of Francophone parents' children 
from publicly funded English language education in Quebec is not 
discriminatory 
The other 2005 case, released on the same day as Solski, is Gosselin (Tutor 
of) v. Quebec (Attorney General),230 brought by several francophone parents 
residing with their school-age children in Quebec, and - a bit unusually - 
seeking access for them to publicly funded English language education, under 
s. 73 of  the Charter of  the French language. 
The problem in Gosselin was that s. 73 only affords this right to children 
having received or receiving education in English in Canada, or whose parents 
received primary education in English in Canada. However, the children did 
not meet such requirement, nor had the parents received their primary 
education in Canada in English, thus they did not qualify under s. 73 (or under 
s. 23 of  the Canadian Charter): '[t]heir situation, therefore, [wa]s fundamentally 
and constitutionally different from that of  the appellants in the companion 
case Solski.'231 
The appellants argued then that s. 73 was unconstitutional, because it 
allegedly discriminated against the majority of  French-speaking Quebec 
children, in violation of  the principle of  equality. The issue was then again 
how to reconcile the constitutional right to minority language education and 
the right to equality. 
The Court rejected the appellants' claim, observing that 'the practical 
effect of  the[ir] [...] equality argument would be to read out of  the 
Constitution the carefully drafted compromise contained in s. 23 of  the 
Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms. This is impermissible. As the 
Court has stated on numerous occasions, there is no hierarchy amongst 
constitutional provisions, and equality guarantees cannot therefore be used to 
invalidate other rights expressly conferred by the Constitution.  All parts of  
                                                 
228 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 47. 
229 [2005]1 S.C.R. 201, § 48. 
see Sonja Grover, 'The right to minority language 
as a function of  the equality guarantee: a reanalysis of  
 Canada Charter case' [2006] 18(4) Education and the Law 283. 
230 [2005]1 S.C.R. 238. For a comment, 
public school education 
the Gosselin Supreme Court of
231 [2005]1 S.C.R. 238, § 9. 
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the Constitution must be read together.  It cannot be said, therefore, that in 
implementing s. 23, the Quebec legislature has violated either s. 15(1) of  
the C
s consistent in including it as well). 
ut the Court objected that '[i]n the context of minority language 
t
anadian Charter or ss. 10 and 12 of  the Quebec Charter.'232 
The judgment explains that what the appellants were seeking was simply 
to exploit 'the right to equality to access a right guaranteed in Quebec only to 
the English language minority,'233 whereas they belonged to the French 
language majority of Quebec. In particular, they were relying on the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis on language in s. 10 of the Quebec 
Charter (and in s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter: although such provision did not 
include language among the grounds of discrimination explicitly forbidden, the 
case-law of the Court wa
B
educa ion, equality in substance as opposed to mere formal equality 
may require differential treatment as the Court noted in Arsenault-Cameron v. 
Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 1, at para. 31,'234 and that 
'[t]he purpose of s. 73 is not to “exclude” but rather to implement the positive 
constitutional responsibility incumbent upon all provinces to offer minority 
language instruction to its minority language community.'235 
In other words, 'the attempt to give equality guarantees a superior status 
in a "hierarchy" of rights must be rejected,'236 therefore minority language 
rights were not to be considered subordinated to it: '[t]he appellants are 
members of the French language majority in Quebec and, as such, their 
objective in having their children educated in English simply does not fall 
within the purpose of s. 23:'237 their attempt to "abuse" of a minority right, 
cunningly relying on the prohibition of discrimination in order to claim access 
to a financial benefit only provided for minority members, was therefore 
rejected, and rightly so. 
 
5.19 Nguyen (2009): Quebec's rules squarely disqualifying certain 
categories of parents from s. 23(2) rights in order to react to some 
rtionate to the (legitimate) goal of remedying abuses were dispropo
such abuses 
After another two cases, which we will not take into account because 
they deal with relatively marginal issues,238 in 2009 the Court issued its latest 
                                                 
232 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, § 2. 
233 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, § 10. 
234 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, § 15. 
235 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, § 16. 
236 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, § 26. 
237 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238, § 30. 
238 The first one, Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Canada [2008] 1 
S.C.R. 383, simply extended to a federal institution, acting as a provincial police force in New 
e obligations imposed on New Brunswick institutions by s. 20(2) of  
                                                
Brunswick, the languag
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judgment on minority rights, in a case that was a follow-up to Solski and 
Gosselin, and that also arose from Quebec: Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation 
and S
sidized private schools for short periods (just in 
order
 the French language in Quebec), and that there was a rational 
causal link between the restrictions and the goals, but holding that the rules at 
on was based on Solski, that had clarified that the "major 
part"
ogg and Bushell (now 
Thornton) 'respond[ed] to the argument that the Canadian Charter was 
 always undemocratic, [by] [...] suggest[ing] 
ports).239 
The case concerned the constitutionality of two provisions added in 
2002 to the Charter of the French language, aimed at contrasting what the Quebec 
government felt as abuses of the rights afforded by s. 23(2) of the Canadian 
Charter. In particular, such new rules disqualified from s. 23(2) parents whose 
children had enrolled in unsub
 to become eligible for s. 23(2) benefits), or had received instruction in 
English only due to a special authorization (that was meant to be limited just 
to the case considered in the authorization, and not to indirectly trigger the 
application of s. 23(2)). 
The Court ruled both restrictions unconstitutional, acknowledging that 
they pursued sufficiently important and legitimate goals (i.e. protecting and 
promoting
bar did not pass the proportionality test, going illegitimately beyond a minimal 
impairment of s. 23(2) rights. 
The conclusi
 requirement had to be interpreted 'as giving rise to an obligation to 
conduct a global qualitative assessment of a child’s educational pathway.'240 
The new rules amounted instead to an only partial assessment of a child's 
educational pathway, thus having to be struck down as unconstitutional, even 
though the Court suspended for one year the effects of the declaration of 
invalidity. 
 
6. A constructive dialogue (with occasional fights), as a means to build 
the Canadian identity: the dangers of an instrumental approach to 
language rights 
In their already mentioned 1997 article, H
illegitimate because it was almost
that where a judicial decision is open to judicial reversal, modification or 
                                                 
the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms. The second case, DesRochers v. Canada (Industry) 
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 194 dealt instead with the interpretation of  s. 20(1) of  the Canadian Charter 
and Part IV of  the Official Languages Act, and on the scope of  the obligation, imposed on 
public bodies by such provisions, to offer services of  "equal quality" in both English and 
French. For a comment to both these cases, as well as to Nguyen (the case we are about to 
consider), see, in the Italian scholarship, Eleonora Ceccherini, 'La giurisprudenza della Corte 
Suprema del Canada 2008-2009', [2010] 55(5) Giur. Cost. 4245, 4262-6 (§ 4, I diritti 
linguistici). 
239 [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208. 
240 [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208, § 28. 
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avoid
ly Ford; but also the choice to recur to the de facto doctrine and 
delay
hinted at Reference re Secession of Quebec also show that dialogue can often give 
way to an open fight between judges and politics. To be sure, the major 
clashes between courts and legislators happened with regard to Quebec, 
ance, then it is meaningful to regard the relationship between court and 
the legislative body as a dialogue. In such a case the judicial decision causes a 
public debate in which Charter values play a more prominent role than they 
would if there were no judicial decision. The legislative body is in a position to 
devise a response which is properly respectful of the Charter values that have 
been identified by the court, but which accomplish the social or economic 
objectives that the judicial decision has impeded.'241 
The case-law we have reviewed is arguably a fairly good example of that 
dialogue in action: we have seen the Court strike down legislation on some 
important occasions, but also give legislators some advice on how to reform 
laws that were being declared unconstitutional, like in Mahe, Arsenault-Cameron, 
and especial
ed declarations of invalidity, in Manitoba Language Rights and in Bilodeau, 
provides evidence of the Court's leaning towards dialogue: the justices are 
aware that a plain declaration of invalidity in cases like the two just mentioned 
would have devastating consequences for the provinces involved, and choose 
to avoid creating such a scenario, thus preferring to maintain an acceptable 
relationship even to the cost of sacrificing individuals' rights on the altar of 
Realpolitik.  
But big cases like Ford itself, or the Quebec Veto controversy, or the just 
                                                 
241 Richard Clayton, 'Judicial deference and "democratic dialogue": the legitimacy of  judicial 
intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998' [2004] Pub. L. 33, 42. Hogg's and Bushell 
(now Thornton)'s article sparked a very large deal of  comments in legal scholarship: on the 
same journal, see in particular Christopher P. Manfredi and James B. Kelly, 'Six Degrees of  
Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell' [1999] 37 Osgoode Hall L. J. 513, and the authors' 
Reply on page 529; the numerous articles in the Spring 2007 Special Issue Charter 
Dialogue Revisited (Volume 45, Number 1); Rosalind Dixon, 'The Supreme Court of  
Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference' [2009] 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 235. But see also, inter 
zionale canadese, p. 269. 
alia, Grant Huscroft 'Rationalizing Judicial Power: The Mischief  of  Dialogue Theory' in J B 
Kelly and C P Manfredi (Eds), Contested Constitutionalism. Reflections on the Canadian Charter of  
Rights and Freedoms (UBC Press 2009), p. 50; Mary T. Moreau, 'La Charte canadienne des droits et 
libertés comme instrument de dialogue entre le tribunal et le législateur' [2007] 36 Int'l J. Can. 
Studies 319; Kent Roach, 'A Dialogue About Principle and a Principled Dialogue: Justice 
Iacobucci's Substantive Approach to Dialogue' [2007] 57 U. Toronto L.J. 459; Id., 'Dialogue or 
Defiance: Legislative Reversals of  Supreme Court Decisions in Canada and the United 
States' [2006] 4(2) Int'l J. Const. L. 347. In the Italian scholarship, the original Hogg's and 
Bushell (now Thornton)'s contribution is extensively discussed by Sergio Gerotto, 'Il dialogo 
tra Corti e legislativi in Canada: una soluzione ai problemi di non democraticità del judicial 
review?' [2005] 7(2) DPCE 995; see also Anna Margherita Russo, 'La Carta dei diritti e delle 
libertà nel "comparative dialogue" della Corte suprema: flessibilità e cross fertilization 
giurisprudenziale, in Rolla (ed), L'apporto della Corte suprema alla determinazione dei caratteri 
dell'ordinamento costitu
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reflecting and at the same time reinforcing the tension in the relationship 
between this province and the Canadian federation,242 the most recent 
exam
orking with Quebec as well, presumably also thanks to 
the e
ple of which was a bill, introduced during the past legislature by the 
Quebec government before that province's National Assembly, that would 
have amended the Quebec Charter of Rights and freedoms and Charter of the French 
language in order to limit education rights of non-francophones.243 
Elsewhere, the dialogue seems to prevail, while in Quebec the case-law 
seems to show that adversarial tones are still quite strong. However, we 
registered significant instances of dialogue in Quebec too: even when the Court 
ruled that that Province could not lawfully make French its only official 
language, like it did in Blaikie No. 1, the Quebec Legislature immediately re-
enacted also in English all its French-only laws (as we saw in § 5.1). Less 
politically sensitive cases than Ford, the Quebec Veto controversy or the Reference re 
Secession case, like Solski, Gosselin and Nguyen, provide further evidence that the 
dialogue paradigm is w
ffect of the institutional choice of appointing three out of the nine judges 
of the Supreme Court 'from among the judges of the Court of Appeal or of 
the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec or from among the advocates 
of that Province.'244 
This leads us to one of the possible keys to a categorization of the cases 
we have reviewed: indeed, a first criterion can be the province where the case 
                                                 
242 On top of  the literature already recalled supra, at footnote 43, see also, inter alia, Peter H. 
Russell, 'The Patriation and Quebec Veto References: The Supreme Court Wrestles with the 
Political Part of  the Constitution' [2011] 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 69; Jocelyn Maclure, Québec Identity, 
The Challenge Pluralism (McGill-Queen's University Press 2003); M F Labouz (ed) Intégrations et 
identités nord-americaines vues de Montréal (Bruylant 2001); Nathalie Des Rosiers, 'From Quebec 
Veto to Quebec Secession: The Evolution of  the Supreme Court of  Canada on Quebec-
Canada Disputes' [2000] 13 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 171; José Woehrling, 'La Constitution 
a "nazione"' [2007] 9(1) 
ilable on the website of  the Quebec Community 
'La Corte Suprema del Canada, «custode della 
canadienne et l'évolution des rapports entre le Québec et le Canada anglais de 1867 à nos 
jours' [1992] 10 Rev. fr. droit const. 195; in the Italian scholarship, see for instance Marco 
Olivetti, 'La crisi costituzionale canadese del dicembre 2008' [2009] 11(1) DPCE 261; 
Giuseppe Passaniti, 'Approvata la mozione che qualifica il Québec un
DPCE 70; Larrivée (ed), Linguistic Conflict and Language Laws. Understanding the Quebec Question; 
Nicola Vizioli, 'Il Québec tra Costituzione e prassi', [2002] 32(1-2) Amministrare 251, and in 
particular 259-261. 
243 For a critical comment on this bill, that never became law, see Richard Y. Bourhis and 
Pierre Foucher, 'Bill103: Collective Rights and the declining vitality of  the English-speaking 
communities of  Quebec' (17 Sep 2010), ava
Groups Network, http://www.qcgn.ca/ (last accessed 20 Feb 2012). 
244 Thus provides indeed s. 6 of  the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26: see, in the 
Italian scholarship, Tania Groppi, 'La Corte suprema del Canada come "giudice dei diritti", in 
Rolla (ed), Lo sviluppo dei diritti fondamentali in Canada. Tra universalità e diversità culturale, p. 63, 
72; but also, Tania Groppi and Lorenzo Luatti, 
Costituzione»: alcune considerazioni sulla sua composizione e sulla procedura di controllo di 
costituzionalità' [1997] 28(2) Polit. Dir. 215. 
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arose
to regulate language issues according to the principle of separatism and 
veral cases about education 
                                        
. We will then distinguish cases from Quebec, on the one hand (the 
Quebec Veto case, Blaikie No. 1 and No. 2, Protestant School Boards, MacDonald, 
Forget, Ford, Devine, Solski, Gosselin and Nguyen), and cases from other provinces 
(all the remaining ones). The picture seems to be that 'the case law of the 
Supreme Court [...] on several occasions has showed to favour the use of 
French more by minorities living in anglophone provinces than within 
Quebec.'245 This seems a way by the Court to counter the tendency by Quebec 
territoriality, while (as was pointed out in § 1) the anglophone provinces tend 
to privilege the principle of bilingualism.246 
But our cases could as well be divided along a different line, namely the 
topic involved:247 we will therefore have se
rights248 (Protestant School Boards, Mahe, Reference re Public Schools Act, Arsenault-
         
gue, l'Éducation et les Minorités: Avant et Depuis la Charte 
                                                
245 Palici di Suni, Intorno alle minoranze, 161 (the translation is ours); see also Piergigli, 
'Minoranza anglofona in Québec versus minoranze francofone del Rest of  Canada,' in 
particular 229-31 and 241-5, where the author speaks of  "asymmetry" to describe the very 
structure of  Canadian federalism, and the way the relationship between linguistic 
communities has been shaped in that country. 
246 Broadly on these issues, see José Woehrling, 'La Constitution du Canada, la législation 
linguistique du Québec et les droits de la minorité angli-québecoise', in N Levrat 
(ed), Minorités et organisation de l’État (Bruylant 1998), p. 561; Id., 'La Constitution canadienne 
et la protection des minorités ethniques' [1986] 27(1) Les Cahiers de Droit 171; for a theoretical 
analysis, in the Italian scholarship, of  the differences between the separatist and the bilingual 
approaches, see Palici di Suni, Intorno alle minoranze, 23-7. 
247 This approach was followed for instance by Pierre Foucher, 'L'interprétation des droits 
linguistiques constitutionnels par la Cour Suprême du Canada' [1987] 19(2) Ottawa Law Review 
381. 
248 On this issue, see for example Cork Maeve Conrick, 'Language choice and education rights 
in Quebec: Bill 101 passes the Supreme Court test?' [2005] 26(97) Fr. Stud. Bull. 9; François 
Boileau, 'Les communautés francophones et acadiennes et le droit à la gestion des 
institutions éducatives' [1999] 12 Rev. Queb. Droit Int'l 185; Sarah Dougherty and Richard A. 
Goreham, School Governance: the Implementation of  Section 23 of  the Charter (Office of  the 
Commissioner of  Official languages 1999); Angéline Martel, 'Les droits constitutionnels des 
minorités linguistiques en matière d'éducation sont-ils solides?' [1995] 27(1) Ottawa L. Rev. 59; 
Anwar N. Khan, 'Minority Language Education Rights in Canada' [1994] 23 J.L. & Educ. 
399; Denise Réaume and Leslie Green, 'Education and Linguistic Security in the Charter' 
[1989] 34 McGill L. J. 777; back in the years of  patriation and immediately after, see also the 
works by Eric Apps, 'Minority Language Education Rights' [1985] 43 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 
45; by Roger Bilodeau, 'La Lan
Canadienne des Droits et Libertés' [1983] 13 Man. L.J. 371; by Daniel Proulx, 'La précarité 
des droits linguistiques scolaires ou les singulières difficultés de mise en œuvre de l'article 23 
de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés' [1983] 14 Rev. Gen. Droit 335; and by William 
Tetley, 'Language and Education Rights in Quebec and Canada (A Legislative History and 
Personal Political Diary)' [1982] 45 Law & Contemp. Probs. 177; in the Italian scholarship, see, 
inter alia, Marco Gaggero, 'Il diritto all'educazione nelle lingue dei "padri fondatori": verso 
un'uguaglianza realmente sostanziale?' in Rolla (ed) L'apporto della Corte suprema alla 
determinazione dei caratteri dell'ordinamento costituzionale canadese, p. 393; Valeria Piergigli, 'I diritti 
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Cameron, Doucet-Boudreau, Solski, Gosselin, and Nguyen), but also others about 
linguistic rights before courts and in general public bodies, and the language of 
official acts (Blaikie No. 1 and No. 2, Manitoba Language Rights, Bilodeau, 
MacDonald, Société des Acadiens, Mercure, and Beaulac),249 others about the 
language of signs, company names, leaflets and paperwork (Ford and Devine),250 
others on more typically political controversies (the Quebec veto controversy and 
the ca
 courts, the 
se, here not considered at length, of the Reference re secession of Quebec), and 
one too on language as a professional requirement (Forget) (interestingly, no 
cases involved election rights, unlike for example in the U.S., where election 
law litigation has always been a very significant tool to advance minority rights 
protection251). 
Anyway, overall the Court seems to apply a similar approach to all the 
different subjects, even though it elaborates principles specific to each one: for 
instance, the "sliding scale" of requirement is typical of the case-law on 
language education rights, while in the cases about rights before
                                                 
linguistici nell’educazione: il contributo della Corte Suprema canadese alla tutela della 
francofonia minoritaria', in S Gambino (ed), La protezione dei diritti fondamentali. Europa e 
Canada a confronto (Giuffrè 2004), p. 141; Ead. 'Sistema educativo pubblico e tutela delle 
minoranze francofone in Canada: spunti per un cauto ottimismo' [2002] 4(2) DPCE 613, 
offering a comment to all the important cases up to that point, and extensively referencing to 
Italian and Canadian literature. 
249 A c
Supreme Court: the New Brunswick Court of  Appeal had ruled that the statutes of  the 
municipalities in that province had to be adopted in both official languages, under s. 18(2) of  
ase concerning bilingualism before courts was also Charlebois v. Saint John (City) [2005] 3 
S.C.R. 563: we did not include it because it was actually more a statutory construction case 
than a language rights case: the 5-4 holding was that 'the City was not obliged to adopt in its 
pleadings the official language chosen by [Mr] C[harlebois] because the word “institution” in 
s. 22, as defined in s. 1 of  the OLA [Official Languages Act], does not include municipalities.' 
Mr Charlebois had instead been successful in a previous application that had not reached the 
the Canadian Charter: for a comment on this latter case, see Serge Rousselle, 'L'Arrêt 
Charlebois: Une Décision Sans Faille En Matière De Droits Linguistiques' [2002] 51 
U.N.B.L.J. 15. Specifically on language rights in federal courts, and on the statutory 
framework resulting from the Supreme Court's case-law, see Marie-Ève Hudon, 'Bilingualism 
in the Federal Courts' (Library of  Parliament, Ottawa 2011), Publication No. 2011-40-F, 
available at http://parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2011-40-e.pdf  (last 
accessed 11 Feb 2012); several years earlier, see John D. Richard, 'Le bilinguisme judiciaire au 
Canada' [2001] 42 C. de D. 389; Renée Soublière, 'Les perpétuels tiraillements des tribunaux 
dans l'interprétation des droits linguistiques' [2001] 4 Rev. C.L. Fr. 1, 45-104. 
250 See on this topic Claude J. Galipeau, 'National Minorities, Rights and Signs: The Supreme 
Court and Language Legislation in Quebec' in A G Gagnon and A B Tanguay (eds), 
Democracy with Justice: Essays in Honour of  Khayyam Zev Paltiel (Carleton University Press 1992), 
p. 66. 
251 The most recent example of  the high sensitivity of  the issue is the U.S. Supreme Court's 
judgment of  20 January 2012 in Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. ___ (2012), where the Court rejected 
elections maps that in this case were deemed to bring an unfair advantage to the Democratic 
Party. 
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structure of the constitutional questions usually does not lend itself to a 
"sliding scale" approach, rather requiring more clear-cut, black-or-white 
answers. Except for Ford and Nguyen, the proportionality analysis seems to 
have lesser relevance in the case-law on linguistic rights, compared to what can 
be observed in many other areas of the Supreme Court's case-law. 
A still different criterion would try to measure how effective the dialogue 
has actually been in the area considered: from this point of view, attention 
shall be paid to whether the laws and administrative measures reviewed 
complied by the Court were deemed to comply with the constitutional 
obligations, or in fact they fell short of them. The most striking example of the 
latter
 it necessary to re-
asses
besides the already mentioned Bilodeau and MacDonald) was from Ontario, just 
g in Mercure) and Binnie (dissenting in Doucet-
 cases is Ford, while the opposite end of the spectrum would arguably be 
Gosselin. 
Also, we did not include much information on that, but a way to deepen 
the analysis would be to look at the level of agreement among justices, and a 
further step would be to investigate whether the dissenting justices tend to be 
the same, and maybe if the justices from Quebec tend to cast similar votes. In 
this vein, the ruling that formally saw the most divided court was Doucet-
Boudreau, the only 5-4 decision, but as we saw in § 5.16, the disagreement did 
not concern the most relevant issue for our purposes. The most controversial 
cases can therefore be considered Forget, which was decided with a 6-3 
majority, and Mercure (a 7-2 judgment), while in Bilodeau and MacDonald there 
was only one dissenter, namely Justice Wilson; Beaulac is a self-standing ruling 
in this categorization, because two of the nine justices (the Chief Justice Lamer 
and Justice Binnie) agreed only on the outcome, but found
s Société des Acadiens: however, they agreed with the majority on the 
interpretation of s. 530 of the Criminal Code, and therefore concurred in the 
judgment.252 
As for the geographic origin of the dissenting judges, they come almost 
exclusively from Ontario and Quebec: Justice Wilson (a dissenter in Forget, 
like Justices Estey (dissentin
Boudreau and only concurring in judgment in Beaulac, as mentioned); instead the 
dissenting judges from Quebec were Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in Forget and 
Justices Le Bel and Deschamps in Doucet-Boudreau (to which it has to be added 
the concurring opinion by C.J. Lamer in Beaulac). The other dissenting votes 
were cast by Justice McIntyre from British Columbia in Mercure, by Justice 
Dickson from Manitoba in Forget, and by Justice Major from Alberta in Doucet-
Boudreau. The remaining cases were decided unanimously.253 The overall 
                                                 
252 As recalled supra, at footnote 186. 
253 Also the reference Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution 
(the second case in the Quebec veto controversy) was a unanimous decision, while the 
reference Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution (the first stage of  the controversy) had 
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picture does not seem to convey any evidence of a particularly marked 
tendency of judges from any province to have a pattern of voting consistently 
different from that of the judges from the other provinces. 
A further criterion is finally the one we have followed in our analysis, 
which is also the most common,254 namely the chronological one. What is 
usually derived is the finding of a first phase - until Manitoba Language Rights - 
when
rights, whether education rights are rights of the parents or of the children); 
an essential feature of the protection of an 
d as necessarily the fruit of some form of political 
 the Court adopted quite a liberal interpretation of linguistic rights, 
proving to be quite open to their enhancement; a second phase, when the 
Court was much more restrictive, as was clear especially in the three 1986 
cases (Bilodeau, MacDonald and Société des Acadiens); a third phase, already 
anticipated by judgments like Ford and Mahe, but definitely inaugurated by 
Beaulac, the case overturning Société des Acadiens, where the Court has returned 
to a purposive and wide-open interpretation of linguistic rights, an approach 
so far confirmed, up to the latest case on linguistic rights, Nguyen. 
To conclude, we will not go back to each of the topics analysed over the 
course of § 5: in particular, the questions regarding the nature of language 
rights (whether they are individual or collective, civil or social rights, whether 
their exercise can be exclusive or is necessarily joint, whether it makes sense to 
include the public authorities among the holders of these rights,255 whether 
language rights before courts are actual linguistic rights or simply due process 
the issue of language rights as 
identity and a culture,256 an
compromise;  the problem of what actually makes a minority; the topic of 
the relationship between the minority protection policies and the institutional 
structure of a state;258 the contrast between francophones protection by the 
                                                
257
 
seen several dissenting votes by different justices on the different issues at bar. 
254 See for instance the already mentioned article by Soublière, 'Les perpétuels tiraillements 
des tribunaux dans l'interprétation des droits linguistiques'; more recently, see Warren J. 
Newman, 'La progression vers l'égalité des droits linguistiques par voie législative et 
judiciaire' [2004] Rev. C.L. Français 19, 22-47 (also considering some important cases not 
from the Supreme Court of  Canada); back at the end of  the 1980s, see also Alan Riddell, 'À la 
recherche du temps perdu: la Cour suprême et l'interprétation des droits linguistiques 
constitutionnels dans les années 80' [1988] 29 C. de D. 829. In the Italian scholarship, see for 
instance Valeria Piergigli, 'I diritti linguistici nella giurisprudenza della Corte Suprema: 
oscillazioni interpretative e linee di tendenza' in Rolla (ed), L'apporto della Corte suprema alla 
determinazione dei caratteri dell'ordinamento costituzionale canadese, p. 149. 
255 As does MacDonald, see supra, § 5.5. 
256 See especially Mahe and Ford. 
257 As stated in Société des Acadiens (§§ 63-4), and reaffirmed by several cases after it. 
258 On which see, for instance, various contributions in the already mentioned work by Levrat 
(ed), Minorités et organisation de l'état, and the reflection on what would have changed for 
minority rights in a supposedly independent Quebec, by José Woehrling, 'The Protection of  
Rights and Freedoms, in Particular Minority Rights, in a Sovereign Québec' [1997] Cahiers du 
Péq 3 (but see also what was observed by Beverley McLachlin, 'Democracy and Rights: A 
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Supreme Court outside and inside Quebec; the sometimes uneasy situation of 
anglophones in Quebec; the fact that French language in Canada falls in the 
category of weak national languages, in other words official languages needing 
to be protected, a situation by no means unknown in Europe;259 or the 
openness of the Supreme Court of Canada to the reliance and discussion on 
foreign legal materials. We have tried to cover each of these topics in due 
cours
y require expenditures from individuals 
e, when considering the cases, and most of all there is already a huge 
amount of literature on them. 
Instead, we would like to make a few final remarks on one particular 
aspect that was touched upon in our analysis (it emerged in particular in 
Arsenault-Cameron and Doucet-Boudreau), and that has earned less attention in the 
scholarship so far, namely the fact that several of these rights, and therefore 
several of these judgments, bear a cost for the public budget. This is not true 
for all of them: commercial speech cases like Ford are different, in that the 
language provisions they rely on, directl
                                                 
Canadian Perspective,' Canadian Speeches, Issues of  the Day, 14:36-45, January/February 2001: 
'Collective rights are the cornerstone on which Canada was built. Without the guarantees 
made to groups and minorities, it is unlikely that the peoples of  Upper and Lower Canada, 
so different from one another, would have joined to form a country'). In the Italian 
scholarship, see inter alia the works by Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, Diritto costituzionale 
comparato dei gruppi e delle minoranze (Cedam 2008); by Carlo Casonato, Minoranze etniche e 
rappresentanza politica: i modelli statunitense e cnaadese (Università degli Studi di Trento 1998), 
specifically on Canada although focussing on ethnic minorities; but also, with specific 
reference to linguistic minorities, by Valeria Piergigli, 'Decentramento territoriale e 
minoranze linguistiche: un'analisi comparata' [2003] 1(5) Federalismi.it, available at 
ess for the competition coming from the 
nd 
 there is a difference in the fact that Quebec is 
http://www.federalismi.it/document/08072003234526.pdf  (last accessed 20 Feb 2012). A 
crucial aspect from this point of  view is also the set of  remedies available to the minority 
individuals or groups to vindicate their rights. In particular, the way judicial review of  
legislation is organised in Canada has had an influence over how the case-law has developed, 
by even providing the occasion for bringing lawsuits that in other countries it would have 
been more difficult to push as part of  a precise "court strategy" to promote linguistic rights: 
see the example of  the Bilodeau case, analysed by the law professor who brought it in his 
already mentioned 1986 article on the 'Judiciarisation des Conflits Linguistiques au Canada.' 
259 In this sense, the need to protect French in Quebec can from a certain point of  view be 
contrasted to the need to protect national languages in countries where the national language 
is weak, and its survival is threatened by a much stronger non-national language (typically, it 
is the case of  Maltese and Irish, both under str
English language; Luxembourgish, suffering from the competition with the much stronger 
French and German languages; or else Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian, with reference to 
Russian) (this problem is studied in detail, in the Italian scholarship, by Elisabetta Palici di 
Suni, 'Il principio di eguaglianza' in Ead, Diritto costituzionale dei Paesi dell'Unione Europea [2
edn, Giappichelli 2011], p. 279, 302-8). Clearly,
only a province of  a broader country, and that English too is in fact a national language in 
Canada, but still the problems raised and the solutions adopted present several similar 
patterns with the countries just mentioned. 
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and b
policy questions: is this money effectively spent? Does it 
meet 
 from its citizens, it'd better put them in the position to comply with 
such 
elf in the language of 
his/h
                                                
usinesses, and it is therefore easy to see such expenditures and arguably 
to be very sceptic on their advisability. 
But when the cost is borne - through taxes - by the public budget, it 
tends to go unseen, and yet it is far from negligible (as documented recently, as 
far as provinces are concerned, by a very deep study by the Fraser Institute260). 
This raises some 
the desired objectives? Could the same goals be achieved more 
efficiently? These are important questions, but they would require a self-
standing analysis, which is by far outside our goals and competences. In fact, 
there is another, conceptually preliminary question, that we would like to 
briefly address here, by relying on the extremely stimulating studies of the 
American linguist Daniel W. Hieber:261 are these expenses unavoidable? 
The answer seems to be two-fold: given the current organization of modern-type 
post-westphalian democracies, it seems quite fair to provide some public funds to 
avoid impairing the rights of people who do not speak the official language of 
the state. Indeed, when the state is exercising its powers, by requiring a certain 
behaviour
obligations. 
In other words, when it establishes a system of mandatory education, it 
seems quite reasonable for it to afford its citizens the right to request that such 
system be in the language of their choice (as indeed acknowledged in Protestant 
School Boards, Mahe, Reference re Public Schools Act, Arsenault-Cameron, Doucet-
Boudreau, and Solski); when it is exercising its criminal jurisdiction, or anyway 
affirming its punitive powers also in administrative violations, the least is to 
require that it allow the accused to fully understand the law on which his/her 
charge is based (Bilodeau) and the exact terms of the charge (contrary to what 
stated in Bilodeau and MacDonald), to express him- or hers
er choice (Mercure), and to have a judge who fully understands him/her 
(Beaulac). 
However, if we adopt a different paradigm, in particular a praxeological 
one,262 in looking at language issues like the ones we have considered, things 
 
260 François Vaillancourt, Olivier Coche, Marc Antoine Cadieux, and Jamie Lee Ronson, 
osts and Benefits in 2006' (Fraser 
st chapter of  this work. 
'Official Language Policies of  the Canadian Provinces C
Institute 2012), available at http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-
ca/Content/research-news/research/publications/official-language-policies-of-canadian-
provinces.pdf  (last accessed on 22 Feb 2012). 
261 See in particular two articles of  his, published on the Mises Institute's website: 'Language 
and the Socialist-Calculation Problem' (7 Sep 2010), available at http://mises.org/daily/4687; 
and 'Why Do Languages Die?' (4 Jan 2012), available at http://mises.org/daily/5846/Why-
Do-Languages-Die (both last accessed on 22 Feb 2012). 
262 It is the perspective adopted firstly by Ludwig von Mises in Nation, State, and Economy 
(Ludwig von Mises Institute 1983 [1919]): as Daniel Hieber explains, see in particular, on 
language issues, the fir
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appear in a different light. We find indeed that the risk of death for a language 
comes in part from the voluntary choices of its individual speakers. When this 
is the case, we should arguably not worry too much, or anyway we could and 
should not do anything against it: after all, languages were not invented or 
planned by anyone, instead they developed spontaneously,263 and in the same 
way their users should be left free to use them until they wish, without being 
forced to abandon them by laws that require the use of a different one, or 
symmetrically to keep using them if they do not wish so. 
 to which there can be no 
perm
                                                
In fact, a closer look shows that the greatest threat to the survival of 
many languages, and of the cultures with which they are associated, arguably 
comes from wrong state policies: indeed '[g]overnments necessarily adopt 
nonoptimal language policies. They are incentivized to violate the rights of 
minority language speakers and support fewer languages rather than more;'264 
after all, '[e]ach nation must at some point address the question, "What is the 
optimal number of languages for the state?" The answer that states tend to 
give is simply "one,"'265 and this is due to the fact that ''[m]inorities' are 
political outsiders who challenge the prevailing principle of legitimacy. [...] For 
at its core, the 'problem of minorities' is what Isaiah Berlin has termed a 
'collision of values' between diversity and community
anent resolution.'266 
In order to fulfil minorities' claims, several states, like indeed Canada, 
have started to adopt two (or more) official languages, something that 
apparently is also beneficial to their citizens' brains:267 but '[h]ow does the state 
determine the optimal number of languages to support? The answer, of 
course, is that it cannot,'268 and thus it downplays other languages, like those 
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada, some of which have in fact official status 
 
Hayek's 
 (1973). 
he Socialist-Calculation Problem', p. 2 of  the pdf  version. 
just think of  the situation in the French 
 being 
e new 
anguage and the Socialist-Calculation Problem', p. 3 of  the pdf  version. 
263 The notion of  "spontaneous orders" was famously a key of  Friedrich von 
reflection in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1982), especially in volume I, Rules and Order
Specifically on language, he wrote: '[a]lthough there was a time when men believed that even 
language and morals had been 'invented' by some genius of  the past, everybody recognizes 
now that they are the outcome of  a process of  evolution whose results nobody foresaw or 
designed' (p. 37 of  the 1983 edition of  Rules and Order by The University of  Chicago Press-
Routledge & Kegan). 
264 Hieber, 'Language and the Socialist-Calculation Problem', p. 1 of  the pdf  version. 
265 Hieber, 'Language and t
266 Jennifer Jackson Preece, Minority Rights: Between Diversity and Community (Cambridge 
University Press 2005), passim from the preface. Let us 
region of  Alsace, that between the 1870s and World War II moved several times from
under French sovereignty to German sovereignty and vice versa: each time th
government imposed its own language, with the result that today in some families the 
grandchildren cannot communicate with their grandparents, because they were educated in 
different languages. 
267 As explains, citing to some scientific studies, Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, 'Why Bilinguals Are 
Smarter' in New York Times, 18 marzo 2012, p. SR12. 
268 Hieber, 'L
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in some territories, but that again are protected through government 
intervention, that leaves out even less fortunate dialects, in the medium-to-
long run presumably sentencing them to death or anyway confining them in an 
extremely marginal place. It is not by coincidence, then, that language laws are 
'often
ped his way of thinking. 
His m
ption that the nation-state is the 'society' 
                                                
 counterproductive to [their] [...] very ends.'269 
Which brings us to the institutional dimension:270 '[s]tates do not cope 
well with diversity or decentralization.'271 Arguably, in much smaller political 
communities than modern nation-states, and in particular in voluntary 
communities, languages would be able to thrive, or least to survive, much 
better than what happens within the context of our modern-times 
democracies. Presumably, some lingua franca would develop or spread, as it 
always has, for communications between different communities, but this could 
happen without displacing the several local languages: the lingua franca for 
business or anyway cross-border relationships would simply add to the the 
existing languages, but it would not wipe them out, like official languages do 
with non-official ones in post-westphalian nation-states.272 
A fascinating metaphor to describe such ideal condition of minority 
groups is the one that we owe to the Australian scholar Chandran Kukathas, 
Chair in Political Theory at the London School of Economics: a Jaffna Tamil 
born in Malaysia, Kukathas has experienced belonging to minorities 
throughout his whole life, and - as he himself acknowledges - this has 
significantly influenced his research interests and sha
etaphor is the one that characterizes society 'as an archipelago of 
different communities operating in a sea of mutual toleration. Unlike its more 
famous twentieth-century namesake, the gulag archipelago, the liberal 
archipelago is a society of societies which is neither the creation nor the object 
of control of any single authority, though it is a form of order in which 
authorities function under laws which are themselves beyond the reach of any 
singular power. Implicit in this is a rejection of nationalism, and of the idea 
that we should start with the assum
 
269 Hieber, 'Language and the Socialist-Calculation Problem', p. 4 of  the pdf  version. 
270 Per se not directly connected to minority issues, according to Pier Carlo Begotti, 'Incontri e 
trong small political communities that 
ich August Freiherr von der Heydte zur Vollendung des 70. Lebensjahres 
conflitti di lingue e culture' in C Lottieri (ed), Dalle vicinie al federalismo. Autogoverno e 
responsabilità (Associazione Culturale Carlo Cattaneo 2010) p. 127, 150-1, but anyway 
important. For a thorough account of  such links in the Canadian case, see L Cardinal (ed), Le 
fédéralisme asymétrique et les minorités linguistiques et nationales (Éditions Prise de Parole 2008). 
271 Ibidem. 
272 After all, it is arguably not by coincidence that Switzerland, that is to say the best example 
in the world of  decentralized political order, and s
come together in the confederation but preserve an extremely high autonomy, was described 
as a "paradise for languages" (Sprachenparadies) (by Karl H. Neumayer, 'Über den Schutz 
bedrängter Sprachminderheiten' in H Kipp, F Meyer, and A Steinkamm (eds), Um Recht und 
Freiheit. Festschrift für Friedr
(Duncker & Humblot 1977), volume I, p. 395, 421). 
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which
h their cultures and languages: '[t]he very 
existe
e nobility or 
princ
ng conditions of its democracy in the national similarity 
of its citizens corresponds to the so-called nationality principle, according to 
 is properly the object of concern when we ask what is a free society. 
The liberalism presented, and defended here is not the liberal nationalism that 
is standard in contemporary political theory. It is a liberalism built on different 
foundations, and issuing in different conclusions.'273 
From this point of view, minority policies to which we are used to, 
including the ones we have reviewed in this article, are often an expensive 
though unsatisfactory way by governments to cope with problems they 
themselves have created, in order to satisfy their need for homogeneity and 
uniformity: 'the state is not highly incentivized to recognize minority 
languages. Running a multilingual government is a logistical nightmare (just 
ask India), and multilingualism is a direct affront to the ideas of national 
identity and standard education.'274 
This has not always been the world's scenario, but is directly connected 
to the rise of modern nation-states and nationalisms, whose ideologies could 
not but trump minorities wit
nce of a modern nation-state, and the ideology it encompasses, is 
antithetical to linguistic diversity. It is predicated on the idea of one state, one 
nation, one people. In Nation, State, and Economy, Mises points out that, prior to 
the rise of nationalism in the 17th and 18th centuries, the concept of 
a nation did not refer to a political unit like state or country as we think of it 
today. A "nation" instead referred to a collection of individuals who share a 
common history, religion, cultural customs and — most importantly — 
language. Mises even went so far as to claim that "the essence of nationality 
lies in language." The "state" was a thing apart, referring to th
ely state, not a community of people [...] In that era, a state might consist 
of many nations, and a nation might subsume many states. The rise of 
nationalism changed all this.'275 
Nationalism, i.e. the fervent glorification of a nation and of its supposed 
collective virtues, sees linguistic diversity as a threat to the unity of the state. 
One of the most famous examples of such view is represented by Carl 
Schmitt's works. In his Constitutional Theory, he wrote that '[a] democratic state 
that finds the underlyi
                                                 
273 Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of  Diversity and Freedom (Oxford 
University Press 2003), pp. 8-9. The author goes on by contrasting his views with the ones of  
Will Kymlicka, a Canadian philosopher that Kukathas ends up describing as 'essentially, a 
liberal nationalist' (p. 15). 
274 Hieber, 'Language and the Socialist-Calculation Problem', p. 4 of  the pdf  version. 
275 Hieber, 'Why Do Languages Die?', pp. 3-4 of  the pdf  version. The reference from Mises's 
Nation, State, and Economy is from p. 37 of  the already cited edition. The heavy "russification" 
policies pursued in the Soviet Union when nationalist drives prevailed in that country are a 
paradigmatic example of  how severely nationalism threatens the survival of  minorities: see 
broadly in Lenore A. Grenoble, Language Policy in the Soviet Union (Kluwer 2003). 
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which
unity: in this case, nation-states tend to prefer conceding to 
bilingualism, rather than having to afford independence to a minority nation 
unde
is enquiry into the "liberal 
archip
aiming 
at lin
 a nation forms a state, and a state incorporates a nation. A nationally 
homogeneous state appears then as something normal. A state lacking this 
homogeneity has an abnormal quality that is a threat to peace.'276 
However, nationalism sometimes has to come to terms with a strong 
resistance to 
r their power, which is reluctant to adhere to the (majority's) nationalist 
story (this will eventually translate into the nation-state enacting the usual set 
of measures meant to safeguard the minority language, which was made 
official, but which is not strong enough to compete on a par with the 
predominant one277). 
This claim is reinforced by the words of Professor Kukathas (whose case 
against nationalism we already mentioned), who makes a very compelling 
point when dealing with language rights in h
elago" and its "enemies," shall we say by paraphrasing Popper's 
masterpiece: 
 
Even if governments take steps to ensure that minorities can preserve 
their languages, there are limits to the benefits this can bring. Small groups are 
simply going to be disadvantaged to the extent that their numbers cannot 
support the variety of activities in which people engage without going beyond 
the linguistic group. There may not be enough people to supply the writers, 
newspaper editors, television journalists, radio show hosts, and teachers in the 
vernacular to sustain the language. In the modern world the division of labour 
is not equally hospitable to all forms of diversity. 
To the extent that language policy does succeed in allowing some groups 
to see their languages in use, however, it will not do so equally. Larger 
linguistic groups will have the advantage over smaller ones; and policies 
guistic equality may benefit large minorities at the expense of small ones. 
For example, in a society in which three languages are spoken, one (say 
English) may be dominant or nearly universally spoken, another (say French) 
may be spoken by a significant minority primarily in a particular region, and a 
third may be spoken by a small minority. Linguistic 'equality' may in fact 
impose the heaviest burden on the smallest minority. The English speakers 
may be able to get away with learning only one language, as may the French; 
but the smallest minority, especially if it is located within the French region, 
                                                 
276 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press 2008 [1928]), p. 262. For an 
example of  this attitude referred to the Italian case, see Begotti, 'Incontri e conflitti di lingue e 
culture' in Lottieri (ed), Dalle vicinie al federalismo. Autogoverno e responsabilità, p. 150. 
w, French in Canada would be in a very similar position towards 
 'La 
 du Canada, la législation linguistique du Québec et les droits de la minorité 
277 From this point of  vie
English as Flemish towards French in Belgium, as pointed out by Woehrling,
Constitution
angli-québecoise,' p. 580. 
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may h
will tell), but in fact they end up creating on their turn 
other "second-level" problems, first of all for those that we could term 
ave to learn two or three languages if it is to survive. It may be better off 
if there were only one other dominant language to learn since that would leave 
the members with more resources to devote to preserving their own.278 
Even though Canada is not mentioned explicitly in this passage, it really 
does sound like a very insightful description of the Canadian case. The author 
goes on to explain very clearly that his 'argument here [...] is not an argument 
against policies accommodating linguistic diversity; it is only an argument to 
suggest that they may not serve equality.'279 Nonetheless, Kukathas here 
captures extremely well the point we have been trying to make in this final 
paragraph, i.e. that most of the linguistic policies adopted, with striking 
similarities, all over the world, appear to be, at a closer look, an attempt by 
nation-states to remedy the consequences of its nationalist ideology, grounded 
as it is on a unitary apparatus of symbols and legitimation.280 
Such policies may be useful for this purpose, and indeed in Canada they 
may be effective in pursuing the federal government's goal of counteracting 
Quebec's inclination to independence and secession (how effective and for 
how long, only time 
"second-class" minorities, a category that in Canada includes the whole, 
diverse group of the aboriginal peoples.281 The real extent of such problems 
                                                 
278 Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of  Diversity and Freedom, pp. 233-4. 
279 Ibidem. 
280 Broadly on the meaning and function of  such apparatus, see in the Italian scholarship 
Carlo Lottieri, Credere nello Stato? Teologia politica e dissimulazione da Filippo il Bello a WikiLeaks 
(Rubbettino 2011) 
281 A typical example of  this situation is that of  what the Italian scholar Elisabetta Palici di 
Suni has described as "restricted minorities" (minoranze ristrette) (in her work Intorno alle 
minoranze, pp. 40-1), i.e. minority groups who are located in an area where there are other 
major minority groups, like typically the germanophone community in Belgium or, in Italy, 
the Walser in Valle d'Aosta or the Ladin in Trentino-Alto Adige. As for Canada, Poggeschi, I 
diritti linguistici. Un'analisi comparata, p. 82 evaluates instead quite positively Quebec's overall 
experience: 'Quebec seems to be one of  the few places in the world where there is a good 
combination between linguistic rights of  first, second and (partially) third species, the latter 
being present in the whole country so that Canada can be considered a fortunate 
constitutional model whose multiculturalism is not just a slogan, but a policy enforced by all 
levels of  government' (our translation); Poggeschi (p. 83) anyway acknowledges that 
'Canadian federalism, based (also) on the bi-national principle, more than towards a 
bilingualism spread across the whole Federation idealized by Trudeau, has moved towards a 
partial bilingualism regime (in federal institutions and in some provincial spheres), inclined to 
territorial monolingualism, particularly in anglophone provinces and only partially in Quebec, 
where there exists a French monolingualism tempered by the anglophone minorities' rights' 
(our translation). For some interesting data, see the Statistics section in the website of  the Office 
of  the Commissioner of  Official Languages, at http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/stats_e.php: for 
instance, according to the most recent figures available, only 17% of  Canadians possess 
knowledge of  both official languages. 
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tends
, in the context of modern 
nation-states, it is not able to remove the threat that nation-states, with their 
regul rity 
langu ven 
incre
 the 
Chart alled 
Chart here 
the g  the 
break ater 
indep
         
 to go unseen, and anyway they tend to be left without satisfactory 
remedies (the whole discourse on multiculturalism emphasizes the need to 
take them duly into account, but generally without questioning the nation-state 
paradigm, which is in our view the key aspect to rethink). From this point of 
view, multilingualism is a happy exception to the predominance of single 
nationalist ideologies, but when it is framed, as it is
ar recourse to the majority principle, pose to the survival of mino
ages and cultures.282 In fact, like Kukathas points out, it may e
ase such threat. 
Indeed, this seems to have been Canada's story too, a story where
er was conceived as instrumental to national unification and the so c
er patriotism was the underpinning ideology of this process, and w
ranting of language rights was first of all a compromise283 to avoid
-up of the country, a concession meant to soothe requests for gre
endence. In the words of two other scholars: 
 
Unifiers see the Charter, and the judicial power it fosters, as 
helping to solve Canada's national unity crisis. Former Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau, the "father" of the Charter, most 
prominently represents this wing of the Court Party. From the 
beginning, Trudeau saw the Charter as much more than a rights-
                                        
h threat was already identified very clearly by Georg Jellinek, in his already mentioned 
Das Recht der Minoritäten, pp. 43 and following. Jellinek's idea was to fight i
ting pluralism, and the rise of  a multilevel linguistic identity, a suggestion in m
282 Suc
work t by 
promo any 
ways similar to the Proposals from the Group of  Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue set up at the 
initiative of  the European Commission, published in Brussels in 2008, with the title A rewarding 
challenge: How the multiplicity of  languages could strengthen Europe, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies /lang/doc/maalouf/report_en.pdf  (last accessed 19 
Mar 2012). Independent of  the concrete solutions proposed and of  the ways to achieve 
them, the call for pluralism and for a multi-level linguistic identity still seems to be very 
fruitful today: as we ourselves have pointed out earlier in the text, languages should arguably 
be looked at not as mutually exclusive, but as possibly co-existing on different levels, for 
different purposes, and for different types of  communication. For some reflections in the 
Italian literature along these lines, building on Jellinek's reflection, see Elisabetta Palici di Suni, 
'La lingua tra globalizzazione, identità nazionale e identità minoritarie' in M Papa, G M 
Piccinelli and D Scolart (eds), Il Libro e la bilancia. Studi in memoria di Francesco Castro, (Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane 2011), volume II, p. 451 (also, in a slightly shorter version, in [2008] 
1(2/3) Percorsi Costituzionali 101); see also, by the same author, the article 'Unitarietà della 
Repubblica e gruppi identitari: il caso delle minoranze linguistiche', in S Labriola (ed), Valori e 
principi del regime repubblicano (Laterza 2006), volume II, p. 635, where Palici di Suni considers 
how to reconcile the principle of  protection of  linguistic minorities with the one of  unity of  
the Republic (the focus is on the Italian constitution, but extensive references are made to 
comparative experiences, including Canada). 
283 See the famous passage from Société des Acadiens we have quoted supra, at § 5.6. 
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protecting document. Indeed, he saw it mainly as a counterweight 
to the forces of decentralizing regionalism and provincialism. The 
harter, he hoped, would lead Canadians to define themselves 
n worse for other, much smaller 
mino
en more. As far as the scope 
                                                
C
more in terms of rights they held in common and less in terms of 
geographical communities that divided them. As early as 1967, 
Trudeau described his Charter project as "essentially testing, and 
hopefully establishing, the unity of Canada." Fifteen years later, in 
debating the Charter in parliament, Trudeau described it as 
defining "the common thread that binds us together," overcoming 
"the forces of self-interest [that threaten to] tear us apart." Peter 
Russell has described this position as "Charter patriotism." 
For Trudeau and the unifiers, the centerpiece of the Charter is 
language rights. Entrenching language rights in the constitution 
culminated Trudeau's long-standing strategy to use bilingualism to 
undercut the appeal of Quebec nationalism and preserve Canadian 
unity.284 
 
From this perspective, Canadian nationalism would have been a means 
to counter Quebec nationalism. The latter is indeed a source of concern, at the 
least for the serious threats it poses on its turn for the anglophones' (and other 
minorities') rights, to which the Supreme Court may not always be in the 
position to react like it did for example in Ford (to be sure, the situation of 
Quebec anglophones would probably be worse were Quebec to become 
eventually independent: it would still be a modern-type nation-state, with its 
inevitable inclination to disregard minority rights, and in particular it is very 
hard to imagine that language minority rights would be on the top of its 
agenda. And things would presumably be eve
rities, as is typical of separatist models such as Belgium, Region Trentino-
Alto Adige in Italy and to a certain extent Spain, while legal systems more 
inclined to the bilingual model, such as India, Finland, or Switzerland are if 
anything more sensitive to the needs of smaller minorities). 
Anyway, what the advocates of Canadian nationalism seem to overlook 
is that it should concern us as well, or actually ev
 
284 Frederick L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter revolution & the Court Party 
(Broadview Press 2000), pp. 59-60. The phrase "Charter patriotism" was used by Peter H. 
Russell, 'The Political Purposes of  the Charter: Have they Been Fulfilled? An Agnostic's 
Report Card', in P Bryden, S Davis, and J Russell (eds.), Protecting Rights and Freedoms 
(University of  Toronto Press 1994), p. 33, 42. The title of  this study rightly catches the 
function of  holy text of  a "civil religion" that is vested with the constitutions of  modern 
democracies (for a reflection on these issues in the Italian scholarship, see Lottieri, Credere nello 
Stato? Teologia politica e dissimulazione da Filippo il Bello a WikiLeaks; on the difficult historical 
process of  creation of  the "Canadian nation," see also Groppi, 'La difficile nascita della 
nazione in Canada: l'integrazione (o la disgregazione?) attraverso i diritti'). 
  
88
5/2012 Working Paper CDCT‐ELC 
www.eulegalculture.di.unito.it 
of th
y's result of this instrumental use of language rights is that nation-
states
d in an interesting article in the Financial Times, this is quite 
o]dd, because in the past half-century, much of the Quebecois identity has 
een built on resisting English. Authorities throw the book at people for doing 
things that would be normal elsewhere in Canada. [...] Now, school authorities 
in Quebec City are questioning whether the time is ripe for introducing those 
English classes after all. Their hesitation has left French-speaking parents 
angry.'285 
Whatever the outcome of such debate, this recent story would seem to 
provide fresh evidence that the characterization of "linguistic duality" as 'both 
a blessing and a curse for Canada,' made by Marcel Côté, was very well 
conceived. As problematic as handling this double-edged "gift" may be, the 
words that the same same author added immediately thereafter arguably said it 
all: 'managing this duality is Canada's greatest challenge, [...] and whether or 
not Canadians like it, the language issue will fuel the Canadian constitutional 
debate forever.'286 
                                                
is work is concerned, the main problem is that the Court itself seems to 
have lent itself to feed such Canadian nationalism, under the guise of Charter 
patriotism: the dialogue on fundamental rights, of which we have reviewed 
some of the most significant examples by looking at the case-law in the field 
of language rights, can be seen as instrumental for the Court to the 
encouragement of the civic religion of the Charter, that ultimately had the goal 
of creating a new unitary identity for all Canadians, irrespective of their 
language, and rather based on their passport. 
Toda
 end up sending misaligned incentives to their citizens, who are thus led 
to lay some contradictory claims: indeed they often find themselves to want 
their cultural and linguistic heritage to be protected and passed along to their 
children, but they also fear this might come as a handicap for their children 
towards members of the nation-state's majority. 
We saw clear evidence of this trend in Gosselin; another example was the 
recent decision by state schools in Quebec to start offering intensive English 
courses: as explaine
'[
b
 
285 Christopher Caldwell, 'The French are right to resist Global English', in Financial Times, 17 
Feb 2012. 
286 The quotes are from Marcel Côté, 'Language and Public Policy' in J Richards, F 
Vaillancourt and W G Watson (eds), Survival: Official Language Rights in Canada (C.D. Howe 
Institute 1992), pp. 7-8. This notion of  linguistic diversity as a curse is extremely old, and 
traditionally it is traced back to the biblical episode of  the Tower of  Babel: things are anyway 
more complicated than what the traditional story tells us, as explained by Umberto Eco, The 
Search for the Perfect Language (English edn Wiley-Blackwell 1995), pp. 6-10. Several scholars 
have made use of  this image of  linguistic diversity as a potential curse: for instance, an 
original view, connected to the alleged negative impact of  linguistic diversity on economic 
solidarity, was expressed by Philippe Van Parijs, 'Linguistic diversity as curse and as by-
product' in Arzoz (ed), Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union, p. 17. 
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